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Abstract 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the global response to one of the 
most pressing environmental problems of our time: the loss of the world’s biological wealth. 
The 188 Parties of the CBD have committed themselves to undertake national and interna-
tional measures that aim at achieving the convention’s objectives of conservation and sus-
tainable use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits that arise out of the 
utilisation of genetic resources. The CBD’s third objective, access and benefit sharing (ABS), 
aims at giving incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by adding 
(economic) value to genetic resources used by industry. The pharmaceutical sector of the 
‘technologically rich but biologically poor’ North is one of the most prominent commercial us-
ers of genetic resources which in turn are mostly found in the ‘technologically poor but bio-
logically rich’ South.  
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development world leaders called for negotiating 
an international regime on access and benefit sharing. It has turned out to be difficult for the 
international community to develop a common vision of the desired properties of a future 
ABS regime. Amongst other issues, the necessity of a legally binding instrument is currently 
being argued. This thesis contributes to the discussions through answering the question ‘To 
what extent are pharmaceutical companies voluntarily realising the ABS provisions of the 
CBD and what can be learned from this a) about the possible role of corporate responsibility 
in biodiversity governance and b) for the ongoing negotiations on the nature of an interna-
tional ABS regime?’  
 The behaviour of the world’s 20 biggest research-based pharmaceutical companies, 
measured against the criteria of awareness, concern and action, is analysed in this thesis. 
The approach draws on regime theory and is influenced by the current debate about global 
governance which acknowledges the potential of private actors in implementing sustainable 
development. The data is derived through an analysis of the instruments of corporate social 
responsibility (reporting, codes of conduct, management standards). Additional empirical 
data has been generated through a questionnaire survey among the companies as well as a 
thorough literature review.  
 The results show that pharmaceutical companies are realising ABS on a voluntary 
basis only to a very limited extent. The loss of biological diversity cannot be tackled by a 
mechanism whose implementation is supposed to work on the grounds of voluntary meas-
ures of the private sector. An internationally binding instrument will be necessary to create an 
effective ABS regime. Furthermore, the behaviour of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies 
indicates a shift away from the utilisation of genetic resources in this sector that questions 
the significance of the theoretically appealing ABS mechanism for biodiversity conservation. 
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Definitions 
Biological Diversity 
According to the definition in the CBD, biological diversity means “the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosys-
tems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within spe-
cies, between species and of ecosystems” (CBD Art. 2). The concept encompasses wildlife 
as well as domesticated species. 
 
Genetic Resources 
The CBD defines genetic resources as “genetic material of actual and potential value” and 
genetic material means “any material from plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of heredity” (CBD Art. 2). It is the genetic information that constitutes the fun-
damental aspect of the genetic resource (OECD 2003: 18). 
 
In-Situ/Ex-Situ Conservation 
It is important for this thesis to distinguish between in-situ and ex-situ conservation. “Ex-situ 
conservation" means the conservation of components of biological diversity outside their 
natural habitats whereas “in-situ conservation means the conservation of ecosystems and 
natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their 
natural surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surround-
ings where they have developed their distinctive properties” (CBD Art. 2). 
 
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity  
The CBD specifies sustainable use as “the use of components of biological diversity in a way 
and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby main-
taining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations” 
(CBD Art. 2). 
 
Biodiversity Prospecting (Bioprospecting) 
Bioprospecting is the “exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and bio-
chemical resources” (Reid et al. 1993: 1). 
 
Biopiracy 
In the view of critics, there is no such thing as bioprospecting: ”There is only biopiracy. In the 
absence of international standards and norms, without practical and credible regulatory and 
monitoring mechanisms, the theft of indigenous and local knowledge will only accelerate in 
the years ahead […] ‘bioprospecting’ can always become ‘biopiracy’” (Mooney 2000: 43). 
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User and Provider (Countries) 
The CBD distinguishes between the country of origin which possesses genetic resources in 
in-situ conditions and the country providing genetic resources (collected from in-situ or ex-
situ resources) (CBD Art. 2). A private actor providing genetic resources is called a provider 
throughout this thesis.  
User countries are countries which mainly receive genetic resources from other countries 
(countries of origin or provider countries). Private actors receiving genetic resources for their 
purposes (like pharmaceutical companies) are termed users. 
 
Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
According to Article 15.5 CBD „access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed 
consent of the contracting party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by 
the party.” Originally, PIC has been used in the realm of international transportation of haz-
ardous waste and in the clinical testing of medicines. Hence, access and benefit sharing pro-
vides a new context for PIC. It must be obtained from source providers and include an 
agreement on the ways in which they are going to be compensated. There are several ob-
stacles related to PIC such as language and cultural differences, the identification of the 
group who should be informed and clarification how substantial that information has to be.  
 
International Regime 
A regime can be defined as “an international social institution with agreed-upon principles, 
norms, procedures and programmes that govern the activities and shape the expectations of 
actors in a specific issue area” (Levy/Young/Zürn 1994). 
 
Protocol  
In international law and international relations, a protocol is a treaty or international agree-
ment that supplements a previous treaty or international agreement. A protocol can amend 
the previous treaty, or add additional provisions. One example: the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established a framework for the develop-
ment of binding greenhouse gas emission limits, while the Kyoto Protocol contained the limits 
later agreed upon. 
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Prologue 
Among many other priceless gifts, nature 
endows humanity with a library of biologi-
cally active compounds and micro-
organisms. Its information potential pro-
vides for the development of new medi-
cines that could help cure some of the 
world’s maladies. There is hope that 
“somewhere within a vast, frozen store-
house of tree bark, fungi and marine crea-
tures, a breakthrough cancer drug may be 
hiding” (CBS 2004). Treating severe dis-
eases is one of the foremost goals for hu-
mankind which nature itself could help us 
attain. 
 
But where to find these promising com-
pounds, the ‘green gold of the genes’ of 
the 21st century? Of huge interest for re-
searchers are not only rainforests – as 
extremely biologically rich terrestrial eco-
systems; especially interesting are also 
marine environments (Coral reefs are 
thought of as the rainforests of the oceans 
because of their variety of species) as well 
as terrestrial microbial species – essen-
tially fungi.  
 
The process of bioprospecting – from ob-
taining an initial sample to the final ap-
proved medicine – is long: The samples 
are crushed, resolved, cracked into mole-
cules, and tested. Micro-organisms might 
potentially be genetically modified or a 
natural compound might get fully synthe-
sised on the way to developing a new 
medicine. However, the original lead is 
derived from nature. 
 
Recently BBC news reported that scien-
tists “believe they can make cancer drugs 
from the humble sea squirt” (BBC 2005a). 
Another example is the potential of tropical 
cone snails. Unfortunately, while they 
"may contain the largest and most clini-
cally important pharmacopoeia of any ge-
nus in nature, wild populations are being 
decimated by habitat destruction and 
overexploitation. […] To lose these spe-
cies would be a self-destructive act of un-
paralleled folly" (BBC 2003).   
 
It is not only public research institutes like 
the US National Cancer Institute (NCI), or 
universities, which conduct research in this 
area. Big pharmaceutical players are also 
very interested in natural products as the 
source of new drugs (see CBS 2004). The 
US-based pharmaceutical corporation 
Bristol-Myers Squibb was successful in 
bringing Taxol on the market that was ap-
proved for sale in 1992. This plant-derived 
anticancer medicine “is one of the best-
selling cancer drugs in U.S. history” (CBS 
2004). Another example of success in us-
ing nature is Topotecan, which is an ap-
proved drug derived from a tree and 
manufactured by the British pharmaceuti-
cal corporation GlaxoSmithKline to treat 
lung and ovarian cancer (ibid).  
 
While these success stories illustrate the 
enormous potential of genetic resources 
for future drug development the source of 
these leads are threatened ecosystems. 
Unexplored resources may disappear be-
fore we have had the chance to tap their 
potential. As studies show, “fishing, cli-
mate change and pollution are altering the 
food chains in the oceans, thus reducing 
biodiversity” (BBC 2004). Terrestrial eco-
systems are also being altered so that 
“almost two-thirds of the natural machinery 
that supports life on Earth is being de-
graded” (The Guardian 2005). 
 
With regard to the wider benefits that eco-
systems provide for human beings as well 
as the potential for medicine development, 
the process of destroying natural ecosys-
tems has to be stopped or at least slowed 
down. The question of how to protect the 
indispensable support functions of ecosys-
tems to all life on earth is at the heart of 
the following thesis. The possibility of mak-
ing use of the economic value of genetic 
resources for the pharmaceutical industry 
to help fight biodiversity loss is of particu-
lar interest for this study. The UN Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity includes provi-
sions to share profits arising out of the 
utilisation of genetic resources in a fair and 
equitable way with the providers of those 
resources in order to increase incentives 
for conservation. This thesis is investigat-
ing how pharmaceutical companies be-
have with regard to those provisions. 
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Instinctively, intuitively, perhaps the loudening whisper of a survival instinct within  
many of us is a deepening, more or less articulate sense that our own survival  
as a species depends on the co-existence of others. 
Arthur Campeau1 
 
1 Introduction: Biodiversity – A Global Challenge 
This introduction outlines from an ecological perspective why the loss of biological diversity is 
one of the major global environmental problems of our time (sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.2). Subse-
quently, it turns to the societal dimensions by briefly introducing processes causing biodiver-
sity loss (1.1.3) and by presenting an understanding of the regulatory problem of biodiversity 
loss (1.1.4). The focus of this thesis is on a global regulatory response to biodiversity loss, 
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and more specifically on the mechanism access and 
benefit sharing (ABS) that aims to stimulate the conservation and sustainable use of biodi-
versity. This leads to the research question that this thesis aims to answer in order to make a 
contribution to the further development and realisation of ABS and ultimately to the mitigation 
of the problem of biodiversity loss (1.2). This is put into the current policy context in the fol-
lowing section which refers to the call to negotiate an international ABS regime by the Jo-
hannesburg conference (1.3).  
1.1 Problem Field 
1.1.1 What is Biodiversity? 
The concept biological diversity, or for short biodiversity, lies at the heart of this thesis. The 
term refers to the variety of life on Earth, and it includes the vast array of genetically distinct 
populations within species as well as the communities and ecosystems of which they are 
part. In a biological sense, biodiversity is the natural stock of genetic material within an eco-
system.2 The usual level of analysis is the number of different existing species and the ge-
netic variation within these species, because biodiversity can be understood as the net result 
of the evolutionary processes of speciation and extinction (Swanson 1997: 8). This process 
is not linear, for at some times there is an explosion of new species whereas at other times 
speciation equals the average extinction rate. Furthermore, biodiversity can be viewed as a 
non-renewable global resource or to put it differently as a “one-time endowment from the 
evolutionary process” (ibid.: 9). By definition, renewable resources will, under a suitable 
                                                
1 Campeau was Canada’s first ambassador for the environment and sustainable development. He had 
faith in the capacity and responsibility of the human community to address environmental threats, in-
cluding biodiversity loss. The authors of this thesis would like to share his optimism but are somewhat 
more pessimistic about the current problem solving capacity of the world society. 
2 For a more precise definition see, page iii. 
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management regime, regenerate themselves, whereas non-renewable resources do not 
have this capacity (Turner/Pearce/Bateman 1993: 205). Due to the necessary timeframe to 
develop the currently existing biological diversity on Earth, it is appropriate to classify biodi-
versity as a non-renewable resource as it cannot be replaced on any timescale relevant for 
humanity (Earthwatch 2002: 5).  
 
1.1.2 Biodiversity Loss as an Ecological Problem 
Why is the degradation of biological diversity such a major problem? The simple truth is that 
human survival fundamentally depends on natural ecosystems of which biodiversity is an 
important component.3 Biodiversity is the result of four-and-a-half billion years of evolutionary 
process which has endowed the Earth with a range of diversity. This diversity is important for 
many reasons, from the perspective of humans as well as from the perspective of life itself 
(Swanson 1997: 6). Depleting biodiversity means jeopardizing the natural basis for human 
life on Earth. The publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) report4 at the 
end of March 2005 has drawn broad public attention (see BBC 2005b; The Guardian 2005) 
to this pressing and often neglected environmental problem. The MA report gives the most 
recent and comprehensive account of the state of biological diversity on Earth. Some of the 
most decisive findings are the following: 
- The distribution of species on Earth is becoming more homogenous; 
- Across a range of taxonomic groups, either the population size or range or both 
of the majority of species is currently declining. […] Between 10% and 30% of 
mammal, bird, and amphibian species are currently threatened with extinction 
(medium to high certainty), based on IUCN–World Conservation Union criteria 
for threats of extinction;  
- Over the past few hundred years, humans have increased the species extinction 
rate by as much as 1,000 times background rates typical over the planet’s history 
(medium certainty);  
- Genetic diversity has declined globally, particularly among cultivated species; 
- Both the supply and the resilience of ecosystem services are affected by 
changes in biodiversity (MA synthesis report 2005: 77).5 
There may be differences of opinion about the rate of loss, but there is no doubt that ecosys-
tems, species and genes are being lost or damaged faster than ever before, with unpredict-
                                                
3 For a more detailed account of the linkage between biodiversity and ecosystem services please see 
Appendix 1. 
4 The MA report was conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and responds to government 
requests for information received through four international conventions (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Ramsar Convention on Wet-
lands, and the Convention on Migratory Species). 1,300 scientists from 95 countries took part in the 
assessment which was aimed at identifying the “consequences of ecosystem change for human well-
being and to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sus-
tainable use of ecosystems and their contributions to human well-being” (MA synthesis report 2005: 
5).   
5 For a more detailed account of the findings of the MA concerning ecosystem degradation and biodi-
versity, please see Appendix 2. 
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able consequences for mankind (IUCN 2002: 6). Some people speak of the ‘sixth great 
wave’ of mass extinction (Kirby 2005; WBGU 2000). The above mentioned MA report con-
cludes that over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and ex-
tensively than in any comparable period of time in human history and that this has resulted in 
a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth (MA synthesis report 
2005: 18).  
Those trends put human survival under excessive pressure which is increasing even more 
due to specific features of biodiversity. Two of these characteristics that are especially impor-
tant to bear in mind are outlined in the following:  
1) The problem of the ‘last refugia’ on Earth 
Altering natural ecosystems by human activities does not diminish biological diversity in a 
linear way. There is an exponential correlation as  
“the rate of species loss is geometrically increasing with the actual amount of 
the total base resource appropriated by the human species. As the technology 
for conversions reaches the final refugia, there will be much greater losses of 
species per square hectare converted than occurred with the first, earlier 
conversions” (Swanson 1997: 32). 
In other words, the more an ecosystem is changed already, the more species will be lost by 
converting any additional unit of land. This means in turn that current numbers of species 
loss and ecosystem damage are merely the tip of the iceberg. One effect of concentrating 
the remaining species in unaltered habitats is that according to estimates 50% of the world’s 
species are now contained in the remaining tropical forests. It is believed that 50 to 80 % of 
the world’s biodiversity is to be found in 6 to 12 tropical countries (ibid: 33). They are the so-
called mega-diverse countries which are all developing nations. From an economic point of 
view, one could argue that the costs – in terms of the value of lost services – of each suc-
cessive conversion are not the same. The global stocks of biological services generate a flow 
of services to all societies on Earth. The first losses from global stocks did little to hinder the 
flows of these services, but the final ones will render these flows non-existent (ibid: 58). All 
ecosystems in the USA or Europe are virtually modified by human activity and now the proc-
ess of conversion is accelerating in the developing world. As the last refugia on Earth are 
endangered, the costs of each conversion escalate rapidly.  
 
2) The decrease of resilience 
Another major problem associated with the loss of natural ecosystems and the associated 
biological diversity is the stability of those systems: They lose their capacity for resilience 
which is defined as the “level of disturbance that an ecosystem can undergo without crossing 
a threshold to a different structure or functioning” (MA synthesis report 2005: 25). Within 
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these boundaries, an ecosystem can stabilise itself after an external disturbance or has the 
capacity to adjust to changing environments. As the MA report describes,  
“there is established but incomplete evidence that changes being made in 
ecosystems are increasing the likelihood of nonlinear changes in ecosystems 
(including accelerating, abrupt, and potentially irreversible changes) that have 
important consequences for human well-being. Examples of such changes 
include disease emergence, abrupt alterations in water quality, the creation of 
“dead zones” in coastal waters, the collapse of fisheries, and shifts in regional 
climate” (MA synthesis report 2005: 16-17). 
Normally, changes in ecosystems take place gradually. However, some changes are nonlin-
ear and once a threshold is crossed, the system can ‘jump’ to a very different state. These 
nonlinear changes are sometimes abrupt; they can also be large in magnitude and difficult, 
expensive, or impossible to reverse. To predict these thresholds is extremely difficult if not 
impossible. Alarmingly, the increased likelihood of nonlinear changes stems from the loss of 
biodiversity and growing pressures from multiple direct drivers of ecosystem change. The 
loss of species and genetic diversity decreases the resilience of ecosystems (ibid.: 25; WRI 
2005: 5-6). 
This has implications for biodiversity policy because it shifts the attention partially away from 
mainly preserving the so-called ‘hotspots’6 to the need to re-think biodiversity protection in all 
other areas. One could argue that,  
“if the main costs of biodiversity loss lie in the loss of resilience of the 
ecosystems affected, biodiversity is valuable to each and every country, not 
just those which are blessed with great numbers of species. Indeed, one could 
even argue that the loss of species may impose much higher costs in species-
poor systems than in those which are more species-rich” (Mc Neele 1997: xii).  
Critics of the ‘hotspot’ concept point out that it seems to suggest that biodiversity is only a 
concern where it occurs in a high density. They state that viewing biodiversity in sustainability 
terms means recognising the value of biodiversity to all people and everywhere: “One’s own 
backyard will always be one’s own hotspot” (Earthwatch Institute et al. 2002: 26-27). 
The decline of genetic diversity, the extinction of individual species and entire symbiotic 
communities and the pollution as well as the degeneration of ecosystems thus undermine the 
natural richness of the planet, threaten the future of the human race and therefore constitute 
one of the main global environmental problems. Arguably, biodiversity loss “has wider and 
less reversible implications for human welfare than almost any other environmental phe-
nomenon” (Pearce/Perrings 1995: 24-25). 
 
                                                
6 The term ‘hotspot’ denotes an area of high concentrations of naturally occurring species, high levels 
of threat to species diversity, or both (Earthwatch et al. 2002: 26). 
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1.1.3 Processes Causing the Loss of Biodiversity  
The following section is embedding the ecological problem of biodiversity loss into the social 
one. It turns to the societal dimensions by briefly introducing processes causing the destruc-
tion of biological diversity. 
The extinction of single species itself can be a natural process and is, together with speci-
ation, even necessary to sustain life on Earth in the context of a changing physical environ-
ment (Swanson 1997: 22). Biodiversity is only threatened when the rate of extinction far ex-
ceeds the rate of speciation which happens during the so-called eras of mass extinction and 
can be due to nonlinear large scale changes in the environment. This has happened several 
times during evolution and is, hence, also a normal part of Earth’s history (as the most well 
known example the extinction of the dinosaurs shall be mentioned here).  
The above described changes of the world’s biological diversity are, however, not the conse-
quence of a natural phenomenon but due to diverse human activities. Those forces are  
“bringing about ever more drastic changes in the magnitude and distribution of 
biological diversity on the Earth, on many different space and time scales. Yet 
we remain largely ignorant of the magnitude and distribution of biological 
diversity, as also of the driving forces behind and the precise course of 
impacts of human activities on the stock of biodiversity” (Gadgil 1996: 345). 
The social and economic causes of biodiversity loss are an area of concern for social scien-
tists interested in this issue. What is driving the destruction of biodiversity? The simple an-
swer is that “biodiversity loss is a consequence of the independent decisions of billions of 
individual users of environmental resources” (Perrings et al. 1995: 8). These decisions lead 
to the direct (physical) causes of biodiversity loss, which are reflected in the literature on the 
subject:  
- habitat alteration/conversion and loss  
- overuse/over-harvesting of natural resources 
- species and disease introduction 
- pollution and climate change (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 2000: 63-68; WRI 
2005: vi; MA synthesis report 2005: 52).  
Of these, habitat alteration, or the process of conversion, is clearly predominant and is oper-
ating at the local level. Its consequences, however, are global in scale and they undermine 
the global flow of services provided by natural ecosystems to all societies on Earth. For the 
global dimensions of man-made habitat alteration (predominantly the expansion of agricul-
ture and built-up urban areas) see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Reshaping Planetary Structure and Function 
 
 
As we have described biodiversity in natural science terms so far, it is interesting to view the 
development of humankind analogously. Swanson illustrates the causes of global biodiver-
sity decline in biological terms: he claims that the fundamental force is the human drive for 
the appropriation of resources and for fitness7. One of the basic strategies to do so, is the 
conversion between different asset forms replacing natural assets (natural landscapes) with 
human-selected assets (cultivation of specialised crops). The conversion process in the spe-
cial form chosen (replacement of the ‘diverse’ with a selection of the ‘specialised’) results in a 
reallocation of base resources towards a small selection of species. This reallocation of re-
sources has greatly benefited human societies while simultaneously reducing the resources 
available to the vast majority of species on Earth. The resulting development led to human 
niche expansion (population explosion) and the expansion of their associated, specialised 
species (1.5 billion cattle, one billion sheep, etc). The cost of this process of expansion is that 
most other species see their ranges and their populations decline (apart from some oppor-
tunistic species)8. One could sarcastically conclude that this strategy for global development 
‘guaranteed’ the loss of a large portion of the world’s natural variety (the whole argument is 
closely following Swanson 1997: 11). If developing countries follow the pathway of the indus-
                                                
7 Following Charles Darwin, life is struggle against the harshness of the physical environment and in 
this struggle only the fittest will survive. In this biologist sense, the human race appropriates natural 
resources to survive.  
8 To put this phenomenon in numbers: Humans consume 40% of terrestrial Net Primary Product 
(NPP) (=total biomass generated by the process of photosynthesis on the globe). This human expan-
sion led to the exclusion of most other species from a substantial part of NPP (Swanson 1997: 56). 
Source: UNDP, UNEP, World 
Bank, and WRI 2000-2001 
Converted Areas 
      Cropland 
      Urban 
 
Major Habitat Types 
 Forest 
      Grassland- Shrubland 
      Desert-Other 
      no data  
33% of global land area has been converted to 
agriculture and urban uses
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trialised countries of focussing the use of natural resources on some economically useful 
species, they will ultimately destroy much of the remaining biodiversity on Earth. 
Apart from the conversion of land, logging, fishing and other natural resource-based activities 
also directly drive biodiversity loss (see Appendix 3 for some examples of direct causes of 
biodiversity loss). 
 
After having described some of the direct (physical) causes, it also has to be acknowledged 
that actors who locally contribute to biodiversity loss – subsistence farmer or fishermen, 
commercial producers, government agents – are acting within a particular set of social, cul-
tural, political, economic and environmental constraints (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 
2000). Individual decisions of resource use are influenced by a complex array of socioeco-
nomic factors that arise at local, regional, national and international levels. The following fac-
tors can be classified as indirect (socio-economic) causes for biodiversity loss:  
- demographic change (population pressure and migration); 
- poverty and inequality; 
- public policies and markets; 
- macroeconomic policies and structures; 
- social change and development biases (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 2000: 63-68; 
WRI 2005: vi; MA synthesis report 2005: 52). 
Direct factors destroy biodiversity by physical anthropogenic activities like logging or conver-
sion of land into cultivated areas locally. Some other anthropogenic causes like pollution, 
climate change or species introduction do not necessarily operate on a local level but destroy 
biodiversity on a wider geographical scale. The indirect socio-economic causes have impacts 
on the direct factors in different ways (see box below). Some of those factors are local vari-
ables like poverty or population growth whereas international trade rules or international 
macroeconomic policies are operating on a global scale. 
 
Interactions between Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, Human Well-being, and Drivers of Change 
Changes in drivers that indirectly affect biodiversity, such as population, technology, and lifestyle 
can lead to changes in drivers directly affecting biodiversity, such as the catching of fish or the ap-
plication of fertilizers to increase food production. These result in changes to biodiversity and to 
ecosystem services, thereby affecting human well-being. These interactions can take place on 
more than one scale and can cross scales. For example, international demand for timber may lead 
to a regional loss of forest cover, which increases flood magnitude along a local stretch of a river. 
Similarly, the interactions can take place across different time scales. Actions can be taken either 
to respond to negative changes or to enhance positive changes at almost all points. Local scales 
refer to communities or ecosystems and regional scales refer to nations or biomes, all of which are 
nested within global scale processes. 
(source: WRI 2005: iii) 
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While most of the introduced causes for biodiversity loss do not seem to be new (climate 
change being the exception), the accelerating rate of habitat destruction and species extinc-
tion can be traced back to the complex combination of increasing direct and indirect pres-
sures.  
 
1.1.4 Biodiversity Loss as a Regulatory Problem 
Providing more than the broad introduction into the natural science perspective of the prob-
lem of biodiversity degradation given above would be beyond the scope of this thesis. More-
over, it would be misleading with regard to the focus of the thesis as it is based on the follow-
ing general assumption: Paradoxically, in most cases, we know how to start protecting bio-
logical diversity and the environment in general, even if we may not fully understand the in-
terrelations within many complex ecosystems. We could begin tomorrow. Many of the root 
causes of biodiversity loss are known as described in 1.1.3. Moreover, the beliefs, practices 
and technologies enabling us to use less resources, produce less pollution, catch less fish, 
log less timber, manufacture fewer cars and computers, and have fewer children are all 
available now. As Lipschutz puts it: “We don’t do these things because the problems we face 
are political…Only politics can save the environment. That might sound pretty normative, and 
it is” (Lipschutz 2004: xi).  
Consequently, our thesis is neither primarily looking at the ways in which humans destroy 
biodiversity nor does it aim to generate new natural scientific findings on how to avoid further 
degradation. Instead, possible ways to implement a global regulatory mechanism, which is 
thought to contribute to mitigating biodiversity loss in the long run, are seen as crucial to this 
study. In doing so, this thesis is however not scrutinising politics in the sense of power 
games or the actual processes of bargaining at the international level. Rather, the implemen-
tation of an innovative mechanism that is thought to alter the behaviour of actors and stimu-
late practices that contribute to the conservation of the planet’s biological wealth shall take 
centre stage. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) introduces one such regulatory 
mechanism9 that aims to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity: 
access and benefit sharing (ABS). ABS can broadly be understood as the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits that arise out of the utilisation of genetic resources as laid down in the 
CBD’s third objective in Article 1. Through redistributing a share of these benefits10, ABS is 
                                                
9 Throughout this thesis we understand a mechanism as “as a set of recurrent processes that link 
specified initial conditions and a specific outcome” (Mayntz 2002: 3). When using the abbreviation 
ABS we refer to the mechanism as a whole, including the act of accessing genetic resources and the 
sharing of benefits that arise out of their utilisation. 
10 The types of benefits can vary widely and are not necessarily limited to monetary payments. They 
also can include inter alia knowledge- and technology-transfer, investment in human capital through 
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thought to lead to an appreciation of biodiversity by actors living with the resource on the 
ground and thereby providing incentives for its conservation and sustainable use.11  
In attempting to reconcile the two contradictory goals of conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity, ABS appears to be a rather complex mechanism which is making an indirect 
contribution to the solution of the underlying ecological problem. Although ABS is not yet 
more than a promising regulatory concept and its ultimate effect on the state of biodiversity is 
currently far from being clear12, it is nonetheless crucial to further its realisation, as the under-
lying ecological problem:  
? is extremely urgent because it threatens the future of the Earth as outlined in 1.1.1 
and 1.1.2, 
? is caused by humankind in general through almost every anthropogenic process,  
? is scientifically difficult to assess, 13 
? has a global scale and requires global solutions; 
? is closely connected with development and trade issues; and 
? current policy measures have not yet sufficiently tackled this complexity by conserva-
tion efforts (see 4.1). 
This already makes it very difficult to mitigate the problem of diminishing biodiversity. Let 
alone these features, it is important to call attention to several dichotomies involved when 
attempting to tackle biodiversity loss which make it such an exceptionally challenging task:  
 
Local costs versus global benefits (also local benefits) 
The conservation of natural ecosystems or their ‘restricted’ use can imply costs of not exten-
sively exploiting natural resources or, it e.g. can evoke costs in the form of spending for na-
ture park management which is needed for effective protection14. The global services deliv-
ered by natural ecosystems (such as climate regulation, etc.) do not provide sufficient incen-
tives if costs of protection measures of those ecosystems are borne locally. It has to be men-
                                                                                                                                                     
training etc. Following the World Bank concept of poverty alleviation some of these benefits could 
increase opportunities for the poor, while others contribute to their empowerment (see GDI 2003: 9). 
11 The ABS mechanism as well as the holistic approach of the CBD with regard to sustainable devel-
opment are going to be explained in further detail in chapter 4. 
12 Benefit Sharing cannot yet be seen as a common praxis and there are only a limited number of 
cases to study. Therefore, it is impossible to exactly assess its contribution to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity on a global scale. It should, however, be pointed out that generating 
empirical data on impact of ABS agreements are not subject matter of this thesis.  
13 It has been argued that the science of the biodiversity problem is extremely complex (more difficult 
than atmospheric chemistry) because it is a social problem embedded within the biological world and 
therefore a broad and integrated approach is required in order to deal with it (focus both on natural 
and social sciences is necessary) (Swanson 1997: 3). 
14 For example, Swanson’s research on African elephant populations shows that nature parks need 
considerable resource input and that park management spending is closely connected to effective 
protection (1997: 83-84). 
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tioned in this context, that biodiversity preservation can also have local benefits which could 
act as incentives for conservation (e.g. eco-tourism). 
 
Private benefits versus public costs 
Conversion of forests into farmland produces benefits primarily for private actors who are 
able to produce agricultural products (e.g. so-called cash crops) for international markets 
with the help of intensive cultivation methods, as opposed to traditional extensive land use. 
The negative externalities caused by this practice are borne by society (such as water pollu-
tion, biodiversity loss, salinisation, wider ecosystem changes). The overall net result of con-
version is often negative as the costs for society are higher than the individual benefits but 
conversion is often promoted because of the significant private gains (WRI 2005: 10). From a 
societal point of view, these conversion decisions do not make sense but they still happen. 
Perrings et al. support this point in saying that the problem to be addressed here is that the 
individual decisions are ‘rational’ but they do not represent the best outcome for society as 
the private and social value of species conservation is different (Perrings et al. 1995: 9; also 
see Pearce/Perrings 1995: 32)15.  
 
Short term benefits versus long term costs 
Economic gains from conversion of land are often immediate or occur on a short term basis 
whereas costs associated with the loss of biodiversity tend to become apparent rather slowly 
(WRI 2005: 5) or are difficult to assess scientifically. Additionally, this is not only a problem of 
time scale but also involves a socio-economic dimension: people living in poverty will tend to 
and have a necessity to discount16 the future costs of resource use at a higher rate than oth-
ers, because what matters is their immediate survival (Perrings et al. 1995: 9).  
 
Vulnerability: Poorer people are more affected than those being better off 
Although ecosystem changes might have offered benefits to some people, those advances 
have not been equitably distributed (WRI 2005: 5). The MA report finds that, 
“poor people, particularly those in rural areas in developing countries, are 
more directly dependent on biodiversity and ecosystem services and more vul-
nerable to their degradation […]. Richer groups of people are often less 
affected by the loss of ecosystem services because of their ability to purchase 
substitutes or to offset local losses of ecosystem services by shifting 
production and harvest to other regions. For example, as fish stocks have 
been depleted in the North Atlantic, European and other commercial capture 
                                                
15 This is because individuals can ignore indirect effects of their activities. Those externalities are typi-
cally not part of the private valuation of biological resources, but they should be part of the social 
valuation of the same resource (Perrings et al. 1995: 13). 
16 For a helpful introduction into discounting and the environment, see Turner/Pearce/Bateman 1993: 
102-106. 
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fisheries shifted their fishing to West African seas, but this has adversely 
affected coastal West Africans who rely on fish as a cheap source of protein” 
(WRI 2005: 5). 
The features of the biodiversity problem described in the paragraphs above make it a very 
complicated environmental and social issue which, as a consequence, is extremely difficult to 
solve. Current regulatory approaches to tackle biodiversity do not allow for the facets de-
scribed above. Any action taken faces manifold challenges as there is no easy ‘polluter-pays-
option’ at hand. ABS seems to be an appealing mechanism trying to reconcile some of the 
described dichotomies. 
 
Benefit Sharing: Robin Hood goes global? 
Of the Convention on Biodiversity’s three pillars, the third one – ensuring the fair and equita-
ble sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources – seems to be the 
most elusive. As one observer of the international negotiations that are taking place in and 
around the CBD notes, “many wondered if the reason for that lies in the somewhat revolu-
tionary nature of this endeavour – seeking to channel benefit flows to developing nations” 
(IISD 2005: 10). This transfer of monetary and non-monetary resources is thought to estab-
lish additional incentives for local stewards to protect biodiversity while giving them the pos-
sibility to meet their basic needs. The equity problems of locals costs vs global benefits and 
private benefits vs public costs as well as the vulnerability problem could potentially be 
solved through a redistributive policy measure such as ABS. One might be reminded of the 
motto of the legendary hero Robin Hood: ‘Take from the rich to give to the poor’. The set 
seems to be appealing: Pharmaceutical multi-billion-$-corporations using genetic resources 
shall contribute to local livelihoods of ‘poor’ people in the South, curbing local pressures on 
ecosystems and thereby making a contribution to solving a global environmental problem? 
Leads for drug developments derived from nature could be one option of sustainable use of 
biodiversity reconciling use with conservation and development. 
However, findings from political science literature suggest that redistributive policies are diffi-
cult to implement, as they are generally met with strong resistance and generate conflict 
(Jänicke/Jörgens/Kern 2001: 20). It remains to be seen in which ways and to what extent 
Benefit Sharing is met with resistance. 
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1.2 Research Question 
With the entering into force of the CBD 12 years ago, this framework convention set out cer-
tain principles that should be considered when accessing a country’s genetic resources.17 It 
furthermore appoints several ABS-related broad commitments (that are legally binding for 
contracting parties to the CBD) regarding the sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation 
of these resources (see Appendix 5). It is a basic principle of international law that interna-
tional conventions like the CBD create binding obligations only for their parties and not di-
rectly for private actors (individual citizens and private organisations, including legal persons 
such as corporations and associations)18. These are not legally obliged to comply with inter-
national provisions and guidelines, unless national law has introduced rights and responsibili-
ties for them (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 14). This is happening at the moment as an increasing 
number of nation states implement the ABS provisions by transforming them into national 
law. This in turn addresses entities and individuals under their respective jurisdiction in order 
to ensure compliance of private actors with the international provisions. 
 
The focus of this thesis is, however, on the realisation of the provisions of a global conven-
tion by industry instead of national governments. With regard to the introductory clarifications 
about international law at the beginning of this section, it is necessary to elaborate in some 
detail on the line of argumentation in the following:  
The sixth Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biodiversity (COP VI) in 2002 
adopted the voluntary Bonn Guidelines on access and benefit sharing. These guidelines set 
up a voluntary framework for national legislative, administrative or policy measures on ac-
cess and benefit sharing as well as ABS model contracts and agreements. Some of the 
guidelines’ provisions are surprisingly not directed towards states. Commercial users of ge-
netic resources are supposed to enter benefit sharing agreements through contract law (Bar-
ber/Glowka/Vina 2002: 367-368). In most cases, a contracting party is going to be a private 
entity as the private sector is generating the benefits that are to be shared. This is the reason 
why the guidelines can be interpreted as addressing “predominantly private users who are 
theoretically not bound by international law” (Dross/Wolff 2005). Following basic principles of 
                                                
17 Amongst others these principles are Prior Informed Consent (PIC) and Mutually Agreed Terms 
(MAT) (CBD Art. 15. 4 and 5). 
18 While there are less than 200 governments in the global system, there are approximately 60,000 
major Transnational Corporations (TNCs), such as Shell, Pfizer, Microsoft, Unilever, or Daimler-
Crysler; 10,000 single-country non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who have significant interna-
tional activities; and 5,800 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), such as Amnesty 
International, the International Red Cross, the World Wildlife Fund, plus a similar number of less well 
established networks of NGOs (see Willets 2001: 366.). This group of private actors in global policy 
making is very heterogeneous and it sometimes causes confusion to put actors into a single category 
that have very different structures, different resources, and different ways of influencing policy making. 
When referring to private actors, this thesis is mainly focussing on the group of TNCs. 
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international law as outlined above, the implementation of the Bonn Guidelines and other, 
broader ABS provisions of the CBD through private users is merely voluntary. It is not en-
forceable unless the Parties to the Convention (nation states) transfer ABS provisions into 
national law. The importance of voluntary realisation of ABS provisions through the industry 
becomes clearer when looking at the current severe difficulties with implementing ABS 
through national legislation. Even though a growing number of states are passing national 
ABS legislation, there are at least two decisive obstacles to getting the ABS mechanism 
started that will be explained in the following paragraphs:  
 
1) The home countries of most commercial users of genetic resources do not have any ABS 
legislation in place; additionally, many provider countries also have not drafted and imple-
mented such regulations yet. 
The United Nation’s ABS Programme finds that on the national level up to 2003, “efforts to 
implement the CBD’s provisions on ABS have resulted in development of national ABS legis-
lation, model contracts, and other instruments in over fifty countries” (UNU/IAS 2003: 3). 
Supporting this assessment, a recent estimate is that 
“25-35% of the Parties to CBD [between 46 and 65 out of 187 countries which 
are Party to the CBD] have ABS legislation in place, maybe not complete 
legislation, but at least provisions to the effect that access to genetic 
resources is subject to prior (informed) consent. If companies are not abiding 
to such legislation they may commit a criminal offence. The main argument for 
elaborating international legally binding rules is probably that consumer 
countries do not have national legislation to support the enforcement of ABS 
legislation of provider countries” (Koester 200519). 
So far, legislation has mainly been passed by (developing) provider countries whereas very 
few (developed) user countries have enacted ABS legislation.20 It is relatively easy to imag-
ine that it is not a prime interest of user countries to regulate their industries in order to en-
sure benefit sharing. An observer of the last meeting of the working group on ABS in Febru-
ary 2005 commented that “those regarded as user countries (i.e., those with industries that 
commercialise genetic resources) – mostly industrialised countries – are quite content with 
the status quo, where access to genetic resources is arguably free” (IISD 2005: 10). Studying 
different national government ABS related initiatives it became clear already some years ago 
that 
 “user countries show little inclination to introduce laws to support the 
enforcement of access agreements in the countries where companies conduct 
their research and development. For these reasons, voluntary compliance by 
industry will be essential” (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 5). 
                                                
19 Personal communication, May 28th 2005.  
20 There are only very few developed countries that have passed some kind of ABS regulation. These 
are Denmark, Norway, Canada, Australia and the USA (Dross/Wolf 2005: 22). 
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Additionally, provider countries surprisingly seem to be inhibited in their legislative responses 
to implement ABS. On the very basic level, there are difficulties in defining what a ‘genetic 
resource’ is21, so that some provider countries have been somewhat unsettled by the possi-
ble implications of drafting legislation concerning these resources. One reason for the lack of 
legislative responses appears to be insecurity of how to regulate appropriately and, espe-
cially in the case of smaller countries, a lack of capacity. Supporting this assessment, on a 
recent IUCN workshop on access and benefit sharing held in India22 it was pointed out that 
many developing countries in the South Asian context have been paralysed over the passed 
decade and have not developed further legislative steps. This is due to discouraging experi-
ences such as on the Philippines where both commercial and scientific bioprospecting sig-
nificantly decreased after launching one of the first national regulations on ABS, the Presi-
dential Executive Order 247, in 1996.23  
 
2) The second obstacle is that provider countries which regulate ABS under national law are 
not able to monitor and enforce compliance of private users due to several features of the 
subject matter. So even in countries where national regulation is in place, it is rather difficult 
for governments to monitor and enforce this legislation as this would involve identifying the 
sources of a sample, which could literally be diminutive, and following its utilisation in the 
complete downstream-development, the R&D process of private users, that most commonly 
takes place in other (developed) countries. Furthermore, determining the exact point of time 
that a sample is taken, is crucial as ABS only applies to those taken after the CBD entered 
into force in 1993.24 Ruiz supports these points in saying that “national ABS policy and legal 
measures and jurisdictional limitations make control of the flows of genetic resources extremely 
complicated” (Ruiz 2003: 10-11). Given these limitations, he argues for international measures to 
fulfil the objectives of the CBD. 
                                                
21 For an explanation of the problems related to recognising, defining and tracking genetic resources 
see Young 2004: 281-283. 
22 This training in “Bioprospecting and Access and Benefit Sharing for South Asia” has been organised 
by the IUCN Regional Biodiversity Programme, Asia and took place on January, 10-12th, 2005 in 
Lucknow, India. Fabian Busch has been able to attend this meeting. It served as a regional prepara-
tion meeting for the international AHOEWG meeting in February 2005 in Bangkok, Thailand.  
23 In 1995 Bristol-Myers Squibb wrote a letter to the US Department of State stating that they would 
not conduct any natural resource research in countries which impose requirements similar to the ones 
in the Philippines (ten Kate/Laird 1999 cited in: Barber/Glowka/Vina 2002: 409). 
24 It is hard to imagine that any authority could have the capacity to monitor all actors in their endeav-
ours to take samples and utilise these in R&D processes abroad or, maybe even more difficult, to 
monitor the sound behaviour of actors with regard to the utilisation of Traditional Knowledge (TK) as-
sociated with genetic resources. Even though TK plays an important role in the broad discussion on 
Intellectual Property Rights and access and benefit sharing it has, for reasons of limited scope, to be 
excluded from this thesis. 
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Additionally, laws and procedures are still quite unclear in most cases and there is little, yet 
growing experience with regard to their application.25 Finally, as the Indian case shows, 
where alleged comprehensive national laws exist on paper (such as the Indian Biodiversity 
Act 2002 and its Biodiversity Rules 2004), they are still far from being smoothly implemented 
on the ground. Even though companies theoretically must respect such existing national ABS 
legislation, currently there are severe difficulties in its enforcement.  
 
In the light of a situation in which national legislation on both provider country and user coun-
try side is often not existing or difficult to monitor, it has to be asked how can one make sure 
that commercial users of genetic resources act in the spirit of the CBD, realise the access 
and benefit sharing mechanism in order to ultimately make a contribution to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity? This question is reflected in the currently ongoing inter-
national discussions about the further development of the international ABS regime as will be 
explained in the following section. Before taking any further decisions on the international 
level on how to enhance the implementation of ABS, it is therefore of prime interest for both 
scientists and policy makers to have information about the actual behaviour of commercial 
users of genetic resources under the current CBD provisions and the voluntary Bonn Guide-
lines. In order to approximate the behaviour of commercial users of genetic resources it is 
necessary to initially clarify the question who these users are, which group this thesis is go-
ing to focus on and why. 
 
The Pharmaceutical Industry as Users of Genetic Resources. 
Apart from the general human concern in keeping biodiversity as a basis for living, some 
stakeholders have a more specific interest. Several industry sectors use genetic resources 
commercially as an important input for their products. In their landmark study, ten Kate and 
Laird identify the main user sectors of genetic resources as follows:  
? the natural products and pharmaceutical industry; 
? the botanical medicine industry; 
? the seed industry; 
? horticulture; 
? crop protection; 
? biotechnology industry; 
? and the natural personal care and cosmetics industry (ten Kate/Laird 1999).  
The pharmaceutical industry and other user sectors are not primarily addressed because 
they are responsible for biodiversity loss (no ‘polluter-pays’ perspective), but because those 
                                                
25 For example, during personal communication with the secretary of the Karnataka State Biodiversity 
Board on January, 13th 2005 in Bangalore, India, it become clear that even two years after its founda-
tion in 2003 there are still no state rules in place that could guide the boards activities. As a conse-
quence the Board is incapable of action even though Karnataka is considered as being one of the 
frontrunner states in India with regard to the implementation of the Indian Biodiversity Act.  
 Busch and Kern: Realising Access and Benefit Sharing Provisions of the CBD 
 16
industry branches have a stake in genetic resources. They can potentially realise profits from 
the utilization of genetic resources in product development processes. This thesis focuses on 
one particular user-group: pharmaceutical corporations. As mentioned in the prologue, these 
private actors have a vital interest in maintaining biodiversity as 
they can capitalise on the informational value of natural re-
sources. Current data shows that the added value from genetic 
resources is mainly utilised in the pharmaceutical industry, the 
seeds industry and biotechnology (Deke 2004: 16). Apart from 
this, the focus on the pharmaceutical sector is also due to some 
more specific reasons which will be explained more thoroughly in 
chapter 5.1.  
 
Against this background, the following research question is going to be answered: 
 
To what extent are pharmaceutical companies voluntarily realising the ABS provisions 
of the CBD and what can be learned from this a) about the possible role of corporate 
responsibility in biodiversity governance and b) for the ongoing negotiations on the 
nature of an international ABS regime? 
 
In order to answer this research question, the following sub-questions are going to guide this 
thesis: 
• What are possible driving forces behind a voluntarily realisation of international ABS 
regulation for pharmaceutical companies?  
• What kind of provisions on ABS are entailed in the CBD and its Bonn guidelines?  
• By which theoretical concepts is ABS backed up? 
• How can the behaviour of companies be assessed?  
• What are appropriate sources of information for the behaviour of pharmaceutical 
companies?  
 
1.3 Context of the Study: The Formation of an International ABS Regime 
Having explored the problem field and posed our research question on the voluntary realisa-
tion of ABS provisions through one group of commercial users of genetic resources, this sec-
tion is going to embed the thesis’ focus into a broader policy context. This is going to be done 
in order to a) outline the relevance of the findings for the ongoing policy-making processes 
around ABS on the international level and b) indicate that the findings might contribute to a 
better understanding of global governance processes in the environmental area.  
Tropical cone snails could yield 
new drugs to treat chronic pain, 
cancer, and other afflictions. 
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 In some respects, our starting point is paragraph 44 (o) of the Plan of Implementation of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, which calls for action to  
"negotiate within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to promote and 
safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources".26  
Following this call, Decision VII/19 of the Conference Of the Parties (COP) to the CBD in 
2004 mandates the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing 
(working group on ABS)27 with the collaboration of other stakeholders to “elaborate and ne-
gotiate an international regime on ABS with the aim of adopting an instrument/instruments to 
effectively implement the provisions in Article 15 and Article 8 (j) and the three objectives of 
the Convention”.  
Moreover, it determines the terms of reference for the working group on ABS which specify 
its task to deal with the nature of the international re-
gime. Accordingly, the regime “could be composed of 
one or more instruments within a set of principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures, legally-
binding and/or non-binding” (COP Decision VII/19). 
Hence, a critical point for the negotiations is the proto-
col question: is there a need for a separate interna-
tional legally binding instrument on ABS (an ‘ABS pro-
tocol’) under the CBD to commit user countries to draft supportive ABS legislation? (see 
IUCN 2004: 6).28 Young confirms this assessment of the negotiations and points out that  
“contrary to many statements, the current choice is not between ‘negotiating 
an entirely new regime’ and ‘negotiating a part or interpretation of the regime’, 
because any negotiation will involve only parts of the regime. The regime is 
and will be a combination of established and new instruments, concepts, and 
principles. The only question is ‘what kind of instruments will be added to this 
mix – interpretation, protocol, annex, guideline or COP decision?’” (Young 
2004). 
It is not surprising that different groups of states (e.g. the members of the European Union or 
the Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries29) argue in the negotiations for different instruments 
to enhance the implementation of ABS, according to their diverging interests:  
                                                
26 The Plan of Implementation is to be seen as the major outcome of the UN World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. It contains targets and timetables to spur action on a 
wide range of issues, including a commitment to halt the trend of biodiversity loss by 2010. 
27 The Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing was established through 
COP V in 2000, initially to develop guidelines and other approaches for submission to COP VI. In the 
following it will be simply referred to as the working group on ABS.  
28 For a more detailed clarification of the legal concepts of binding/nonbinding and/or volun-
tary/mandatory instruments see Appendix 4. 
Plenary Meeting of the Working Group on 
ABS in Bangkok, February, 14th-18th 2005 
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The world’s greatest concentration of biological wealth is found in the so-called ‘hotspots’ of 
the tropics. Genetic resources are of an undetermined, yet remarkable, commercial value. At 
the same time, provider countries are often beset by acute poverty (UNDP, Equator Initia-
tive). Consequently, the biodiversity ‘rich’ but technological ‘poor’ developing countries of the 
South largely argue for a legally binding protocol that would oblige user countries to intro-
duce national ABS legislation in order to prevent ‘biopiracy’. Beyond the CBD, these actors 
argue that the relationship between the World Trade Organisation’s Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and the CBD has to be clarified.30  
In contrast, the developed countries of the biodiversity ‘poor’ but technological ‘rich’ North 
generally argue for measures that facilitate easy access to genetic resources and favour vol-
untary benefit-sharing schemes over any binding regulation. The last meeting of the working 
group on ABS highlighted that “a clear political demarcation between the two was still evident 
during the course of discussions” (IISD 2005: 10). The political debate about the protocol 
question is so far more driven by diverging interests than by knowledge about the current 
status of the realisation of ABS. Knowledge on the potential for benefit sharing in different 
sectors to facilitate the negotiation process is needed (ibid.: 11).  
 
Our working hypothesis is that pharmaceutical companies do not sufficiently realise ABS 
provisions yet. If our empirical findings indicate that this is true, we could argue that there is 
little reason why these actors should change their behaviour under any future international 
ABS regime that is merely based on voluntary instruments. Thus, our empirical analysis 
maps the state of the realisation of ABS provisions by pharmaceutical companies. This might 
be of special interest as the pharmaceutical sector is believed to be the frontrunner in realis-
ing ABS (ten Kate/Laird 2002: 272).  
The call for negotiating an international regime on ABS opens up a window of opportunity for 
regulatory change and this thesis is to be seen in this topical context. Answering the re-
search question could make a contribution to the discussions about the nature of the interna-
tional regime by weakening or strengthening negotiation positions of either proponents or 
                                                                                                                                                     
29 The Like-Minded Group of Megabiodiverse Countries (LMMC) are a group of developing countries 
which have common interests and therefore try to speak with one voice to increase their power in the 
negotiations (Bolivia, Brazil, China, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malay-
sia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and Venezuela). 
30 Regarding the relationship between the CBD and the TRIPs Agreement, at the last working group 
meeting on ABS the EU, Australia, Japan, the USA, Switzerland and New Zealand did not see any 
conflict between the two agreements. They take the standpoint that the CBD and TRIPs would even 
be mutually supportive while the African Group of countries, supported by Brazil, pointed out that the 
agreements could only be reconciled through an amendment of TRIPs (see UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/7, 
p. 20-21; also see WTO IP/C/W/257 2001). Given the opposition of the EU, Japan, Australia, Switzer-
land, New Zealand and the USA, such an amendment in favour of a disclosure requirement is, how-
ever, rather unlikely. 
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opponents of an international ABS protocol under the CBD.31 So far, existing evidence about 
the current voluntary commitment of private actors is limited to several qualitative case stud-
ies which are cited repeatedly in the relevant literature (e.g. the Indian Kani or the Costa Ri-
can Merck-INBio case32). To sum up, on a political level this thesis aims at contributing to the 
ongoing negotiation process by generating data on the behaviour of private actors in the 
realm of ABS. 
 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 will lay out the main theoretical foundations this thesis is based on. The 
starting point for analysing ABS as a potential problem solving mechanism is rooted in re-
gime theory. As the implementation of this mechanism takes place on different levels (na-
tional legislation and through private actors), the perspective of international regimes has to 
be enlarged towards the inclusion of private actors. The global governance literature depicts 
these ideas and is accordingly chosen as a point of reference. Within the global governance 
considerations, the role of businesses and their contributions to global environmental prob-
lem solving is reflected in the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This branch of 
research looks at the normative competition among companies regarding social and envi-
ronmental standards. CSR is only one aspect of strategy-making in corporations though. Ac-
cordingly, it has been deemed necessary to complete the picture by presenting an under-
standing of strategy-making in companies to put CSR into a broader context. 
Chapter 3 explains the methodological approach of this thesis in answering its re-
search question. Departing from the already introduced concept of corporate responsibility, 
categories for the analysis of the realisation of the ABS provisions through pharmaceutical 
companies are derived (3.1). The chapter also reflects upon the process of identifying the 
target group of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies (3.2) as well as the process of gather-
ing the empirical data (3.3). Section 3.4 derives indicators for the analysis of the empirical 
material. Limitations of the approach chosen are depicted at the end of the chapter (3.5). 
After outlining the governance of biodiversity prior to the CBD, chapter 4 introduces the 
Convention on Biodiversity and reviews its ABS provisions. The underlying economic founda-
tions as well as the main principles of the mechanism are going to be discussed here to in-
form the empirical analysis in chapter 5.  
                                                
31 It should be stated at this point that further options to ensure ABS compliance through instruments 
developed outside the CBD are currently being discussed in different international fora. These options 
are inter alia an amendment to the World Trade Organisation’s TRIPS Agreements or an amendment 
to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) under the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to 
include the disclosure of the source/origin of genetic resources and Traditional Knowledge in patent 
applications (see for instance Pythoud 2004).  
32 For an assessment of some of the most well known cases, please see GDI 2003. 
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Chapter 5 is the centrepiece of this thesis. The pharmaceutical industry is introduced 
as a special industry sector which uses genetic resources commercially. The sector’s market 
development and structure as well as the process of developing new medicines are briefly 
outlined. Following this, empirical data about the top 20 pharmaceutical companies’ policies 
on biodiversity is laid out and analysed according to the categories derived in chapter 3. The 
companies’ reporting, codes of conduct as well as their management standards related to 
biodiversity loss, the CBD and its ABS provisions are the main sources of information for the 
analysis. Additionally, questionnaires to explore the companies’ behaviour have been used to 
obtain data. The respective literature on access and benefit sharing cases is screened for 
any inclusion of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies. Those cases are included in the 
analysis.  
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions. The results of the empirical analysis in the preced-
ing chapter are briefly summarised to answer our research question. Departing from the find-
ings, the authors argue for the importance of a legally binding ABS regime. 
Chapter 7 puts the ABS mechanism and its role in biodiversity conservation as well as 
the role of voluntary measures of private actors into a broader perspective. 
 
Please find a graphical illustration of the thesis below. 
 
Figure 2: Design of the Thesis 
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2 Theoretical Considerations 
The following chapter outlines the theoretical foundations on which this thesis is based. It 
initially describes its background and pre-understanding by embedding the study into the 
context of other literature on the topic (2.1). Subsequently, it draws on theoretical perspec-
tives from the discipline of International Relations, in particular regime theory (2.2). It further 
refers to the discourse around global governance and looks at corporate social responsibility 
as one of its elements (2.3). Hereafter, some theoretical considerations on strategy devel-
opment in companies rooted in business studies are introduced (2.4). The idea behind the 
merging of these different perspectives is twofold:  
Firstly, it is intended to narrate the broad storyline behind the development of a theoretical 
understanding of global policy making which could, at its shortest, be described as a change 
from “government to governance”. Moreover, making transparent this study’s underlying 
theoretical interpretations of the world will further a better understanding of its research ques-
tion on the realisation of access and benefit sharing by private actors.  
Secondly, the different but complementary theoretical perspectives are serving as the 
framework of analysis to answer the research questions. They are to be seen as the founda-
tion on which the criteria and indicators of the analysis of pharmaceutical companies rest.  
2.1 Background and Pre-Understanding 
One important strand of research on access and benefit sharing is to give specific design 
advice for policy makers, based on experiences with national and regional legislation 
(Heinecke/Wolff 2004; BMZ 2001; Caillaux/Ruiz 2002; Seiler/Dutfield 2001). So far, corpo-
rate behaviour in the realm of access and benefit sharing has predominantly been studied 
inductively through leadoff research on a few benefit sharing cases33 (see GDI 2003; Dow-
nes/Laird 1999). Those studies analyse first practical experiences that both public and pri-
vate actors around the world made with the implementation of ABS on the ground. Moreover, 
in 1998, COP IV of the CBD in decision IV/8 called for case studies on different thematic ar-
eas and cross-cutting issues. 34 Sharing these experiences from different contexts and elabo-
rating on best practice examples of successful ABS agreements is important and will help to 
take the discussion about how to regulate ABS forward step by step. The idea of most of 
these studies has been to learn more about the specific design of possible concrete instru-
                                                
33 Generally, these have been subject to controversial discussions amongst stakeholders and scien-
tists. Therefore, it remains unclear whether or not access and benefit sharing in a specific case really 
has taken place in ‘the spirit of the CBD’. 
34 So far, 28 studies have been submitted, see: http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-
eco/benefit/cs.aspx. 
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ments for the ABS mechanism and their application while they neglected to put the single 
cases into perspective of the overall reaction of the industry to the CBD. Furthermore, they 
do not provide a structured assessment of the industry’s behaviour.  
 
In 2002, Laird and ten Kate summed up their assessment of the state-of-the-art of corporate 
ABS policies. They outlined the current status-quo for different industry sectors using genetic 
resources and found that the awareness of the CBD is highest in the pharmaceutical, crop 
protection, seed and biotechnology industries (Laird and ten Kate 2002: 279). Generally, it 
seems that awareness of CBD issues is on the rise and an increasing number of companies 
are responding by changing business practices. Laird and ten Kate also claim that the direct 
impact of the CBD provisions “is most evident in the pharmaceutical industry” and refer to 
some early examples of corporate policies (Novo Nordisk, Glaxo Wellcome, Xenova Discov-
ery Ltd. and Shaman Pharmaceuticals) from the 1990s. Nevertheless, they conclude that 
“very few companies have developed policies in response to the CBD, let alone clear and 
detailed public documents designed to ensure and to demonstrate compliance with the CBD 
and national laws on access” (ibid: 280).  
 
Departing from Laird and ten Kate’s finding, this thesis compiles and assesses the initiatives 
regarding ABS of large pharmaceutical companies to give a broader, more comprehensive 
and updated picture of the current state of realisation of the CBD’s ABS provisions. In con-
trast to earlier studies on single cases, it does not aim at coming up with technical design 
suggestions for specific instruments for the ABS mechanism. Its strength lies in generating 
an assessment of the overall response of the pharmaceutical industry’s main actors to the 
CBD.  
 
2.2 Ecological Interdependence and International Regimes  
In the course of industrialisation and population increase, human processes have been con-
suming ever increasing quantities of natural resources and increasingly using the Earth as a 
sink for the remnants of civilisation. Life cycles of fish, pesticides or carbon dioxide do not 
make halt at artificial borderlines. These phenomena led to a situation of interdependence of 
nation states in a new area beyond classical security issues that have been studied by 
scholars of international relations before.35 Ecological interdependence is becoming a central 
category in explaining the rise of environmental cooperation in the international system: 
                                                
35 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye introduced the idea of complex interdependence. It refers to the 
various, complex transnational connections, interdependencies, between states and societies (Keo-
hane and Nye 1977). Reflecting on the relaxing situation between the conflict parties in the late seven-
ties period of the Cold War, they argued that with the decline of military force as a policy-tool and with 
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“Interdependence gives rise to collective-action problems in the sense that 
actors left to their own devices in an interdependent world frequently suffer 
joint losses as a result of conflict or are unable to reap joint gains because of 
an inability to cooperate” (Young 1994: 15). 
Moreover, the increasing probability for cooperation among different actors in the interna-
tional system can be illustrated by taking a closer look at specific structures of transnational 
environmental problems. One famous example is Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’. His 
argumentation is built on the example of a pasture open to all. As a rational human being, 
every herdsman will seek to maximise his gains by adding animals to his herd. This behav-
iour will sooner or later destroy the pasture when the herd will exceed the pasture’s carrying 
capacity. The tragedy lies in the fact that  
“each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons” (Hardin 1968: 1244).  
This tragic situation does not only exist locally, but can easily be thought of in categories of 
international interdependence as is the case with open seas fisheries. Hardin describes the 
classical collective action problem, which in essence is the lack of congruence between indi-
vidual incentives and desired outcomes for the group. The problem is clearest with the most 
famous category of collective goods: public goods. They are non-excludable and non-rival in 
consumption. Ecosystem services, biodiversity and genetic resources are generally catego-
rised as public goods: they provide benefits to economies that are unpaid and difficult to 
market (see for example Pearce/Perring 1995: 36; Constanza et al. 1997: 257 and OECD 
2003: 7). Under these conditions no individual has an economically rational incentive to con-
tribute to the provision of a public good, because everyone would rather free-ride on the con-
tributions of others. Thus, this public good is not adequately provided by market forces.  
 
Over the past decades (from the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stock-
holm in 1972 to the UNCED in Rio 1992 and the WSSD in Johannesburg 2002), the aware-
ness of the need for international cooperation to solve problems related to ecological inter-
dependence has increased. In conjunction with accelerating problem pressure, this has led 
to the creation of international organisations and regimes.36 These institutions were seen as 
an attempt to solve such problems and regime theory evolved as a new perspective in inter-
                                                                                                                                                     
the increase in economic and ecological forms of interdependence the probability of co-operation 
among states increases as well. 
36 UN framework conventions on climate (1992) and biodiversity (1992) were negotiated, a steady 
strengthening of the ozone depletion regime followed the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and Agenda 21 
provided a vast blueprint for implementing sustainable development. At the same time, international 
conventions on the transport of hazardous wastes (1989) and desertification (1994) were developed, 
along with a network of regional environmental agreements.  
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national relations theory. A regime can be defined as “an international social institution with 
agreed-upon principles, norms, procedures and programmes that govern the activities and 
shape the expectations of actors in a specific issue area” (following Levy, Young and Zürn 
1994).37 Realist and Institutionalist scholars of international relations see the nation-state as 
the pivotal actor in the international system. They draw, however, different conclusions on 
the probability and relevance of international regimes38: 
“The realist research programme denies any significant independent role for 
intergovernmental institutions and organisations, or for non-state actors. 
Institutionalists have argued that inter-governmental co-operation is both 
theoretically possible and empirically undeniable” (Biermann 2002: 1).  
Regime theory is concerned with explaining cooperation of sovereign nation states, develop-
ing categories for analysing effects of international institutions and is studying the evolution 
of regimes over time. Assessing the effects of regimes is, however, rather difficult. Reviewing 
different scholars of regime theory reveals a common denominator of their contemplation: 
accordingly, the crucial effects of international regimes should be evaluated along scales that 
measure either changes in the behaviour of stakeholders on the ground (problem originators 
and/or problem solvers) being regulated or changes in the environmental indicator that is the 
ultimate concern of the institution (see Green 1996; Keohane and Levy 1996; Mitchell 2001; 
Oberthür 1997; Schreurs and Economy 1997; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 
1994/1999). It is rarely, if at all, possible to draw any simple causal relations in complex so-
cial and environmental systems between a change in the environmental variable and the 
existence of a regime. Therefore, regime theory generally considers behavioural change of 
actors as the central category for the analysis of effects.39 Following these considerations, 
the extent to which access and benefit sharing provisions are voluntarily realised through 
pharmaceutical companies is going to be assessed in behavioural terms.  
 
Any potential voluntary realisation is of special interest as the implementation of international 
environmental regulation generally has been rather constricted. One crucial factor for this is 
the absence of a global authority that could enforce international regimes through the threat 
of sanctions.40 The lack of coercive power often results in an implementation deficit of these 
regulations. Reflecting on the effects of international environmental regimes in general, Vo-
gler and Jordan summarise that “the one overwhelming conclusion from much of this work 
[regime-theory] was that there were significant, and on occasion apparently insurmountable 
                                                
37 The background of the international ABS regime as well as the ABS mechanism as such are going 
to be explained in chapter 4. 
38 For an introduction into this debate see Little 1997. 
39 For a detailed overview on other possible categories see Young 1994. 
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problems in translating international agreements into sustainable solutions on the ground” 
(Vogler and Jordan 2003: 141).41 Accordingly, much of the last few years’ discussions in the 
realm of sustainable development centred around the question how to overcome this deficit. 
Unlike its predecessor ten years earlier, the WSSD in 2002 produced no further landmark 
legal conventions to govern critical areas where trade, environment and social processes 
intersect. Instead, the leaders and their civil society partners emphasised the role of the pri-
vate sector as the essential centrepiece for making progress in the years ahead. The UN is 
shifting its focus in the direction of an increasing responsibility of businesses as partners in 
the struggle for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is led by Secre-
tary General Annan’s Global Compact42 to mobilise the power of the world’s major multina-
tional corporations and their sense of corporate responsibility to help meet the UN’s envi-
ronmental, social and other goals (Kirton/Trebilcock 2004). The world’s industries have to 
account for a good deal of environmentally damaging practices. Market failure and the exter-
nalisation of production costs are some of the important reasons for the often devastating 
state of ecosystems. The question arises why and how the private sector could suddenly 
contribute to the implementation of environmental regimes? Possible driving forces for busi-
nesses to transform from being part of the problem to becoming part of the solution are 
therefore going to be explored in the following. 
 
2.3 International Norms and Corporate Responsibility 
This section argues from a social constructivist viewpoint that the normative pressure for in-
ternationally operating businesses could lead to an environmentally and socially sound be-
haviour codified in their codes of conducts and standards. To our knowledge there is cur-
rently no study in the realm of ABS that applies the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to explore the potential of the pharmaceutical sector to voluntarily realise ABS. The 
ideas and assumptions underlying CSR are discussed in further detail below. 
The concept of corporate responsibility rests on some fundamental changes in the constella-
tion of actors in the international system which are mirrored in the discourse about global 
governance. At the most general level, global governance can be conceptualised as a move 
toward multi-actor, multi-level decision-making in world politics (Fuchs 2002: 11). The rea-
sons for the growing involvement of non-state actors in global politics are too manifold and 
                                                                                                                                                     
40 This is true mainly for international environmental regimes. In contrast, the international trade re-
gime around the World Trade Organisation has to be seen as an exception as it is possible to sanction 
member states through its dispute settlement mechanism.  
41 This estimation is shared by other scholars, e.g. see Brühl and Rittberger 2002. 
42 The UN’s Global Compact asks multinational corporations to voluntarily subscribe to a list of interna-
tional human rights and environmental standards and to regularly report on their progress in imple-
menting these norms. 
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complex to investigate them in this thesis. Deregulation and economic liberalisation are often 
seen as the main reasons for the rise of private actors in the global arena, which increases 
the number of multinational corporations as well as strengthening their position in world poli-
tics. At the same time it provokes the formation of an opposing network (consisting of 
NGOs). Other driving forces for the growing significance of private actors are the develop-
ment of new information technologies, which foster the formation and emancipation of civil 
society, and the end of the cold war that speeds up privatisation tendencies (Brühl 2002). 
During the course of theoretical considerations about globalisation and global governance, 
some scholars focus on the diffusion of norms and other cultural scripts, a perspective rooted 
in social constructivism:  
“Following this argumentation, social reality does not fall from heaven but 
human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices. 
Constructivism is based on a social ontology which insists that human agents 
do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively 
shared systems of meanings” (Risse 2004).  
With regard to the focus on pharmaceutical corporations, constructivism and the diffusion of 
norms might offer an explanation why these actors could potentially realise ABS provisions 
voluntarily. Over the past twenty years in many issue areas of international politics we can 
observe what Finnemore and Sikkink called a “norm cascade” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998). 
“Norm cascade” refers to the tipping point where international norms become global stan-
dards of appropriate behaviour in the sense that a growing number of states subscribes to 
them. Once the tipping point is reached, international norms tend to exert constitutive effects 
on the states in the sense that it becomes the “normal” and appropriate thing to do to ratify 
the respective treaties.  
While the process described so far pertains mostly to states as the main subjects of interna-
tional law, a more recent tendency extends international norms as standards of appropriate 
behaviour to the private sector. In the period of the 80s to the mid 90s, a series of catastro-
phes – from Bhopal to Chernobyl and the Rhine disaster – prompted a range of legislation 
and environmental, health and safety standards. Business and global brands from Shell to 
Nike and Monsanto were repeatedly seen to have failed in an environmental sense. They 
were accordingly targeted by NGOs to catalyse public debate and to evoke regulatory and 
market responses.  
 
Besides this general trend, however, one special event is generally believed to have trig-
gered a change in business strategy: the public debate about Shell’s intended disposal of the 
Brent Spar off-shore oil rig in the open sea in 1995 which symbolises the emergence of a 
very different agenda for business (see Pattberg 2003, SustainAbility 2004). After wide-
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spread public protest and consumer boycott, Shell’s Chief Executive Officer Herkstroter high-
lighted the positive aspects of the successful campaign by Greenpeace and other NGOs:  
“We took decisions, which in retrospect were mistakes. We now realise that 
alone we could never have hoped to reach the right approach – that we should 
have discussed them in a more open and frank way with others in order to 
reach acceptable solutions. […] In essence, we were somewhat slow in 
understanding that environmental groups, consumer groups and so on were 
tending to acquire authority” (Heap 2000: 3). 
Transnational campaigns against multinational companies have led to the extension of inter-
national environmental norms to the private sector, re-constituting private actors in the sense 
that they have to accept these norms in order to be recognized as ‘good global citizens’. Self-
set codes of conduct, concepts of auditing, reporting and social and environmental engage-
ment – all instruments of corporate social responsibility that aim at improving a company’s 
performance with regard to social, environmental and health issues – entered the main-
stream of business management. The question in the case of the negotiation of an interna-
tional regime on access and benefit sharing is whether the voluntary compliance of pharma-
ceutical corporations with ABS provisions works on the grounds of corporate responsibility? 
At first, in order to answer this question it is necessary to define CSR. There are many defini-
tions of CSR, but a reasonably representative one has been provided by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development. It defines CSR as the  
“continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and 
their families as well as of the local community and the society at large” 
(Holmes and Watts, in Michael 2003: 115).  
Consequently, CSR has to be seen as an enclosing concept drawing on business effort to 
improve social, health and environmental conditions while taking ethical considerations into 
account. CSR has important functions for both the external and internal relations of a corpo-
ration.  
Externally, one of the main aims can be to attract socially responsible investors. The Earth-
watch Institute describes a trend where  
“a growing number of institutional and individual investors prefer to invest in 
socially responsible businesses […] Behind these funds, there is an emerging 
analytical capacity to evaluate the social and environmental performance of 
companies. New developments, such as the Global Reporting Initiative, are 
also setting up a common framework for reporting on the social and 
environmental dimensions of corporate behaviour. By integrating biodiversity 
into their business models, companies can attract the growing supply of 
socially responsible capital“ (Earthwatch et al. 2002: 20). 
Michael supports this view by outlining some recent empirical evidence that CSR is important 
in attracting capital and promoting shareholder value in financial markets (Michael 2003: 
118). To give an example of the trend towards responsible investment: In April 2004, the 
NGO Rainforest Action Network (RAN; www.ran.org) managed to ‘shame’ the last of Amer-
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ica's three banking giants into adopting an environment-oriented investment policy. JP Mor-
gan is the 3rd largest bank in the United States and adopted a comprehensive environmental 
policy that will guide its lending and business practices and that takes significant steps for-
ward on climate change, forest protection, and indigenous rights. From RAN’s viewpoint, JP 
Morgan Chase’s policy sets a new standard for environmentally responsible investment43 and 
RAN believes this policy to be the tipping point of the US financial sector. In the pharmaceu-
tical sector, the Danish company Novo Nordisk is recognised as one of the leading compa-
nies with regard to CSR. Novo Nordisk answers the question why it is committed to pursue 
its business goals in a way that is socially and environmentally responsible by emphasising 
its view that “responsible business is profitable business”.44 Novo Nordisk sees the driving 
force behind responsible corporate behaviour is the chance to redefine corporate branding. It 
is hoped, to catch attention in the global “race for the voice” and to earn trust thereby making 
the company more distinguishable from its competitors and ultimately more attractive for po-
tential investors. 
Beyond attracting investment, a voluntary corporate policy also “provides a tool to communi-
cate their positions and commitments to suppliers and other outside collaborators” and “is a 
vehicle for positive public relations” (ten Kate/Laird 2000: 258-259). Agreeing with this point 
another recent study claims that users of genetic resources, “who set a positive example by 
revealing their activities and experiences, thus creating transparency, can contribute to the 
improvement of their image” (Holm-Müller/Richerzhagen/Täuber 2005: 47).  
After Shell’s Brent Spar experience it is needless to say that a company’s image is also cru-
cial with regard to the sales of its products. Protests against brand-name retailers are only 
about 10 years old, but as a Greenpeace activist once expressed, ‘it was like discovering 
gunpowder for environmentalists’. Subsequently, after the consumer boycott against Shell, it 
became clear that under certain circumstances the ‘naming and shaming’ of environmental 
harmful practices in public campaigns can provide a powerful tool for NGOs to impose pres-
sure on business actors. Similarly, as with the point of attracting responsible investment, 
companies can also use CSR to promote a positive image which in turn aims at selling more 
products:  
“With regard to product demand, CSR can be seen as one element in a larger 
branding strategy. By engaging in CSR programmes, marketing them and 
auditing them, CSR can attract demand from market segments particularly 
                                                
43http://www.ran.org/ran_campaigns/global_finance/jpmc_victory.html?ms=VictoryJPGeneral, (ac-
cessed 02.08.2005). For details on the policy, please see the company’s public environmental policy 
statement 
(http://www.jpmorganchase.com/cm/BlobServer?blobtable=Document&blobcol=urlblob&blobkey=nam
e&blobheader=application/pdf&blobwhere=jpmc/env_policy.pdf). 
44 The information about Novo Nordisk’s activities regarding CSR has been gathered at a seminar on 
Corporate Social Responsibility on April 13th 2005 at Copenhagen Business School with the atten-
dance of Ms Susanne Stormer, Head of Department Corporate Responsibility Management. 
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interested in social issues. […] Moreover, advocates claim a type of herding 
behaviour could ensue because companies that derive competetive 
advantage from their CSR activities would see competitors quickly following 
suit (Michael 2003: 117). 
Beyond these somewhat more obvious external functions, CSR can also fulfill several inter-
nal functions for businesses. In the realm of the CBD for instance, a voluntary ABS policy  
“provides an opportunity and a mechanism for a company to familiarize itself 
with the letter and spirit of the Convention and access legislation, and will 
result in a management tool that can protect the company from liability by 
ensuring compliance with required standards and procedures” (ten Kate/Laird 
2000: 258-259).  
This is especially important for transnational corporations operating in many different coun-
tries as they are required to comply with varying national ABS legislations (as far as in 
place). An ambitious voluntary code of conduct as one single standard applied can signifi-
cantly reduce transaction cost in this case. Additionally, a voluntary corporate policy “can 
enable more proactive companies to design tools for continuous improvement in their sup-
plier and user chains, and can contribute to the development of a company’s R&D strategy” 
(ibid.). Another important point of being a responsible corporate citizen seems to be to attract 
a skilled and motivated workforce. According to the Earthwatch Institute  
“responsible companies are more likely to attract and motivate good workers. 
Today’s entrants into the workforce prefer companies that are committed to 
environmental and social responsibility. Hence, by making a strong and 
transparent commitment to biodiversity conservation, companies will be able 
to improve the quality and the productivity of their workforce” (Earthwatch et 
al. 2002: 21). 
Michael confirms this by pointing out that CSR both influences the decision to join the com-
pany and it affects the human resources policies of employees once part of the company 
(2003: 117). In this line of argumentation, highly educated researchers will pay attention to 
ethical and environmental standards of their employers, so that they might prefer to work for 
a company that has sound policies in these issue areas and an excellent reputation. This is 
especially important for branches like pharmaceutical companies which depend highly on 
their qualified and skilled workforce as Ms Stormer from Novo Nordisk confirms.45 In the 
pharmaceutical sector, success or failure of a company does not depend so much on ‘hard’ 
production factors (like in the automobile industry for example) but on the ‘brains’ working for 
the company. They are one of the companies’ most important resources.  
 
Generally, as Michael puts it „the CSR discourse appears to signal a new form of co-
operation between government, business and civil society in the promotion of social objec-
tives” (2003: 126) – in this regard, CSR activities of multinational corporations can be seen 
                                                
45 Seminar on CSR at Copenhagen Business School, see footnote above. 
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as one facet of the currently emerging global governance architecture. It remains to be seen 
to what extent this optimistic view prevails in the face of the following analysis.  
To sum up, it has been shown in section 2.2 that we are operating with ‘behaviour’ as the 
central category for our analysis of the voluntary realisation of ABS provisions. Furthermore 
in this section, corporate social responsibility has been introduced as a concept that could be 
applied in order to assess the norm conformance of companies. Consequently, our empirical 
chapter is going to analyse the instruments of CSR of the pharmaceutical companies in-
cluded in this study as these allow for conclusion on their behaviour. The necessary indica-
tors for the analysis are going to be developed in chapter 3.4. On a more general level, this 
approach might contribute to an enhanced understanding of the potential of CSR for imple-
menting sustainable development. 
 
2.4 A Basic Understanding of Strategy-Development in Companies 
Although CSR and its potential as a concept for our analysis has been outlined above, we 
are aware that CSR considerations are only one element of the companies’ strategy making. 
To enlarge the framework described above, it is complemented with a perspective which is 
based upon a basic framework derived from contemporary management analysis following 
Grant (2005). What are the driving forces for companies’ behaviour beyond CSR? In order to 
answer this question, companies have to be put into context and the analysis has to incorpo-
rate the business perspective.  
No company or organisation exists in isolation from its environment. Therefore the nature 
and extent of its relationship and interactions must be considered. Organisations are subject 
to a variety of economic, legal, social and ethical pressures which they must be capable of 
accommodating if they are to operate effectively (Pettinger 1996: 35). Companies use strat-
egy to ensure their effectiveness. Accordingly, the understanding to be applied here views 
“strategy as forming a link between the firm and its external environment” (Grant 2005: 12). A 
company can be analysed through three sets of key characteristics: its goals and values, its 
resources and capabilities and its organisational structure and systems. The external envi-
ronment of the firm consists of all economic, social, political, and technological factors that 
influence the company’s decisions and performance. This is a complex set of factors which 
impact on a company and it is difficult to relate a certain strategy to one specific factor. How-
ever, “for most strategy decisions, the core of the firm’s external environment is its industry, 
which is defined by its relationships with costumers, competitors, and suppliers” (Grant 2005: 
13). 
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Figure 3: Strategy as a Link between the Company and its Environment 
 
 (Source: Grant 2005: 12) 
This very basic understanding is establishing the connection between the provisions of an 
international regime along with its national implementation and our analysis of corporate be-
haviour with regard to those provisions. The macro-perspective of regime theory is comple-
mented with some basic thoughts from a companies’ perspective. It puts the ABS provisions 
into the wider context of decision-making within companies which is a highly complex proc-
ess depending on multiple factors. The very basic distinction used in figure 3 is to separate 
internal from external factors. However, there are some transcending variables such as 
CSR/image considerations, shareholder, stakeholder relations or expert networks in which 
the companies’ personnel is involved which do not easily fit into one of those categories. The 
provisions of the CBD are only one factor of the external environment which is probably not 
decisive for the formulation of the overall companies’ R&D strategies and should not be 
overestimated. The networks in which the activities of a company take place, namely the 
competition with other pharma-
ceutical companies, the market 
development and the relations 
with suppliers of genetic re-
sources in this case seem to be 
of major importance. Figure 4 
(see below) is sketching some 
of the important factors sur-
rounding the companies’ strat-
egy-making in the context of 
this study. 
 
Figure 4: The Company and 
its External Environment 
 
 
To assess why the companies follow different strategies with regard to the provisions of the 
CBD is beyond the scope of this thesis for various reasons (e.g. unavailability of information, 
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lacking in-depth theoretical framework). Answering this question would mean to provide a 
multivariate analysis taking into account the decisive factors of the complex interplay men-
tioned above. To prove a direct causal correlation between ABS provisions and the compa-
nies’ behaviour is not possible in any way.  
 
2.5 Summary: A Complimentary View  
This thesis draws on a mixture of theories and analytical categories as explained above. The 
main reason for this is our conviction that no single theoretical approach is sufficient to guide 
the analysis answering the research questions posed. Both originally coming from a political 
science background, we initially have been interested in the making and implementation of 
international regulation but changed the focus of analysis during the course of the enquiry 
towards private actors. 
The following matrix summarises the described theoretical foundations of this thesis and 
gives the reader a structured overview. 
 
Figure 5: Matrix of Theoretical Concepts 
Theory Focus of Analysis Central actors Main Categories Purpose 
Regime The-
ory 
Cooperation among 
nation states in 
specific problem 
areas 
 
 
MACRO 
Nation states, Interna-
tional Organisations 
(and transnational 
actors) 
Principles, norms, 
rules, procedures, 
implementation, com-
pliance, effectiveness 
Explaining coopera-
tion of sovereign 
nation states and 
developing categories 
for analysing effects 
of international institu-
tions 
Corporate 
Social Re-
sponsibility 
 
Behaviour of com-
panies related to 
social and environ-
mental norms 
 
 
MESO 
Companies, NGOs 
 
Social and environ-
mental responsibility, 
management stan-
dards, reporting, 
codes of conduct, 
labels, voluntary 
measures 
Explaining the driving 
forces behind volun-
tary compliance with 
norms 
Strategy-
Making 
Strategy as a link 
between the firm 
and its external 
environment 
 
 
 
 
 
MICRO 
Individual company 
 
The company’s goals 
and values, its re-
sources and capabili-
ties and its organiza-
tional structure and 
systems, external 
environment of the 
company including 
competitors, cos-
tumers, shareholders 
Understand strategy-
making in companies 
Source: own compilation; inspired by Krell 2000. 
 
Essentially, the mix of concepts is used to shed light on the issue at hand from two distinct 
perspectives (see figure 5): From a regulatory, macro (top-down) perspective, taking its de-
parture in the provisions of an international framework convention, and a bottom-up perspec-
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tive, taking its departure on the micro (company) level involving efforts to be a ‘good corpo-
rate citizen’ and internal strategy-making. Combined, the two perspectives should offer a 
good view on corporate behaviour in the realm of ABS. 
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3 Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodological approach of this thesis is presented. The focus is mainly 
on four issues: the development of criteria for the assessment of corporate realisation of ABS 
provisions (3.1), the identification of the target group46 (3.2), the process of generating the 
empirical data (3.3), the development of indicators for the analysis (3.4) and a reflection upon 
the limitations of the chosen approach (3.5). 
 
3.1 Developing Criteria for the Assessment of Corporate Realisation of 
ABS Provisions 
‘Do regimes matter and how would we know?’ This question is at the bottom of many en-
deavours to trace the effects of international conventions. It is however in no case an easy 
task to come to a sophisticated assessment of the wide variety of possible effects that could 
be triggered by such an institution (see 2.2). Looking at the implementation of regulation is 
certainly only one dimension. The following paragraphs develop our methodological ap-
proach on how to assess the realisation of access and benefit sharing.  
It is crucial to explain along which criteria the companies are going to be assessed. The ex-
tent of ‘realisation of ABS provisions’ is essentially going to be measured in terms of norm 
conform behaviour of pharmaceutical corporations. Behaviour is seen as being a qualitative 
category with different dimensions. These dimensions are not clear cut. Instead, they range 
on a continuum from awareness to concern and ultimately to concrete action and serve as 
our criteria for the analysis. Consequently, a company’s awareness of the problem of biologi-
cal diversity is going to be classified as the weakest form of relevant behaviour as it is not 
more than a first step towards the ultimate goal of benefit sharing. Secondly, concern for bio-
diversity is expressed when a company acknowledges the relevance of the CBD and its ABS 
mechanism for the company itself. Finally, the strongest dimension of behaviour is when a 
company not only is aware of the problem of biodiversity loss and develops a position on 
ABS, but when it is actively involved in the implementation through concrete ABS agree-
ments. Figure 6 visualises the three criteria for the analysis of corporate behaviour: 
                                                
46 Target group is used here not for the intended audience of the thesis but for the companies ana-
lysed as the addresses of the thesis.  
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Figure 6: Criteria for the Analysis of Company's Behaviour 
 
(Source: own illustration) 
These three dimensions of behaviour are still too broad to guide the analysis in chapter 5. 
The question arises as to how we can assess if corporations behave as ‘responsible global 
citizens’ that voluntarily realise the provisions of an international convention? Therefore, 
more specific indicators are developed in section 3.4. 
 
3.2 Identification of Target Group 
It is necessary to delimit the target group of this thesis into a manageable scope. The proc-
ess of data generation therefore started with the identification of the target group. 
In order to analyse the behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry with regard to ABS provi-
sions of the CBD, we are looking at the world’s 20 biggest pharmaceutical corporations. They 
account for ~60% of the annual turnover of this industry47, thus this survey is significant. To 
keep the scope of the thesis manageable, the survey has only been targeted towards large 
health care/life science companies. Those companies were identified via different sources: 
The best known and comprehensive study on ABS conducted in 1999 already identified the 
top ten pharmaceutical companies of the world (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 35). The updated ver-
sion of this list was also taken into account (Laird/ten Kate 2002: 246). Additionally, a report 
launched by The Global Biodiversity Institute (GBDI) in cooperation with the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) also identified the leading pharmaceutical companies 
(GBDI/IITA 2000: 8). Finally, the members of the main sector association of research-based 
pharmaceuticals in Germany (www.vfa.de) have been screened to complete the picture and 
                                                
47 For more information about the global market size and the analysed companies share, see chapter 
5.1. 
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to determine the adequate addressees for the survey of corporate behaviour48. The compa-
nies were ranked according to their yearly turnover (latest numbers available). If companies 
had significant business activities other than pharmaceuticals, the turnover of the pharma-
ceutical division has been used.  
 
3.3 Gathering the Empirical Data  
In contrast to the enormous importance of pharmaceutical companies for the implementation 
of the ABS provisions, relatively little knowledge about their actual behaviour seems to be 
available. After having identified the target group, we followed several steps in order to col-
lect relevant data.   
 
1. Analysis of CSR Instruments 
Awareness, concern and concrete action are going to be scrutinised through an analysis of 
the main instruments of CSR, namely codes of conduct, management standards and sus-
tainability reporting. Responsible behaviour in the realm of sustainability is primarily commu-
nicated through those channels shown in chapter 2. The three main instruments of CSR are 
introduced as the sources of information in the following paragraphs: 
 
1) A code of conduct is defined as a “formal statement of principle defining standards for 
specific company behaviour” (EC 2004: 7). Triggered by a number of severe acci-
dents and scandals and through the further establishment of NGOs and activist 
groups as ‘watchdogs’, a growth of public interest in companies’ social and environ-
mental impacts and their ethical conduct over the past decade can be witnessed (as 
explained in chapter 2.3). As a reaction codes of conduct have rapidly multiplied. 
Through a code of conduct,  
“a company states its values and ethical standards its business subscribes to. 
Some companies adopt codes as a direct response to public pressure (media, 
consumer groups, activists). Besides the positive impact on corporate 
reputation, the adoption and implementation of codes of conduct can entail 
other business benefits such as an improvement in the relationship with 
business partners, the promotion of good governance and legal compliance in 
countries of operations, and increased quality and productivity as a result of a 
healthier work climate” (EC 2004: 8). 
 
2) Management standards are “internal tools for companies to integrate their values into 
everyday practice. They refer to a set of procedures, process steps and specifications 
                                                
48 We assume that the world’s biggest pharmaceutical companies will be represented in Germany as 
one of the largest markets worldwide. 
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that an organisation uses to manage a process or activity” (ibid: 15). In order for their 
commitment to CSR to be taken seriously, companies are expected to develop sys-
tems to implement, assess and evaluate CSR policies and practices. Management 
systems help improve the strategic management of CSR and enhance the companies 
CSR performance, accountability and credibility. Management standards against 
which a company can be certified can be useful benchmarks and communication 
tools of performance. The most well known example for an international environ-
mental management standard is ISO 14001 which was defined and published in 1996 
and has been revised in 2005. What does the standard say? To sum up ISO 14001 in 
one sentence: It requires an organisation to “control and reduce its impact on the en-
vironment” (Whitelaw 2003: 4). However, it does not itself contain specific environ-
mental performance criteria but defines appropriate management systems. This stan-
dard is applicable to any organisation that wishes to:  
• implement, maintain and improve an environmental management system 
• assure itself of its conformance with its own stated environmental policy  
• demonstrate conformance 
• ensure compliance with environmental laws and regulations 
• seek certification of its environmental management system by an external 
third party organization 
• make a self-determination of conformance.49 
 ISO 14001 aims at systematically integrating environmental concerns into the man-
agement of organisations. It is the internationally most widespread norm to certify en-
vironmental management systems (Bilharz 2003: 9). 
 
 
3) Reporting is an activity in which a “company’s social and environmental performance 
is measured against specific indicators, while the auditing or assurance process is the 
verification and assessment of the information given in the report” (EC 2004: 28). 
Sustainability reporting is a relatively new trend as companies only started in the late 
1980s to publish separate environmental reports in addition to financial reports. Since 
then “the number of companies that has started to publish information on its environ-
mental, social or sustainability policies and/or impacts has increased substantially” 
(Kolk 2004: 52). Nowadays, particularly in the largest and most visible companies ar-
guments in favour of reporting prevail over those against it (ibid: 53). This holds es-
pecially true for the analysed pharmaceutical companies.  
 
                                                
49 http://www.iso14000-iso14001-environmental-management.com/iso14001.htm,accessed 04.08.05. 
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 All these activities of companies are seen as instruments for responsible management help-
ing companies to integrate social and environmental norms into their business strategy. 
These instruments are  
“complementary and mutually reinforce one another: in order to translate 
principles into practices, a code of conduct needs to be backed up by a 
management system defining target, processes, roles and responsibilities, and 
management systems often include measurement and reporting mechanisms 
which allow for progress assessment and for identifying targets for 
improvement” (EC 2004: 7) 
Accordingly, the latest reports of all companies (annual reports, sustainable development 
reports/corporate responsibility reports/Environment, Health and Safety reports/sustainability 
reports) were analysed according to the criteria outlined in 3.1. For a complete list of all re-
ports analysed, please see Appendix 6. Why are the CSR instruments and especially the 
reports a) significant and b) reliable source of information? Firstly, they are seen as signifi-
cant as the underlying assumptions of CSR is that voluntary measures only make sense as 
long as they are communicated. Following the logic behind the concept of CSR as explained 
in chapter 2.3, companies that are actively complying with an international norm will be eager 
to inform potential investors, share- and stakeholders about their activities. Corporations are 
subject to a normative competition and have to differ from their competitors to attract cos-
tumers and investors. Hence, they will not refrain from telling about their normatively moti-
vated voluntary commitments if they exist. Secondly, the reliability of the information gath-
ered via CSR instruments can be assed on a case-to-case basis by applying the concept of 
‘implementation likelihood’ as explained in figure 7. 
Figure 7: Implementation Likelihood of CSR Instruments 
When is CSR more than PR? 
For the companies which report on their biodiversity related activities, the question ‘Do they 
act as they claim?’ is of importance. Analogously to what other research on corporate codes 
of conduct has designated as ‘compliance likelihood’ (Kolk/van Tulder/Welters 1999), this 
thesis draws on the concept of ‘implementation likelihood’ as suggested by Kolk (2004: 59). It 
is applied to judge the likelihood that the codes’ and reports’ contents have indeed been im-
plemented by an organisation. At first glance, verification of a report by third parties (mostly 
the major four accountancy firms) gives some kind of assurance about the reliability of a re-
port. However, some remaining problems should be alluded to: 
“The very fact that a report has been audited does not imply that its data and all its contents have 
been checked thoroughly and are fully reliable. Readers still have to scrutinise the audit statement to 
learn about the scope of the assignment and its reliability for the report or parts thereof. There is thus 
no easy, unequivocal way to distinguish ‘greenwash’ from ‘realistic’ reporting that reflects actual per-
formance, with all the shades in between” (Kolk 2004: 61). 
Kolk therefore suggests the following components which are relevant to an assessment of 
the implementation likelihood of a sustainability report: 
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a) Determination of the focus and scope of the report: what is the nature of the report (environmental, 
social, economic or combination?), what is the company’s ambition and objective with regard to report-
ing? What are the standards, codes and guidelines the company is referring to? 
b) What organisational arrangements are to be found in the company?: the existence of  management 
system (ISO certification). 
c) Looking at performance indicators: are the indicators mentioned in a report as detailed and quanti-
tative and preferably as normalised as possible? Do the performance indicators as selected by the 
company itself provide as much relevant and reliable information as possible, based on the present 
state of the art? 
d) Monitoring and verification: which part of the management system is monitored and by whom (com-
panies themselves or external parties paid by them or legal authorities), the existence and nature of 
external verification of the report and the type of verifiers (Kolk 2004: 62). 
Overall, the more specific and comprehensive all the information in the report is, the higher 
the implementation likelihood. Although this analytical scheme admittedly will not provide an 
unequivocal answer to the question of whether companies have really implemented the 
things that they have included in their reports, but it represents a step in that direction. 
 
Bearing in mind the concept of ‘implementation likelihood’ a critical analysis of the pharma-
ceutical companies’ CSR instruments considers the possibility that corporate communication 
on sustainability issues walks the thin line of misusing these instruments as a podium for 
‘greenwashing’50. 
 
2. Contact with Companies 
During the initial phase of this thesis, we sent out a first wave of emails to the default con-
tacts of the 20 targeted companies and posed some broad questions on their potential utili-
sation of genetic resources, corporate policies on biodiversity and possible practical ABS 
experiences. It was thought to establish contacts at an early stage of the research process to 
build upon in the further development of our undertaking and to be able to adjust our ap-
proach as we went along.  
Even though this led to some initial contacts, the overall response rate was somewhat disap-
pointing and it became clear that a more strategic approach was necessary in order to in-
crease this rate. Consequently, each company was contacted via a fax that introduced our 
request and asked for a possible contact person in each company. As a third step, we com-
pleted the identification of responsible contact persons in each company by means of tele-
phone calls and agreed in personal communication on sending out a questionnaire (ex-
plained in further detail below) to these company representatives. In the fourth and final 
phase, we provided the companies (with the exception of Wyeth) with a questionnaire either 
via fax or email, depending on the procedure agreed on beforehand. 
                                                
50 In our understanding of ‘greenwashing’ we follow the Oxford English Dictionary and define it as ‘dis-
information disseminated by an organisation so as to present an environmentally responsible public 
image’. 
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Conceptual design and operationalisation of the questionnaire 
Generally, questionnaires have certain pitfalls (such as response fatigue or measurement 
bias). The most important one in our context is the potential rejection by companies which 
are not willing to provide information for their own reasons. This issue is reflected on in the 
limitations section (3.5). However, we are aware of those pitfalls and the questionnaire was 
only strategically used to obtain some specific information which reduces this problem to a 
certain extent: The questionnaire was designed in order to receive valid first-hand informa-
tion from the concerned pharmaceutical companies to complement the analysis of the com-
panies’ reports. An example of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 26. It aimed at 
cross-checking the information obtained through the reports, gaining additional information 
about the companies’ views and perspectives on biodiversity/CBD/ABS and providing expla-
nations of their rationale behind their policy schemes. The questionnaire was also used to 
determine whether or not the companies actually use genetic resources in their R&D.  
As the questionnaire asked the companies sensitive questions, we expected a low response 
rate. Companies which have an advanced biodiversity policy were more likely to respond to 
the questionnaire whereas companies having ignored biodiversity issues were not likely to 
reply. Nevertheless, the questionnaire was assumed to be useful as one expected outcome 
of the survey was to find out which of the companies do not use genetic resources in their 
R&D at all. Also we hoped to obtain more in-depth information about the companies which 
have some kind of biodiversity policy. Other companies would be defensive, so we did not 
expect to gain much more information about their underlying reasons for not complying with 
the CBD. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections: the first question block clarified the actual 
use of genetic resources (incl. source countries, providing institutions, etc), the second block 
asked about the corporate views and policies on biodiversity loss and the CBD (problem 
awareness, knowledge of CBD/ABS, changes post-CBD) whereas the third block more con-
cretely asked about the actual behaviour/experience regarding the ABS provisions. 
 
The first questions block sought to identify actual user companies of genetic resources and 
revealed information on the type and sources of those resources (providing country, provid-
ing institution, in situ or ex situ) as well as on their use in R&D, especially in which countries 
the research takes place. This is crucial information for the analysis of the corporate policies 
as the concerned nation states might have (ABS or other) legislation in place which had to be 
taken into account. It is also crucial to know the significance of genetic resources for product 
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development. As for the non-user companies, it is interesting to ask about the reasons for not 
using genetic resources in their R&D.  
 
The second questions block aimed to reveal the companies’ knowledge of and views on bio-
diversity loss as an environmental problem and the CBD. This is to determine the problem 
awareness. The following questions concern the corporate biodiversity policies in order to 
determine if awareness translates into policies or changes in conducting business. This block 
tried to assess the influence of the CBD on the pharmaceutical companies. 
 
The third questions block is aimed at achieving knowledge and perspectives on first hand 
experiences from the companies which have benefit-sharing partnerships in place, including 
the question why they voluntarily comply with these norms. To complete the picture, compa-
nies were also asked about the behaviour of their competitors as we assume that they are 
well informed about this and we were interested in their views. The underlying assumption is 
that there is a normative competition among companies aiming to be ‘good corporate citi-
zens’. We also wanted to identify concrete benefits out of the utilization of genetic resources 
for the companies involved (patents, products) as to determine the scope of benefits to be 
shared. Alternatively, companies not having gained any experience with ABS or not having a 
biodiversity policy so far were asked for their reasons for this lack in order to determine ob-
stacles for voluntary corporate policies. 
 
19 of our companies were supplied with a questionnaire with the exception being Wyeth. It 
was not possible to get in touch the respective contact person. Of the 19 companies supplied 
with a questionnaire, Lilly and Amgen were not willing to participate in our survey. Amgen 
claimed not be resourced to handle our request whereas it is part of Lilly’s corporate policy 
not to participate in any surveys. Of the remaining 17 companies, only four replied to our 
questionnaire, namely Roche, Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim and Eisai. Put in number, this 
equals a response rate of 20% (4 out of 20). Roche and Boehringer Ingelheim claimed not to 
use any genetic resources and accordingly their answer was very brief. Eisai also replied 
only briefly by referring to their natural compound library but refusing to comment on any 
other issue. The most detailed information was disclosed by Bayer in a phone interview 
based on the questionnaire. Other than the questionnaire, we obtained information on GSK 
through personal communication with Dr. Melanie O’Neill51. 
                                                
51 per e-mail on May, 16th, 2005. 
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This response behaviour was expected as explained above. Companies with a detailed ABS 
policy in place (GSK, Bayer) were willing to provide information whereas most of the compa-
nies seemingly did not want to comment on biodiversity related issues. 
 
3. Structured Literature Review  
To identify benefit-sharing cases involving the top 20 pharmaceutical companies the relevant 
literature was screened. On its fourth meeting the COP called for case studies to help devel-
oping “a common understanding of basic concepts and to explore all options for access and 
benefit-sharing” (COP 4, decision IV/8). As a result of this call, the Secretariat of the CBD 
provides 28 case studies on different thematic areas and cross-cutting issues.52 All benefit 
sharing case studies found there involving one of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies were 
analysed for this thesis.  
In addition, a very recent study commissioned by the German Federal Nature Protection 
Agency (BfN) includes a comparative table of ABS agreements (Dross/Wolff 2005: 162-181). 
All agreements were screened for involvement of the major pharmaceutical companies.  
Last but not least, the IUCN offers a recent overview of existing implementation processes of 
the ABS provisions from a state perspective and also provides examples for cases (IUCN 
2004). 
 
In sum, this empirical data generated in this study rest upon 
• the latest available annual, environmental and sustainability reports of the 20 biggest 
pharmaceutical companies;53  
• corporate policy statements/codes of conduct and other company publications; 
• contacts with companies through mail/telephone/questionnaire;  
• and the review of relevant secondary literature on concrete ABS cases. 
The analysis of the data generated is the last step in the process and will be described in 
more detail below. 
 
3.4 Indicators for the Analysis of the Data 
In the following, more specific indicators for the three dimensions of behaviour (awareness, 
concern and concrete action as outlined in 3.1) will be introduced: 
 
Criteria 1: Awareness 
Awareness is generally defined as ‘having knowledge of or state of elementary or undifferen-
tiated consciousness’. In our thesis awareness is seen as the first important criteria because 
                                                
52 See http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/benefit/cs.aspx. 
53 For a list of all reports, please see Appendix 6. 
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having knowledge of the problem of biodiversity degradation is the basic precondition for any 
further action. Awareness raising is therefore amongst the fundamental goals of any regime. 
Constructivists argue that issues are not a problem until they are framed as one. Biodiversity 
is not such an obvious or visible environmental problem. The CBD frames biodiversity as a 
problem of global importance. Acknowledgement of this by individual companies is important 
as it first constitutes an elementary consciousness for the issue. Biodiversity loss then be-
comes part of the agenda and has found its way into the company. This is measured with 
indicator 1.1. 
 
Indicator 1.1: position towards biodiversity loss as an important environmental prob-
lem 
 
Criteria 2: Concern 
Concern is generally defined as ‘a matter of interest or importance’ but also has the meaning 
of ‘to be relevant to, affect or involve’. Biodiversity loss as framed by the CBD involves users 
of genetic resources as a crucial part of ABS. The provisions affect commercial users of ge-
netic resources directly. The companies are therefore normatively bound to be concerned 
with biodiversity loss. The possible acceptance of this responsibility is measured with indica-
tor 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
 Indicator 2.1: explicit statement accepting the CBD’s ABS provisions 
 Indicator 2.2: codified concrete approach how to deal with ABS  
 
Criteria 3: Concrete Action 
Concrete Action is the most obvious criteria. As ABS in the pharmaceutical industry is mainly 
ensured through bioprospecting contracts, those agreements are chosen as an indicator to 
measure action (3.1). Indicator 3.2 is measuring if monetary or non-monetary benefits have 
been shared as part of a bioprospecting agreement under the CBD. 
     
 Indicator 3.1: bioprospection agreements under ABS provisions 
 Indicator 3.2: concrete sharing of benefit  
 
Criteria 4: Overall Environmental Capacity 
Building up on the three criteria focussing specifically on biodiversity and ABS, a more gen-
eral one is added here. Capacity is generally defined as ‘the power or ability to do some-
thing’. The overall environmental capacity of companies is supposed to measure the ability of 
companies to deal with environmental issues. The existence of an externally certified man-
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agement system or the quality of the environmental reporting can increase the capacity of 
companies to deal with biodiversity loss and ABS. 
  
 Indicator 4.1: existence of an externally certified environmental management system 
Indicator 4.2: nature and scope of environmental reporting 
 
Altogether with the help of these seven indicators it should be possible to conclude the 
analysis with some basic evaluation of the corporation’s behaviour regarding ABS. This ulti-
mately will answers the question to what extent the ABS provisions of the CBD are currently 
voluntarily realised by the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
3.5 Limitations 
Research on the behaviour of organisations per se has important limitations: Its results are 
not as certain, predictable, valid or reliable as those generated by nature sciences and it is 
difficult to arrive at solid conclusions. Rather than controlled experimentation, the investiga-
tion on the behaviour of companies relies on case studies, the analysis of documentation and 
the use of qualitative investigations and questionnaires to provide the information with which 
it arrives at its conclusions (Pettinger 1996: 3). CRS is making the strategies of companies 
transparent to a notable degree and utilisable for research. Also non-disclosure of informa-
tion can be interpreted as a certain behaviour – the unwillingness to disclose information is 
also a stance from which conclusions can be derived. However, our methodological ap-
proach has to be seen more as a striving towards understanding a complex reality as far as 
possible rather than towards absolute enlightment. Complex social systems are character-
ized by the absence of linear cause-and-effect chains (Cusnick 2000).  
Another major challenge of this thesis relates to the cautious attitude of companies and is a 
well known problem in this field of research. “Organisations may, for their own reasons, be 
unwilling to commission or allow research to take place if it is likely to produce uncomfortable 
or threatening results“ (Pettinger 1996: 12). Pharmaceutical companies might not want us to 
look into their ABS policies. They usually refuse to make the terms of the benefit-sharing 
contracts public. Only a limited number of cases are therefore available as most of these 
contracts are confidential between stakeholders (see OECD 2003: 39; Guerin-Mc Manus 
1998: 11-12). The reason for this confidentiality is to protect the potential profits of all parties 
should a drug be developed. This is criticised by some authors: Tobin argues that bio-
prospecting contracts  
“have been assigned an inordinate level of commercial confidentiality that has 
raised concerns about the nature of these agreements and, in particular, their 
treatment of intellectual property rights and benefit-sharing […] The costs of 
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commercial confidentiality to date have entailed a loss of public confidence, 
both in relation to the adequacy of agreements to protect the national interest 
and to ensure equitable benefit-sharing” (Tobin 2002: 305). 
Also partner institutions in the South hold information on royalty rates and other contract de-
tails confidential (i.e. INBio, see OECD 2003: 18). We contacted several partner institutions 
of pharmaceutical companies (BIOTEC (Thailand), Kunming Institute (China), Extracta (Bra-
zil), but were in the end not able to obtain information on contract details of their bioprospect-
ing contracts. In light of this, this thesis can only rely on information from already existing 
case studies and information revealed through contacts with user companies. 
 
Apart from those points, several other decisions had to be taken to reduce the scope of this 
thesis: 
• This thesis analyses the behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry only with regard to 
the realisation of the CBD’S ABS principles. Their role in the negotiation process of 
the international ABS regime is admittedly an interesting field of study but is not part 
of this thesis. 
• We focus on wild biodiversity, which is excluding agro-biodiversity even though this is 
a very important aspect in the discussion on biodiversity loss (see IÖW et al. 2004). 
It is fully recognised by the authors of this thesis that international regulation and its national 
implementation is not the only answer to the problem of biodiversity loss. Barber et al. argue 
that „[…] it must always be remembered that legislation is not a panacea and that there are 
many complementary approaches […] that countries need to consider in tandem with legisla-
tive and regulatory development” (Barber/Glowka/Vina 2002: 414). Being aware of this limita-
tion, it is nevertheless worth elaborating on the potential of a relatively new regulatory ap-
proach (ABS) as there is a window of opportunity for regulatory change which one cannot let 
slip away. 
Accordingly, ABS is certainly not ‘the one solution’ for global biodiversity protection. How-
ever, it is the hope “that as a by-product of its business the private sector will contribute to 
the conservation of biological diversity, and thus complement the activities of the non-profit 
and governmental sectors” (Laird/Wynberg 1996: 11). Business activities using scarce re-
sources should be used to creating incentives for the conservation of these natural endow-
ments. ABS is trying to tap the potential of private actors and establishes business responsi-
bility to contribute to tackling the problem of biodiversity loss. To judge to what extent this 
approach can be successful is beyond the scope of this thesis. One has to bear in mind, that 
“while ABS may help with the goal of preserving biodiversity, it is just one of many factors 
affecting an uncertain level of desired conservation (OECD 2003: 25). 
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4 Governing ABS within the Framework of the CBD 
4.1 Pre-CBD Biodiversity Governance 
Prior to the CBD, different approaches to tackle biodiversity loss can be distinguished:  
1) Institutional responses can be found in global conventions such as the Ramsar Conven-
tion on Wetlands from 1971 or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) from 1975. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) estab-
lished in 1991 as a supporting financial institution that funds the ‘incremental’ or additional 
costs associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global envi-
ronmental benefits. Moreover, several national governments came up with national biodiver-
sity strategies and action plans.  
2) The operational responses are diverse and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to 
try to deliver a comprehensive account. Therefore, the following paragraphs roughly sketch 
out the important lines of development for biodiversity conservation measures over the past 
decades: 
The dominant ‘big idea’ of conservation throughout the 20th century has been the establish-
ment of protected areas and endangered species legislation. Parks, sanctuaries and re-
serves have been set up, all reflecting the varying ways and opinions as to how people think 
protected areas should be managed. However, the underlying idea of legal protection of eco-
systems, natural resources and landscapes has changed very little (Adams 2003: 4). The 
limits of this approach, which had some success in developed countries, soon became obvi-
ous in the context of developing countries. It soon became apparent that  
“setting aside areas of land as a mechanism for ensuring the conservation of 
biodiversity often meant ignoring long-standing human interactions with the 
ecosystems contained in these areas. This often resulted in protected areas 
whose formal designation had very little impact on the ground (so-called 
‘paper parks’) because mechanisms for supervision and enforcement failed. In 
other cases the best efforts of governments to set aside critical ecosystems 
ran foul of local needs of natural resources, with resulting encroachment and 
degradation”  (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 2000: 6).  
The problem of ‘paper parks’ gave rise to the insight that the protected ‘status’ alone is insuf-
ficient to guarantee biodiversity conservation and that the commitments on paper have to be 
backed up with real, costly effort on the ground (Swanson 1997: 83). He further argues that 
the protected areas movement has been the core of the international conservation efforts but 
its weaknesses have led to the emergence of other, complementary strategies. The IUCN 
World Conservation Strategy published in 1980 “highlighted the need to link protected-area 
management with economic opportunities for adjacent communities based on the experi-
ences previously described” (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 2000: 7).The new strategy puts 
more importance on the idea of ‘sustainable use’ of biodiversity. The debate about conserva-
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tion and development gave rise to the question whether species and ecosystems could be 
harvested sustainably as an option to reconcile the two (see Adams 2004: 15). As a conse-
quence, innovative funding instruments such as ‘debt-for-nature swaps’ (see e.g. Swanson 
1997: 92), or ‘integrated conservation and development projects’ to promote small-scale 
economic development for local communities which otherwise have to rely on their local envi-
ronments were introduced. This was thought to be a way of deflecting pressure away from 
protected areas (Wood/Stedman-Edwards/Mang 2000: 7). 
This progression in approach made the consideration of economic issues an important con-
cern. The fact that the CBD recognizes ‘sustainable use’ as one of its main objectives re-
flects the emerging importance these new approaches had been given in the late 80s. This 
trend  
“comes within a context of trade liberalization, globalization, and the 
development of a hegemonic school of thought according to which the market 
should play an increasing role in all sectors of society while the state seeks to 
diminish its own role. […] Thus the field is open for economics, all 
stakeholders are knocking at its door for both a diagnosis and a prescription” 
(Revéret/Webster 2002: 233). 
Strategies focussing on local economic development as a conservation tool were thus sup-
ported by a growing body of environmental economics. This relatively new discipline sought 
to explain the direct causes of biodiversity loss and focussed on the failure of economic sys-
tems to properly value natural resources. One of the most important issues raised by envi-
ronmental economists was the degree to which biodiversity loss occurs because markets do 
not adequately recognise the cost of society exploiting them (see chapter 4.3 for more de-
tails). Strategies for conservation (such as the debt-for-nature swaps) consequently sought to 
address that lack of economic incentives. 
 
4.2 The Convention on Biological Diversity 
This section briefly introduces the Convention on Biodiversity. It is going to trace the CBD’s 
history in a few words, to explain its objectives and to delineate it from other environmental 
regimes and arguing for its importance. 
In June 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
the so-called "Earth Summit", took place in Rio de Janeiro. For the first time, it was attempted 
to look for common solutions in order to conserve life on earth as such and to aim for a 
global and comprehensive approach. At UNCED, biodiversity has been made the subject of 
a treaty under international law – the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). As stated 
before, the CBD has three main objectives: protecting biological diversity, the sustainable 
use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits generated out of the 
exploitation of genetic resources (CBD Art. 1).  
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The CBD can be seen as a ‘landmark treaty’ (GDI 2002) and is appreciated by major re-
searchers is this field: 
“Whereas earlier treaties dealt with specific aspects of biodiversity, such as 
trade, particular ecosystems, geographic areas or species, the CBD is 
comprehensive in its approach. Its scope is global, covering all components of 
biological diversity, from ecosystems and habitats, species and communities 
to genomes and genes, and it deals not only with the conservation of 
biological diversity in situ and ex situ, but with its sustainable use and benefit-
sharing” (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 13)54. 
The CBS’s scope is much larger and its social and political impact is arguably more profound 
than that of most other Multinational Environmental Agreements (MEAs). It is not just a con-
servation convention in that it also touches core contemporary international issues, such as 
development and trade (Le Prestre 2002: 1).  
According to Laird/Wynberg, the CBD reconciles “the need for con-
servation with the concern for development. It is also based on con-
siderations of equity and shared responsibility, emphasising that natu-
ral resources are the property of individual countries” (Laird/Wynberg 
1996: 10). This is an important shift in international biodiversity policy. 
The Convention changed the legal status of genetic resources from 
‘common heritage of mankind’ (global common good: free access) to 
‘common concern of mankind’ (access subject to national legisla-
tion55) (see Ruiz 2003: 4). This redistributes property rights and can 
be seen as an important win for developing countries at the negotia-
tion table. 
Its three objectives of conservation, sustainable use and benefit-sharing make it perhaps the 
first truly sustainable development convention (Le Prestre 2002: 1). It is therefore an effort 
that goes beyond ‘conservative approaches’ of natural resource management which did not 
suffice in tackling biodiversity loss. The inherent connection of its third objective with devel-
opment and global trade, property-rights, and North-South issues makes the CBD more than 
a purely environmental regime and it might for this reason have the potential to be more suc-
cessful than current approaches or at least complement them by establishing additional in-
centives to protect biodiversity.  
 
 
                                                
54 However, there is also critical views on the CBD (for example see Pearce/Perrings 1995: 39). 
55 The basic condition for ABS, however, is that provider countries of genetic resources assert their 
rights over these resources by enacting national legislation concerning genetic resources. As ex-
plained in detail above not all countries have yet asserted their sovereignty rights (see also OECD 
2003: 23).  
The Chinese Campto-
theca tree is the basis 
for Topotecan, an anti-
cancer drug sold by 
GlaxoSmithKline.
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4.3 Understanding Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) 
As the focus of this thesis is on the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources, the following chapter describes and reviews the general 
ideas and the most important features of the ABS mechanism briefly. For an understanding 
of the mechanism, two main thoughts are to be explained: adding value to biodiversity and 
the ‘grand bargain’ nature of this mechanism. The underlying mechanism of adding value to 
biodiversity is reviewed in terms of economic theory (4.3.1). The ‘grand bargain’ idea ex-
plores the North-South-aspect of the discussion surrounding ABS which is a fundamental 
feature of the regulatory problem (4.3.2). This section will then turn to the Bonn guidelines 
which substantiate the CBD (4.3.3).  
 
4.3.1 The Main Idea of ABS derived from Economic Theory: Adding Value to Biodiversity 
As explained above, biodiversity renders important benefits to all life forms. At the same 
time, however, its depletion has been generating advances for human societies which have 
been developing for many centuries. Naturally existing forms of assets have been converted 
into other forms more valued by human societies. As Swanson strikingly puts it, 
“This trade-off, between the benefits and opportunity costs of conversion, 
constitutes the fundamental problem of biodiversity management. […] 
However, the nature of the services received from biodiversity makes it difficult 
for their value to be translated into incentives for investment in stocks of 
diverse resources. The absence of these incentives is the global problem of 
biodiversity” (Swanson 1997: 10; 76). 
ABS is supposed to create such incentives for conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity. It is hoped that the regulation of access to genetic resources and associated tradi-
tional knowledge, and the sharing of benefits that arise out of their global utilisation with the 
providers of these resources are going to ameliorate the costs of maintening diversity in its 
natural locations as far as possible. Benefit-sharing can include inter alia monetary payments 
as well as the transfer of technology and know-how, education and training and the participa-
tion of providers in genetic resources research. 
The conservation of biodiversity is costly. It is therefore necessary to balance the costs and 
benefits of preserving biodiversity to come to a rational decision (GDI 2003: 4). Adding eco-
nomic value to biodiversity therefore influences the decision in favour of preserving biodiver-
sity – but what is the value of biodiversity and why is it that biodiversity is seen as being un-
dervalued?  
Economic theory distinguishes between different values: The most basic distinction is be-
tween use and non-use values. Biological diversity is used to satisfy human needs in two 
ways: the use value of biodiversity satisfies the consumption or production needs of human 
society while the non-use value satisfies fundamental human needs (e.g. the services of eco-
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systems) (see Perrings et al. 1995: 10). Economists suggest that biodiversity so far has been 
undervalued because of market failure. It is a well known problem that because “ecosystem 
services are largely outside the market and uncertain, they are too often ignored or under-
valued” (Constanza et al. 1997: 259). Indicators of market failure are externalities 
(Pearce/Perrings 1995: 36).  
Figure 8: The Externality Problem 
Generally, “externalities exist when an activity undertaken by one individual or group has a (positive or 
negative) effect on another individual or group, and those affected neither compensate (positive exter-
nality) nor are compensated (negative externality) by those causing the externality” (OECD 2003: 10). 
In our case, positive externalities are services that are rendered from biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices which are not reflected in market prices for biological resources. Negative externalities are im-
pacts of natural resource use on biodiversity which are not reflected in market prices for those re-
sources either.  
From an economic point of view, individual decisions leading to biodiversity loss are privately rational, 
but do not represent the best outcome for society. Accordingly, “the undervaluation of biological re-
sources in the past is the cause of much biodiversity loss in the present” (Pearce/Perrings 1995: 27). 
This is because the private and the social value of biodiversity conservation are different due to the 
fact that individuals can ignore indirect effects of their activities; the so-called externalities. Those ex-
ternalities are not part of the private valuation of biological resources, but they should be part of the 
social valuation of the same resource (argument summed up following Perring et al. 1995: 9-13). 
 
Externalities generally result in socially not optimal resource allocation decisions, which is the 
loss of biodiversity in our context. The challenge for policy therefore is to change the incen-
tive structure towards taking the wider effects into account. How can a changed incentive 
structure be achieved through policy measures?  
Of main interest for this thesis is especially the value of genetic resources (for more detail 
see chart below56). The mechanism of ABS is supposed to partially correct this market failure 
by creating additional value for biodiversity beyond the direct use value. 
The general idea of access and benefit-sharing is fairly easy: If conservation of biodiversity is 
costly, there have to be some local incentives to preserve it. Adding more value to biodiver-
sity will therefore influence the conversion decision: “If more of the benefits of biodiversity 
conservation are locally capturable, the local incentive to biodiversity conservation is in-
creased” (Perring et al. 1995: 17). The more substantial the incentive, the larger the impact 
on conservation will be. The basic assumption of ABS is that economic valuation of biodiver-
                                                
56 It has to be said that as biological diversity has so many dimensions, it is extremely difficult to value 
it in economic terms. The chart displays some categories mainly described by economists and is cer-
tainly not exhaustive or complete. It is supposed just to give a rough idea of the different forms of 
value involved. 
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sity contributes to its preservation as the shared benefits “compensate local and indigenous 
communities as well as governments for not extensively exploiting natural resources” 
(Dross/Wolff 2005: 63). 
Figure 9: The Total Economic Value of Biodiversity 
 
(Source: GDI 2002: 9) 
The most important undervalued features of interest for the argument of this thesis is the 
informational value of biodiversity (also called heritable value; see figure above). Biological 
material is not only useful for mankind as a concrete material to provide the basis for food, 
fuel and other supplies but also because of the information stored in those resources. This 
information is not traded on the market so far and is therefore a widely unaccounted value of 
biodiversity and can be seen as a positive externality. The heritable value of genetic re-
sources represents a large share of their total economic value (GDI 2002: 10). Where market 
mechanisms fail to provide incentives for conversion, complementary policy instruments are 
called for. 
 
Informational Value of Genetic Resources  
Genes are not meaningless or random sequences but biological resources that are particu-
larly useful as they contain biologically active compounds which made evolution and survival 
possible. The activity of those chemicals can be very interesting for industrial applications for 
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example in the pharmaceutical industry, as it limits the search “quite substantially away from 
complete randomness in chemical combinations” (Swanson 1997: 64). Constanza et al. refer 
to this informational value stored in species and ecosystems as an intangible form of capital 
(1997: 254). Intangible forms of capital are difficult to value and it is difficult to set a market 
price for them directly. This is especially the case for the informational value of genetic re-
sources because “assumptions have to be made on future technologies using presently 
known and unknown genetic information as well as on future environmental and market con-
ditions in which genetic resources could be of value” (GDI 2002: 10). However, intangible 
forms of capital can be made tangible through the use of property rights such as patents for 
example. Historically, this has been and still is going on with regard to the informational value 
of inventions. The investment in information of this kind was made lucrative because of social 
norms that protected knowledge through intellectual property rights in the form of patents 
which enable the holder to profit from his invention. This mechanism makes sure that the 
socially desirable investment in knowledge takes place. The informational value of genetic 
resources has so far been not adequately valued; hence investment in biodiversity protection 
has been insufficient so far. To capture the positive externalities described above compensa-
tion schemes or other instruments are needed. One of the options is the assignment of prop-
erty rights to achieve a market-based solution.  
Access and benefit-sharing is attaching additional value to biodiversity beyond payments for 
the material as such by channelling benefits derived from the informational value of genetic 
resources back to the providers of those resources. 
 
Beyond economics 
Value addition can also be viewed as transcending a purely monetary understanding. Sev-
eral case studies outline how innovative benefit-sharing mechanisms in connection with bio-
prospecting can be used to promote biodiversity conservation: 
A case study from Suriname showed that 
• First, the inventory associated with collection of samples can help increase knowledge 
of the fauna and flora of the region, and to preserve indigenous knowledge about their 
medicinal uses. Educational opportunities for scientists and students in source coun-
tries emphasize the benefits of intact forest ecosystems and the study of natural sci-
ences, ethnobiology, and biotechnology. As the value of these resources becomes 
ever more apparent, the incentive to protect them increases on a local, national and in-
ternational scale. 
• Second, the sharing of pharmaceutical technology and equipment can provide source 
countries with the opportunity to increase the economic value of their resources, 
thereby promoting potential alternatives to the unsustainable use of the forests. 
• Third, bioprospecting projects can contribute to the dissemination of traditional medi-
cines beyond the traditional boundaries of a village or community as well as to the 
growing world trade of dietary supplements (Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 1998: 2-3). 
Aalbersberg in his case study also refers to the increased awareness of the value of biodi-
versity as a result of bioprospecting and to the fact that “community members can be trained 
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as sample collectors, processors, to and monitor populations of key species” (Aalbersberg 
1998: 2) which also establishes an incentive for conservation. Moreover, sometimes even 
mere public discussions about benefit sharing may 
increase the appreciation of biological diversity on 
the ground as a case from India shows. Here, the 
herbal traditional knowledge holder Kunjira Moolya 
from Mala, Karnataka, was awarded by the National 
Innovation Foundation (NIF) for his outstanding 
knowledge on the utilisation of approximately 600 
medicinal plants in January 2005. As a conse-
quence of this public recognition, the awareness amongst the villagers of Mala for their bio-
logical assets increased.57  
 
4.3.2 The ‘Grand Bargain’ 
Access and benefit-sharing as a mechanism has an important North-South-component. As 
mentioned before biodiversity is not evenly distributed among the globe. Most of the remain-
ing biodiversity is located in countries of the so-called South which creates a difficult situa-
tion: Biodiversity-poor but technological and capital rich countries exploit genetic resources 
which is mainly located in the South whereas developing nations, rich in terms of biodiversity 
but poor in terms of technology and capital, lack the capacity to do so. ‘The North’ benefits 
from biodiversity while ‘the South’ does not have the necessary funding to protect biodiversity 
which is a global interest58. This constellation led to the birth of ABS. The main idea is to rec-
oncile equity with establishing an additional source of funding for biodiversity protection59. 
The term ‘grand bargain’ has been used to describe this trade-off of balancing “the needs of 
both technologically and biologically endowed countries” (ten Kate/Laird 2000: 243). It is to 
reach two goals simultaneously: enhanced conservation and elevated incomes for the con-
servers (GDI 2002: 10)60. As mentioned before re-distributional policy measures are often 
controversial and this also holds true for benefit-sharing. Developing nations, maybe surpris-
                                                
57 This assessment is based on field studies in Karnataka in January 2005 which were conducted in 
the course of an internship with The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in New Delhi, India. 
58 While overall this still seems to an accurate assessment it should be pointed out that some coun-
tries such as India developed their own biotechnological capacities over the last decade to an extent 
that opens up a South-South scenario of ABS. 
59 It is by no means implied by the authors that this additional funding will be sufficient to protect biodi-
versity as a whole. ABS doesn’t fully compensate for the mentioned market failure but is a step to-
wards bridging the gap between private and social value of biodiversity. However, this is only one 
contributing mechanisms and biological resources are still not going to be adequately valued by intro-
ducing ABS. 
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ingly, have succeeded in bringing this onto the international agenda and outlining the provi-
sions of the mechanism in the CBD61.  
Access versus benefit-sharing is a good deal for both providers and users of genetic re-
sources as the common concern is the protection of biodiversity which is not achievable only 
through conventional, single nation state measures but by a global effort (GDI 2002: 12). 
This mechanism seems to be promising from a conceptual point of view but its practical ‘real 
world’ implications remain to be seen. Practical implementation is an enormous challenge for 
the many industry sectors using genetic resources for product R&D (see ten Kate/Laird 2000: 
243). This thesis goes some way in this direction by analysing corporate policies of the 
pharmaceutical industry with regard to ABS.  
 
4.3.3 The Bonn Guidelines  
To gain an understanding of how ABS is supposed to work, a brief introduction to the stipula-
tions will be provided here. The general principles of the framework for international access 
to and sharing of genetic resources are set out in Article 15 of the Biodiversity Convention. 
Access to genetic resources is contingent upon: 
• adherence to sustainable uses, Art 17 (2), 
• mutually agreed terms (MAT), Art 17 (4), 
• prior informed consent (PIC), Art 17 (5), 
• and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources, Art 17 (7). 
Figure 10: Article 15 of the CBD. Access to Genetic Resources 
1. Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine 
access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic re-
sources for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions 
that run counter to the objectives of this Convention. 
3. For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a Contracting Party, as 
referred to in this Article and Articles 16 and 19, are only those that are provided by Contracting Par-
ties that are countries of origin of such resources or by the Parties that have acquired the genetic re-
sources in accordance with this Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                     
60 There is a growing literature on linking the mechanism to poverty alleviation and other development 
goals (see e.g. GDI 2003). It is unfortunately beyond the scope of our thesis to have a deeper look into 
this discussion. 
61 For more information regarding the negotiation process and how ABS came into being, please see 
McGraw 2002. 
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4. Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the provisions of this Arti-
cle. 
5. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party pro-
viding such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party. 
6. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scientific research based on ge-
netic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with the full participation of, and where possible 
in, such Contracting Parties. 
7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, and 
in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the financial mechanism estab-
lished by Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of re-
search and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of 
genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be 
upon mutually agreed terms. 
 
As the box above shows, Art. 15.7 of the CBD requests to establish administrative, legal and 
political measures in order to guarantee the implementation of ABS but does not contain pre-
cise suggestions or guidelines for the implementation of the ABS (Holm-
Müller/Richerzhagen/Täuber 2005: 16). Also the other provisions are not described in more 
detail as the CBD is only a framework convention. 
The adoption of the Bonn Guidelines on ABS at the 6th Conference of the Parties in The 
Hague in March 2002 was a significant step for the further development of the ABS mecha-
nism (GTZ 2004). The text of the Bonn Guidelines is contained in Decision VI/24 and has 
been published by the Secretariat of the CBD (Secretariat of the CBD 2002). The Bonn 
Guidelines are intended to support the contracting parties and other relevant actors in “shap-
ing national policy, legislative and administrative frameworks on ABS, and/or negotiating bio-
prospecting projects in line with the principles of the CBD” (ibid.). The parties adopted the 
Bonn guidelines to facilitate and promote common approaches to implement ABS amongst 
themselves (OECD 2003: 7). Generally, the guidelines assign different responsibilities to 
countries of origin of genetic resources and countries with users of genetic resources under 
their jurisdiction (Dross/Wolff 2005: 15). 
Interestingly, the guidelines are also expected to assist “stakeholders in developing overall 
access and benefit-sharing strategies…and are intended to help them when …negotiating 
contractual arrangements for access and benefit-sharing” (Secretariat of the CBD 2002: IV). 
Art. 11 lists the objectives of the guidelines: Among them, point (d) is to inform the practices 
and approaches of stakeholders (user and providers) in access and benefit-sharing ar-
rangement. Section C. Responsibilities, lists roles and responsibilities for both users and 
provider parties and stakeholder. This is unusual as generally from a legal perspective provi-
sions of international law do not create any obligation for private actors (individuals or corpo-
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rations) (Godt 2004: 206). They normally only apply to the contracting parties (states) which 
oblige each other to take certain actions. The stipulations are then transposed into national 
law in order to create rights and obligations for private actors. Nevertheless, Art 16 (b) and 
(c) of the Bonn Guidelines stipulate rules for private actors (providers and users) which are 
rather detailed. It will be interesting in the course of this inquiry to see to what extent compa-
nies are aware of those provisions and have formulated corporate policies accordingly. It has 
to be said though, that as the guidelines are still rather broad and due to their non-binding 
nature they leave room for interpretation (Dross/Wolff 2005: 15).  
The Bonn Guidelines faced different points of criticism after its adoption: There was a per-
ceived imbalance of the stipulations on access and those on benefit-sharing. Developing 
countries felt that the guidelines are “not adequate to ensure that the benefits from the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources are equitably apportioned between the countries of origin and the 
users of the resources” (GTZ 2004). From this viewpoint the guidelines mainly elaborated on 
access while the benefit-sharing aspect was left rather unspecific. It has been argued that 
the WSSD call for an international regime therefore stresses more the dimension of benefit-
sharing as opposed to access (Dross/Wolff 2005: 13).  
In general, the main point of criticism was the voluntary nature of the Bonn Guidelines (GTZ 
2004; Dross-Wolff 2005: 19). Countering this view, the executive secretary of the CBD Mr. 
Zedan argues that  
“although they are not legally binding, the fact that the Guidelines were 
adopted unanimously by some 180 countries gives them a clear and 
indisputable authority and provides welcome evidence of an international will 
to tackle difficult issues that require a balance and compromise on all sides for 
the common good” (Secretariat of the CBD 2002: IV).  
The point to be made here is that this discussion is of crucial importance. Are the guidelines 
with their voluntary nature (from a legal point of view) sufficient to achieve appropriate stake-
holder behaviour or is a strong legally binding obligation necessary to make private actors 
comply with the provisions of the CBD respective the Bonn guidelines. The analysis of the 
corporate policies of pharmaceutical companies in the empirical part of this thesis is contrib-
utes to this discussion. 
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5 The Pharmaceutical Industry and Access and Benefit-Sharing: 
An Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Background 
5.1.1 The Pharmaceutical Industry 
This thesis’ analysis focuses on large pharmaceutical companies and their ways of dealing 
with the ABS provisions of the CBD for various reasons: 
First of all, the authors of this thesis follow the line of argumentation of ten Kate and Laird 
who state that the “global market for pharmaceuticals, and the research budgets and profit 
margins of companies in this sector, are relatively large compared with those of other indus-
try sectors using genetic resources” (ten Kate/Laird 2000: 253). The pharmaceutical industry 
is the most R&D intensive in the world spending more on R&D than the botanical medicine 
industry generates in global sales per year (Laird 2000: 89). Moreover, bioprospecting part-
nerships involving pharmaceutical companies attracted attention even before the principles 
of benefit sharing and PIC were articulated in the CBD. The awareness of the convention is 
highest within the pharmaceutical sector (among others) and “direct impacts on corporate 
business practice are greatest in the pharmaceutical sector” (ten Kate/Laird 2000: 257). 
Pharmaceutical companies are therefore already more familiar with this issue, whereas in 
other sectors there is very limited action concerning ABS (e.g. horticulture, biotechnology 
applications). From a practical viewpoint this also means that there is more literature avail-
able.  
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies highly depend on a positive image of their brand name 
which is very visible for consumers. They are presumably more responsive to voluntary 
guidelines than other actors as they are involved in a normative competition with their com-
petitors as described in more detail in chapter 2.4. Furthermore, the pharmaceutical sector is 
of special interest as it often has been central to heated discussions on sustainable devel-
opment issues between the North and the South62. The focus on the biggest and therefore 
                                                
62 This was for instance the case with Intellectual Property Rights on HIV/AIDS medication. In 2001 
Oxfam International campaigned against 39 drug companies to drop their law suit against the South 
African government for alleged violation of WTO patent rules. Oxfam’s Cut the Cost campaign was 
aimed at reducing the price of vital medicines and allowing poor countries to bargain for lower prices 
with the giant pharmaceutical companies in order to have access to cheap generic versions of life-
saving medicines. The campaign caused an immense public stir and made the companies withdrew 
their law suit (Oxfam International 2002: 4). Furthermore, in recent years, several cases of misappro-
priation of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, often labelled as ‘biopiracy’ in the 
public debate, have taken place and caused quite a stir in developing countries. So-called “bad pat-
ents” have been granted (For example: U.S. patent number 5,401,504 on the use of turmeric and 
European Patent number 436257 on neem – both traditional medicinal applications in Indian Ay-
urvedic medicine). 
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most decisive players in this field is mainly due to the necessity to keep the analysis within a 
manageable scale. Additionally, it is assumed that large corporations will be more likely to 
realise ABS due to more capacity in terms of financial and other resources. 
 
The Pharmaceutical Industry in Numbers: Market Size, Structure and Developments 
Markets for pharmaceuticals have seen impressive growth rates during the last few years. In 
1999, the market for pharmaceuticals equalled US$ 320 billion (GBDI/IITA 2000: 8). With 
growth rates between 7 and 9% annually between 2001 and 2004, audited and estimated 
unaudited global sales of pharmaceuticals reached US$ 550 billion in 2004 (IMS World Re-
view 200563). This trend is going to continue in the future. According to Graham Lewis, IMS 
Vice President, "aging populations and the ongoing demand for innovative therapies are ex-
pected to effectively sustain pharmaceutical growth” (IMS World Review 2003). As men-
tioned above, the pharmaceutical industry is a sector heavily investing in research. Put in 
numbers, the R&D expenditures of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies totalled US$ 61.2 
billion in 2004 (see 5.2). These figures create certain expectations with regard to the sharing 
of benefits. However, it has to be said that the single most costly factor in the R&D process is 
the clinical development. However, profits of the pharmaceutical businesses are immense. 
Just to name a few examples: in 2004, Switzerland-based Novartis achieved a net profit of 
US$ 5.8 billion (Novartis 2005: 10), Abbott (USA) US$ 3.2 billion (Abbott 2005: 46) and 
Merck (USA) US$ 5.8 billion (Merck 2005: 2). 
 
The market structure for pharmaceuticals can be characterised as follows: Geographically, 
the most important markets for pharmaceuticals are North America, Japan and the European 
Union. Together those markets accounted for 88% of the audited worldwide pharmaceutical 
sales in 2004 (IMS 2005). In addition to this, there is significant market dominance by a few 
corporations. The world’s top 20 pharmaceutical companies (accoding to sales) account for 
US$ 332.7 billion which equals a global market share of 60,5%. Moreover, even single prod-
ucts can account for huge market shares. The top-selling drug in 2003, Lipitor, had sales of 
US$ 10 billion and it is also significant “that the number of blockbusters continue to grow, 
with 64 products having over US$ 1 billion in sales in 2003, and 23 of those over US$ 2 bil-
lion" (IMS 2004). In 2004 there were 82 ‘blockbuster’ drugs (IMS 2005)64. Of the top 20 com-
panies, nine have headquarteres in the USA, eight in Europe and three in Japan. 
                                                
63 IMS World Review is compiled using the IMS MIDAS global analysis system, which captures the 
dynamics of pharmaceutical activity in more than 80 countries. Growth in sales is measured in con-
stant dollars, enabling analyses without the influence of fluctuating currency exchange rates. Pharma-
ceutical sales figures include prescription and certain over-the-counter data, and represent manufac-
turer prices. 
64 ‘Blockbusters’ are defined as drugs with sales over US$ 1 billion annually. 
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There seem to be two different types of pharmaceutical corporations: life science giants with 
some share in pharmaceuticals or companies focusing entirely on pharmaceuticals (ten 
Kate/Laird 1999: 36). Life science giants are horizontally integrated to an enormous extent. 
They combine business areas including pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, chemicals, agro-
chemicals, agrobiotech and animal health. The second type of pharmaceutical corporations 
are “traditionally large, vertically-integrated concerns that conduct the full range of activities 
from creating libraries of compounds to marketing the drugs that emerge from their pipelines” 
(ibid.). More recently, Platz argues that the life science strategy was primarily adopted during 
the 1990s. In the meantime the concept of integrated life science businesses seems to be 
outdated. The integration of those business branches didn’t meet expectations, neither in 
terms of sales increase nor in above average increases of net profits. A majority of those 
corporations discarded this strategy during restructuring processes between 1998 and 2002, 
partly due to the criticism of shareholders. Most of them are now focussing more on core 
competencies (Platz 2003: 21). This tendency might influence the demand for genetic re-
sources in pharmaceutical R&D as some therapeutic areas do not rely on natural resources 
so much. If companies focus on those areas, they are likely to close down their natural prod-
uct development units. Natural compounds are mainly used in therapeutic areas like anti-
viral, anti-bacterial or anti-cancer products.  
 
Although markets are already dominated by a few large multinational corporations as argued 
above, there is a continued ‘urge to merge’ (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 36) which creates even 
bigger corporations. The number of mergers & aquisitions (M&A) has been increasing tre-
mendously recently which indicates a process of re-orientation and re-positioning in the life 
science industry as mentioned above. M&As in this sector amounted to 324 transactions in 
1999/2000 worldwide, whereas this number increased up to 669 in 2000/2001 (Platz 2003: 
22). Reasons for this tendency are seen in the attempt to “achieve economies of scale, a 
larger pool of funds for increasingly expensive research and development programmes, and 
sometimes to acquire a new drug in another company’s ‘pipeline’” (Laird/ten Kate 2002: 247-
248). 
 
5.1.2 The Use of Genetic Resources in Medicine Development 
From a historical perspective, plants have been the basis for traditional medicines in different 
cultures for thousands of years. Ancient Egyptian, Chinese, and Indian societies used nu-
merous plant-based remedies and preventives. Later, the Greeks and Arabs both contributed 
substantially to the assimilation, codification, and development of plant-based medicines 
(GBDI/IITA 2000: 5). Even today, approximately 80 percent of the world’s population still re-
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lies on traditional plant-based medicines for primary health care. The remaining 20 percent of 
the world’s population indirectly depend on plant products for health (ibid; also BMZ 2002: 
58). 
According to Newman and Laird, natural products contribute in a range of ways to the dis-
covery of a drug which include 
? Biologicals or biopharmaceuticals – an entity that is a protein or polypeptide ei-
ther isolated directly from the natural source or more usually made by recombi-
nant DNA techniques followed by production using fermentation; 
? Natural products – an entity that, though occasionally manufactured by semi-
synthesis or even total synthesis, is chemically identical to the pure natural prod-
uct; 
? Derived from a natural product – an entity that starts with a natural product that 
is then chemically modified to produce the drug; and 
? Structural class from a natural product – this is material where a parent structure 
came from nature and then materials were synthesised de novo but following the 
natural template (in: ten Kate/Laird 1999: 40). 
 
To highlight the dimensions of the importance of genetic re-
sources in the development of pharmaceuticals, it has to be 
acknowledged that a "recent survey published in the Journal 
of Natural Products showed that well over 50% of approxi-
mately 900 pharmaceuticals introduced between 1981 and 
2002 were based on natural products" (Rosenthal 2004: 28). 
UNEP claims that 10 of the world’s 25 top-selling drugs in 
1997 were derived from natural resources (UNEP 2002: 121). 
ten Kate and Laird estimate that components derived from genetic resources account for 
25% to 50% of global pharmaceutical sales (ten Kate/Laird 1999: 2). They also refer to re-
search done by Newman and Laird which finds that 42% of sales of the world’s 25 top-selling 
drugs are “either biologicals, natural products, or entities derived from natural products” 
(ibid.: 34). Deke arrives at similar findings by studying empirical investigations using different 
methods and having different foci. Given the diverse results of those studies, conservative 
estimates are that 25% of the global pharmaceutical product sales are derived from genetic 
resources (Deke 2004: 8). This seems to be the general consensus among researchers in 
this area. For the sake of the argument one could calculate a number for the year 2004: A 
25% share of the global sales volume would equal US$ 137.5 billion. Whereas the general 
value of genetic resources in the drug development process seems to be enormous, it is dif-
ficult to determine the relative importance of genetic resources for the individual company. 
This highly depends on the companies’ strategy of drug development. 
The demand for genetic resources is a crucial factor for the success of ABS. Generally, there 
are at least three current tendencies which potentially could have a positive influence on the 
demand for genetic resources: “Advances in biotechnology have increased the potential 
Clavelina, a group of transparent 
sea squirts. Sea squirts are be-
lieved to host microbes which 
could help fight tumours.
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value of genetic resources, while the rate of biodiversity loss has also increased dramatically” 
(Davalos et al. 2003: 1512) which increases scarcity of these resources. The described 
growth rates for pharmaceutical markets would also suggest an increasing demand for natu-
ral resources. The other side of the coin is that scientific developments (high-throughput 
screening technologies, combinatorial chemistry) create pressure on natural product depart-
ments because combined those two technologies have a promising potential for fast and 
efficient drug development processes. Natural product development is often viewed as too 
slow, costly and problematic. Recent trends in the financial and management decision-
making process to reduce cycle times and costs favour this view. 
However, the current empirical picture seems to be mixed. Laird and ten Kate state that al-
though some companies have scaled down or closed natural products programmes (Abbott, 
SmithKlineBeecham, Shaman Pharmaceuticals) while arguing that “all of the world’s top 
pharmaceutical companies either run natural-products discovery programmes in-house or 
through wholly owned subsidiaries” (Laird/ten Kate 2002: 249). They predict that “natural 
product drug discovery is likely to continue as an element of pharmaceutical R&D, if on a 
modest scale relative to other discovery tools” (ibid.: 250), but also that scientific and techno-
logical advances will lead to a more specific demand for samples. This might include a trend 
away from bulk collections and towards smaller numbers of targeted samples. Trends in bio-
diversity policy and ABS might also influence the future demand for genetic resources. 
Generally, the pharmaceutical business is characterised by long product development cy-
cles. The first step is the discovery process which might or might not be based on a lead 
from nature as explained above. The whole discovery process typically takes six years or 
more and entails costs around US$ 128 million. Following the discovery of a potential drug is 
the actual development process. The development process of a new pharmaceutical product 
typically takes about six years and costs more than US$ 270 million. The entire drug discov-
ery and development process therefore takes approximately 12 years and costs about US$ 
400 million (GBDI/IITA 2000: 7-8).  
After the last clinical tests, the company ultimately has to decide whether to submit the drug 
to the authorities or not (see figure below). The process of reviewing a new drug application 
e.g. by the US Food and Drug Administration takes approximately two years in addition to 
the development process. Generally, the success rate at the outset of the whole process is 
very low. According to Novartis “in average, only one out of 10,000 originally synthesized 
compounds will clear all the hurdles on the way to becoming a commercially available 
drug”65. In the case of success, the net profits for the average new drug amount to nearly 
US$ 3 billion over 25 years (GBDI/IITA 2000: 8).  
                                                
65 http://www.nibr.novartis.com/OurScience/drug_development.shtml; accessed 04.08.2005. 
 Busch and Kern: Realising Access and Benefit Sharing Provisions of the CBD 
 62
For an illustration of the complex, lengthy and costly process of drug discovery, see figure 
below.  
 
Figure 11: The Drug Development Process 
(source: http://www.nibr.novartis.com/images/OurScience/drug.discovery_graph.jpg; accessed 04.08.05) 
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5.2  Presentation of the Empirical Data and Analysis 
As explained in the methodology part in more detail, our thesis is based on the analysis of 
pharmaceutical companies’ behaviour towards ABS. As the most basic result, we identified 
the 20 largest pharmaceutical corporations and gathered information about the yearly turn-
over of their pharmaceutical sections, their world market share and investments in R&D. The 
companies are listed according to their yearly turnover below. This survey can be seen as 
significant as these corporations account for ~60% of the overall global annual sales of US$ 
550 billion of this industry in 2004 – a huge market growing at annual rate between 7 and 9% 
over the past few years. Based on the financial means of these 20 corporations, we assume 
that transnational pharmaceutical corporations have the capacity to deal with ABS issues. 
 
Figure 12: Financial Information on the top 20 Pharmaceutical Companies 
Company 
Yearly turnover in 
billion US$ in 2004 
(pharmaceutical 
section) 
World Market 
Share in Phar-
maceuticals of 
Company in 
2004 
R&D ex-
penses in 
2004 in 
billion US$ 
in 2004 
1 Pfizer Inc (USA) 46,1 8,4% 7,7 
2 GlaxoSmithKline (UK) 32,8 6,0% 5,4 
3 SanofiAventis Pharma (France) 32,2 5,9% 5,4 
4 Johnson&Johnson (USA) 22,1 4,0% 5,2 
5 Merck & Co., Inc (USA) 21,5 3,9% 4,0 
6 AstraZeneca (GB) 21,4 3,9% 3,8 
7 Roche (Switzerland) 19,0 3,5% 4,5 
8 Novartis (Switzerland) 18,5 3,4% 4,2 
9 Bristol-Myers Squibb (USA) 15,5 2,8% 2,5 
10 Lilly Pharma (USA) 13,9 2,5% 2,7 
11 Wyeth (USA) 13,4 2,4% 2,5 
12 Abbott (USA) 13,2 2,4% 1,7 
13 Bayer Health Care (Germany) 11,5 2,1% 2,8 
14 Boehringer Ingelheim (Germany) 11,1 2,0% 1,6 
15 Takeda (Japan)* 10,2 1,9% 1,2 
16 Amgen Inc. (USA) 10,0 1,8% 2,0 
17 Schering-Plough (USA) 6,4 1,2% 1,6 
18 EISAI GmbH (Japan)* 4,9 0,9% 0,7 
19 Schering AG (USA) 4,5 0,8% 0,9 
20 Sankyo Pharma (Japan)* 4,4 0,8% 0,8 
  Total 332,7 60,5% 61,2 
All currency conversions were based on exchange rates as of 31.12.04. Source of Rates: www.xe.com 
*Figures are based on the fiscal year from April 1, 2003-March 31, 2004. 
Source: Own Compilation according to Annual Reports of the Companies 
 
 
The empirical data is presented in a special, condensed format. This follows a structure in 
which the characteristics of each company are shortly outlined. Subsequently, a brief sum-
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mary presents our assessment of the company’s biodiversity and ABS policy. The format has 
been chosen to reduce the size of data presented in order to make the amount of information 
on 20 companies manageable for the reader. The detailed main-assessment of each com-
pany, including exact sources from their reporting, internet presence, codified codes of con-
duct, secondary literature, questionnaire and the like are extensively documented in Appen-
dix 7-26 (all empirical data has been gathered as explained in more detail in chapter 3.3.). 
For an overview, Appendix 6 contains a complete list of all company reports analysed. The 
assessment is based on the indicators outlined in 3.4. The indicator performance of every 
company will be brought together in a table which will be presented in section 5.3 to summa-
rise the analysis.  
 
5.2.1 Pfizer Inc. (USA) 
In 1849, Charles Pfizer opened a fine-chemicals business 
in New York. Today, Pfizer Inc. is the world’s largest re-
search-based, global pharmaceutical corporation. It dis-
covers, develops, manufactures and markets medicines 
for humans and animals as well as consumer healthcare 
products. Pfizer’s pharmaceutical business accounts for 
88% of the company’s revenues (US$ 46.1 billion). To put this figure into perspective: the 
Costa Rican GDP was US$ 18.2 billion in the same year. With spending of approximately 
US$ 7.7 billion in research&development (R&D) in the same year, Pfizer features the phar-
maceutical industry's largest R&D organisation, active in hundreds of research projects 
across multiple therapeutic areas (Pfizer 2005: 2; 9; 10). 
 
Summary 
Pfizer has no official position on biodiversity. The company does not explicitly acknowledge 
the CBD and its ABS provisions and has not adjusted a coherent approach how to deal with 
them. Accordingly, Pfizer has not entered into any benefit sharing agreements. This may be 
due to the fact that the company has closed its natural product research group for the time 
being. 
 
5.2.2 GlaxoSmithKline (UK) 
The history of GSK is difficult to portray as today’s corporation has many roots: Starting in 
the 1830s different entrepreneurs opened drugstores in the US, England and New Zealand. 
After a process of merging that took over 150 years, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was finally 
formed in 2000 through the merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham. Today, 
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GSK is a UK-headquartered world leading research-based pharmaceutical company with 
sales of US$ 32.8 billion (pharmaceutical section) in 2004 and an investment of US$ 5.4 bil-
lion in R&D (GlaxoSmithKline 2005a: 2; 66). 
 
Summary 
GSK, as already its predecessor companies Smith-
Kline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome, has experi-
ence with biodiversity initiatives. Consequently, 
GSK’s corporate policy on biodiversity seems to be 
a straightforward and detailed way of accepting and 
following the CBD provisions at least on the con-
ceptual level. The company’s biodiversity statement directly refers to the CBD and even spe-
cific ABS provisions (PIC, MAT) and mentions partnerships in place to obtain access to ge-
netic resources. It remains to be answered in how far this commitment translates into sharing 
of benefits on the ground.66 The mentioned ABS cases (Rhodes University, Extracta) give 
some indications but do not provide enough information for a more detailed assessment. It 
would be crucial to obtain direct information from the partners to the agreement which proved 
to be difficult. However, GSK has a detailed and extensive biodiversity policy including ac-
cess and benefit-sharing agreements and direct reference to other CBD provisions (PIC, 
technology transfer), entered into partnerships with NGOs, supports nature conservation pro-
jects and implements biodiversity site management. GSK seems to be more active in this 
field than most of the competitors. 
 
5.2.3 Sanofi-aventis Pharma (France) 
Sanofi has been created by Elf Aquitaine in 1973. In 1998-1999 
Sanofi merged with Synthélabo and the new group refocused on 
its core business: pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, Rhône-Poulenc 
and Hoechst created Aventis which was then a new leading life 
science company. Only in 2004, the two companies merged to 
SanofiAventis. The corporation is headquartered in France and 
has seven therapeutic areas (cardiovascular, thrombosis, central 
nervous system, oncology, metabolic disorders, internal medicine and vaccines). Pharma-
ceuticals account for 90% of its business, while vaccines account for 10%. With about 
100,000 employees worldwide Sanofi-aventis is present in more than 100 countries. The 
                                                
66 One of the remaining questions is e.g. why the biodiversity policy statement is not part of the official 
corporate responsibility report which is externally verified. 
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companies sales amounted to US$ 32.2 billion in 2004, while investing US$ 5.4 billion in 
R&D (Sanofi-aventis – 2005a: 2; 6). 
 
Summary 
Sanofi-Aventis seems to neglect the problem of biodiversity loss entirely and does not refer 
to the provisions of the CBD at any point. This is rather surprising because Aventis (on of the 
predecessor companies) has had a position paper on biodiversity issues and also conducted 
other biodiversity protection activities (Appendix 9). It is unclear why SanofiAventis after the 
merger did not adopt a similar corporate policy.  
 
5.2.4 Johnson&Johnson (USA) 
The company history dates back to as 1886 when the three Johnson 
brothers started operations with 14 employees in New Brunswick, 
US. In 1887, the Company was incorporated as Johnson&Johnson 
(J&) and entered the antiseptics and surgical dressings industry. 
Nowadays, J&J is a manufacturer of health care products as well as 
provider of related services for the consumer, pharmaceutical, and 
medical devices and diagnostics markets. The corporation employs 
111,000 people in 57 countries.67 The pharmaceutical segment alone had sales worth US$ 
22.1 billion in 2004 and J&J invested US$ 5.2 billion in R&D (Johnson&Johnson 2005a: 30; 
32). 
 
Summary 
In J&J’s reports biodiversity protection is merely seen as a matter of nature conservation in 
developing countries which is an important global concern and therefore sponsored finan-
cially. It is, however, neither linked to the company’s R&D activities nor the provisions of the 
CBD. 
 
5.2.5 Merck & Co., Inc (USA) 
Merck is a global research-driven pharmaceutical company that was established in 1891 in 
New York by George Merck. Merck discovers, develops, manufactures and markets vaccines 
and medicines in over 20 therapeutic categories. The company’s pharmaceutical section had 
revenues of US$ 21.5 billion in 2004 and R&D expenses of US$ 4.0 billion. Merck has about 
70,000 employees in 120 countries and 31 factories worldwide (Merck 2005: 4).  
                                                
67 http://www.jnj.com/our_company/index.htm, 
http://www.jnj.com/our_company/history/history_section_1.htm; accessed 22.06.05. 
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Summary 
Merck is aware of the problem of biodiversity loss. Even though the 
company provides for the probably most well known case of an 
implemented benefit sharing agreement, the Merck-INBio case, the 
company communicates no clear position on the Convention on 
Biodiversity and its ABS provisions. Furthermore, there is indica-
tion that Merck has drastically reduced or even closed its natural 
product programme and is therefore not concerned with ABS. 
  
5.2.6 AstraZeneca (UK) 
AstraZeneca has been formed in April 1999 through the merger of Astra AB (Sweden) and 
Zeneca Group PLC (UK). Astra was founded in 1913 and has been headquartered in 
Södertälje, where now the corporate R&D headquarters is situated.68 After the merger, As-
traZeneca is now one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies with yearly sales of 
US$ 21.4 billion (pharmaceutical section; in 2004) and R&D investments of US $3.8 billion 
(AstraZaneca 2005a: 1). 
 
Summary 
AstraZeneca is fully aware of the problem of biodiversity issue and of the CBD as a 
global attempt to halt its loss69. In this respect, the corporate policy is quite advanced 
and detailed compared to other companies. However, 
AstraZeneca does not feel responsible for biodiversity 
degradation and does therefore not accept the ABS pro-
visions of the CBD. Biodiversity loss is narrowly framed 
as an issue of nature conservation although bioprospect-
ing activities are mentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
68 http://www.astrazeneca.com/article/11167.aspx; accessed 15.06.05. 
69 The detailed corporate policy statement is not part of the verified corporate responsibility report. In 
this official document only the problem of biodiversity loss is acknowledged while negating any major 
impact on global biodiversity of the company’s activities. 
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5.2.7 Roche (Switzerland) 
Roche was founded in 1896 by Fritz Hoffmann-La Roche in 
Basel, Switzerland. The company is nowadays arranged in two 
operative divisions: Pharmaceuticals and Diagnostics. In 2004, 
Roche’s pharmaceutical division had revenues of US$ 19 bil-
lion. The company employed almost 65,000 people worldwide 
and its research and development budget accounted for US$ 
4.5 billion in the same year (Roche 2005: 16; 1).  
 
Summary 
Roche is fully aware of the problem of biodiversity loss. It is explicitly accepting the Conven-
tion on Biodiversity and states to follow its provisions regarding ABS in case of any future 
bioprospection activities. As the company is not active in natural product development, it has 
not entered into any concrete ABS agreements.  
 
5.2.8  Novartis (Switzerland) 
The Novartis group sees itself as a world leader in the 
research and development of pharmaceutical products. It 
was created in 1996 from the merger of two Swiss com-
panies, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, whose histories’ date 
back to the 19th century.70 Novartis is organised into three 
divisions: 1) Pharmaceuticals, which comprise activities in 
innovation-driven prescription medicines (~60% of turnover), 2) Sandoz, which comprises 
activities in generic prescription drugs, and 3) Consumer Health, which comprises activities 
in Over-The-Counter, Animal Health, Medical Nutrition, Infant&Baby and CIBA Vision. In 
2004, the Group's pharmaceutical section achieved sales of US$ 18.5 billion. The Group 
invested approximately US$ 4.2 billion in R&D. Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, Novar-
tis Group companies employs about 81,000 people and operates in over 140 countries 
around the world. 
 
Summary 
                                                
70 Sandoz gained notoriety in 1986 when a fire broke out in its chemical factory near Basel, Switzer-
land. As firemen extinguished the flames, water mixed with toxic pesticides and ~ 30 t fungicide con-
taining mercury flew into the Upper Rhine. The deadly cocktail killed tons of fish and other animals, 
and prompted a drinking water alert for 50 million people as far away as Amsterdam. The disaster 
occurred just months after the Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl and the shock gave further impe-
tus to the environmental movement at that time, not only in the neighbouring European states. 
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Novartis is well aware of the ecological problem of biodiversity loss. The company has natu-
ral product development activities and clearly relates those to the ABS provisions of the 
CBD. It furthermore accepts the concept of benefit sharing and has experience in at least 
one concrete case in Mexico. In this agreement, the direct monetary benefits for the commu-
nities have been low, while the non-monetary benefits such as capacity building and technol-
ogy transfer have been emphasised strongly.  
 
 
5.2.9 Bristol-Myers Squibb (USA) 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb (BMS) is a US-based pharmaceuticals and 
health care company which is headquartered in New York. Its roots 
date back to as early as 1887. After having financial problems during 
the first years, the company changed its business focus a few times, 
before Bristol-Meyers merged with Squibb in 1989 creating a global 
leader in the health care industry. BMS today is specialised on devel-
oping medicines for cancer, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, 
cardiovascular diseases and pain and sells nutritionals and other healthcare products. The 
corporation employs 43,000 people.71 BMS had net sales of pharmaceuticals of US $15.5 
billion in 2004 and invested US$ 2.5 billion in R&D (Bristol-Myers-Squibb 2005: 35; 41). 
 
Summary 
Apart from a brief statement on bioprospecting, the official BMS’ policies refer to the problem 
of biodiversity loss as one to be tackled by local site nature conservation projects. They do 
not take further CBD objectives into account. However, the importance of biodiversity in de-
veloping new medicines is directly acknowledged. 
By engaging in the ICBG agreements BMS has shown commitment to the ABS principles. 
The advance payments to the Suriname Forrest People Fund (US$ 160,000 in total) give a 
rough idea about the magnitude of monetary benefit-sharing so far. 
Unfortunately, there is no further, more detailed information available on the involvement of 
BMS in the ICBG. It is therefore not possible to derive more elaborated conclusions from 
those examples other than an obvious one: BMS is involved in different bioprospecting and 
drug development agreements which aim at sharing benefits from the utilization of genetic 
resources although the official corporate biodiversity policy does not state this. It remains to 
                                                
71 http://www.bms.com/aboutbms/data/index.html; 
http://www.bms.com/aboutbms/content/data/ourhis.html; accessed 17.06.2005. 
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be seen whether or not BMS also engages in partnerships which are not supported by the 
US government72 and develops a general corporate policy on ABS. 
 
5.2.10 Lilly Pharma (USA) 
Eli Lilly and Company is a global, research-based company which was founded in May 1876 
in Indianapolis, USA. Today the company has more than 44,000 employees worldwide with 
approximately 8,400 employees engaged in research and development73. The pharmaceuti-
cal section’s net sales in 2004 amounted to US$ 13.9 billion meanwhile the company in-
vested US$ 2.7 billion in product R&D (Lilly 2005a). It is considered to be one of the leading 
innovation-driven pharmaceutical corporations. 
 
Summary 
In Lilly’s corporate policy, biodiversity is solely 
viewed as nature conservation and the company’s 
responsibility aims to be covered by conservation 
projects on their own sites and beyond. The CBD 
and the following obligations are not mentioned at all. 
 
5.2.11 Wyeth (USA) 
Headquartered in the US, Wyeth is one of the largest re-
search-based pharmaceutical and health care products com-
panies in the world. Wyeth had a spending of approximately 
US$ 2.5 billion in overall research and development in 2004 
while its pharmaceutical section had annual sales of US$ 13.4 
billion (see Wyeth 2005: 33; 62). Its pharmaceutical division 
includes biopharmaceutical drugs, prescription products, nutri-
tionals and vaccines. 
 
Summary 
Wyeth is an interesting case as the company is both a) aware of the problem of biodiversity 
loss and b) participated in the ICBG programme aiming at exploring possibilities for a sus-
tainable use of biodiversity through bioprospection and benefit sharing. Similarly to BMS who 
                                                
72 The US government was not directly part of the agreement but was crucial in the project in providing 
funding, policy guidance, and easing local fears regarding project goals as well as assisting and rais-
ing the project profile within the Suriname government (Guerin-Mc Manus 1998: 18).  
73 http://www.lilly.com/about/history.html, http://www.lilly.com/about/highlights.html;, 
http://www.lilly.com/about/citizenship/profile/profile_index.html; accessed 15.06.2005. 
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also participated in the ICBG (see 5.2.9), Wyeth however, has no coherent policy on how to 
deal with the CBD and its ABS provisions.  
 
5.2.12 Abbott Laboratories (USA) 
Abbott is a US-based company headquartered in Chicago which was founded by Dr. Abbott 
in 1888 and has since then developed into one of the world’s leading health care compa-
nies74. Abbott nowadays produces pharmaceuticals, nutritionals and diagnostics and is split 
into two business groups: pharmaceutical products and 
medical products. Its 2004 net sales of pharmaceuticals75 
amounted to US$ 13.2 billion while the company invested 
US$ 1.7 in R&D (Abbott 2005: 57; 46). Abbott has 60,000 
employees worldwide. 
 
Summary 
Abbott doesn’t demonstrate any awareness neither of the problem of biodiversity loss nor 
regarding the CBD provisions. In general, Abbott seems to lag behind their competitors in 
terms of environmental awareness and corporate social responsibility (incl. reporting).  
 
5.2.13 Bayer Health Care (Germany) 
Bayer is a research-based global enterprise with three 
subgroups: Bayer Health Care AG, Bayer CropScience AG 
and Bayer MaterialScience AG. Bayer is headquartered in 
Leverkusen, Germany and has 113,000 employees world-
wide. The enterprise has been founded by Friedrich Bayer 
in 1863 while the pharmaceutical department was estab-
lished in 1888. Bayer was the company developing Aspirin® in 1897, which became the 
world’s best known painkiller. Nowadays, Bayer Health Care has annual net sales of US$ 
11.5 billion and a R&D budget of US$ 2.8 in 2004 (Bayer 2005a: 5; 33). 
 
Summary 
Bayer is well aware of the biodiversity issue and the provisions of the CBD and claims to act 
accordingly. Furthermore as part of their own responsibility, Bayer is supporting on-site na-
ture conservation projects. However, it is surprising that Bayer does not elaborate on the 
                                                
74 http://www.abbott.com/corporate/history.cfm#1929; 
http://www.abbott.com/corporate/corporate_overview.cfm; accessed 15.06.05. 
75 The figure for the 2004 net sales encompasses sales in pharmaceuticals plus ‘International’ (Non-
U.S. sales of Abbott’s pharmaceutical and nutritional products). 
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corporate biodiversity policy in their sustainable development report. The nature protection 
activities are part of a corporate sustainability policy which is highly appreciated but the re-
port does not directly refer to the provisions of the CBD.  
However, beyond the official reporting Bayer takes a firm stand with regard to the CBD and 
its ABS provisions. Normative assumptions of the Convention are supported and they are 
operationalised through various research contracts involving benefit-sharing. Bayer has 
transferred technology and up-front payments. Milestone payments and royalties are also 
part of those contracts. However, none of the compounds reached this stage and Bayer is 
going to end its natural products activities due to lacking success.  
 
5.2.14 Boehringer Ingelheim (Germany) 
Boehringer Ingelheim was founded in 1885 by Albert Boehringer as a chemical factory in 
Ingelheim (Germany), where the corporate headquarters are still located today. Whereas the 
company mainly produced citric acid and lactic acid during 
the first years, it broadened its business to pharmaceuticals 
in the 1950s. Today, Boehringer Ingelheim is one of the most 
successful pharmaceutical companies in the world.76 The 
pharmaceutical section’s net sales in 2004 amounted to US$ 
11.1 billion while the company invested US$ 1.6 billion in 
R&D (Boehringer Ingelheim 2005: 87; 115). 
 
Summary 
The problem of biodiversity loss is generally acknowledged and the issue is framed as nature 
conservation. The company does not use genetic resources in their R&D processes and is 
therefore not subject to the CBD and its ABS provisions. In general, Boehringer Ingelheim 
seems to lag behind their competitors in terms of environmental awareness and corporate 
social responsibility behaviour (incl. reporting).  
 
 
5.2.15 Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited (Japan) 
Takeda is a research-based global company with its main focus on 
pharmaceuticals. It has been founded in 1781 by Chobei Takeda who 
started selling traditional Japanese and Chinese medicines in Osaka. 
One hundred years later, the company began to import Western 
                                                
76 http://www.boehringer-ingelheim.com/corporate/corp/corp_hist.htm; accessed 18.06.2005. 
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medicines. Today, it is the largest Japanese pharmaceutical company. Takeda discovers, 
develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of pharmaceutical products. The com-
pany had revenues of US$ 10.2 billion in 2004. Its R&D expenses totalled US$ 1.2 billion 
(Takeda 2005: 1). 
 
Summary 
Takeda appears not to be aware of the problem of biodiversity loss, the CBD and its ABS 
provisions. In comparison with its competitiors, the company’s CSR performance is lagging 
behind. A voluntary realisation of ABS is in this case highly unlikely. 
 
5.2.16 Amgen Inc. (USA) 
Amgen Inc. is a US-based company which is considered to be a 
leading pharmaceutical company in the biotechnology industry. It 
was only founded in 1980 as AMGen (Applied Molecular Genetics). 
Amgen pioneered the development of novel and innovative prod-
ucts based on advances in recombinant DNA and molecular biol-
ogy77. It is now the world’s largest biotechnology company which 
has more than 14,000 employees, accumulated US$ 10.0 billion revenues from product 
sales and invested US$ 2.0 billion in R&D in 2004 (Amgen 2005: 28). 
 
Summary 
Amgen does not show any acknowledgement of the problem of biodiversity loss, the CBD or 
ABS provisions. Generally, the company seems to lag behind their competitors regarding 
corporate social responsibility behaviour and the associated reporting. Awareness of envi-
ronmental issues seems to lack completely. 
 
5.2.17 Schering-Plough (USA) 
The company has been established in the late 1800s 
as the U.S. subsidiary of the German Schering AG, 
before it was incorporated in New York City in 1928. 
Schering Corporation became a global research-
based pharmaceutical firm, and in 1971, merged with 
Plough Inc., a worldwide manufacturer of consumer products, to create Schering-Plough 
Corporation. The company’s pharmaceutical section had revenues of US$ 6.4 billion in 2004 
                                                
77 http://www.amgen.com/about/amgen.html, http://www.amgen.com/about/company_history.html, 
http://www.amgen.com/citizenship/overview.html; accessed 15.06.05. 
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and spent US$ 1.6 billion on its research and development programme (Schering-Plough 
2005: 10; 1).  
 
Summary 
Schering-Plough does not have a policy on biological diversity and the CBD. No involvement 
in bioprospecting projects under ABS provisions has been documented.  
 
5.2.18 Eisai (Japan) 
The company history dates back to 1936 when Toyoji 
Naito established the Sakuragaoka Research Laboratory 
which is Eisai’s predecessor company. Through mergers 
and acquisitions the company grew bigger and started 
from the 1950ies on to produce and market pharmaceuti-
cal products.78 Today, Eisai is has yearly net sales of US$ 
4.9 billion and a R&D budget of US$ 0.7 billion (Eisai 2004: 1). 
 
Summary  
Beyond the mentioned aspect of legal compliance due to some Japanese regulation (see 
Appendix 24), a general acknowledgement of the problem of biodiversity loss as framed by 
the CBD seems not to be in place. Furthermore, the company was not willing to comment on 
any issue related to biodiversity which strongly suggests that the corporation does not have 
any kind of biodiversity policy at all and seems to negate any responsibility in this respect. 
 
5.2.19 Schering AG (Germany) 
Ernst Schering, a pharmacist, opened the "Green Pharmacy" in Berlin in 1851. Schering de-
veloped into a global pharmaceutical company which focuses 
on the four business areas gynecology & andrology, oncol-
ogy, diagnostic imaging and specialized therapeutics. The 
company had a pharmaceutical section’s turnover of US$ 4.5 
billion and R&D spending of US$ 0.9 billion in 2004 (Scher-
ing 2005: 4; 3). 
 
Summary 
                                                
78 http://www.eisai.co.jp/ecompany/eprofile/etimeline.html; accessed 19.06.2005. 
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Schering is not aware of biodiversity in general, the company has no position towards the 
Convention on Biodiversity and access and benefit sharing and has not been involved in any 
concrete benefit sharing agreements.  
 
5.2.20 Sankyo Pharma (Japan) 
Sankyo is the second largest pharmaceutical company in 
Japan and the company’s history dates back to the end 
of the 19th century. In 2004, it had annual revenues of 
pharmaceutical section of US$ 4.4 billion and its R&D 
budget amounted to US$ 0.8 billion in the same year. 
Currently, the company is engaged in product develop-
ment in the area of anti-cancer and infectious diseases (Sankyo 2005: 43; 22). 
 
Summary 
Based on the investigation of Sankyo’s annual report and its internet presence, the company 
does not regard biodiversity as an issue and has accordingly no policy in place. Neither the 
CBD nor access and benefit sharing are considered as being of relevance to the company’s 
activities.  
 
 
5.3 Summary 
The data presented above has been assembled following the indicators developed in chapter 
3.4. Accordingly, to present the data in a brief overview, the following figures reduce the in-
formation gathered about the companies’ behaviour in three steps: Figure 13 gives an over-
view about the performance of the studied companies for the seven indicators measured. 
Subsequently, Figure 14 compresses this information in a table compiling the individual 
companies’ activities with regard to the three criteria for behaviour (awareness, concern and 
action), before Figure 15 finally transfers this data into numbers. Companies that turned out 
not to utilize genetic resources, are displayed in grey. Indicator performance is shown in 
green whereas non-performance is highlighted in red. 
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Figure 13: Indicator Results Matrix 
 
 
As the most important information for this thesis is the behaviour of companies. This has 
been measured along the three criteria introduced in chapter 3.1 and is illustrated in the fol-
lowing figure: 
Figure 14: Criteria Results Matrix 
Company Awareness Concern Action 
Pfizer Inc No No No 
GlaxoSmithKline  Yes Yes Yes 
SanofiAventis Pharma  No No No 
Johnson&Johnson Yes No No 
Merck & Co., Inc Yes No Yes 
AstraZeneca Yes No No 
Roche Yes Yes No 
Novartis Yes Yes Yes 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Yes No Yes 
Lilly Pharma  Yes No No 
Wyeth Yes No Yes 
Abbott Laboratories No No No 
Bayer Health Care Yes Yes Yes 
Boehringer Ingelheim Yes No No 
Takeda Pharmaceutical No No No 
Amgen Inc. No No No 
Schering-Plough No No No 
Eisai Co., Ltd. No No No 
Schering AG No No No 
Sankyo Pharma Yes No No 
 
To put the behaviour of single companies in a condensed table for an overview, we assem-
ble the data in the following figure: 
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Figure 15: Behaviour of Pharmaceutical Companies regarding ABS79 
Dimensions of Behaviour 
 
Performance  
according to  
indicators 
 
Awareness Concern Action 
Fulfilled 10 3 6 
Not Fulfilled 7 14 11 
 
 
5.4 Interpretation 
The behaviour of the companies regarding the ABS provisions is quite varied. Departing from 
our findings presented in Figure 14, five different groups of companies can be distinguished:  
1) Group I encompasses the three companies that refrain from using genetic resources 
for their R&D processes. They are not subject to ABS provisions and are therefore 
treated as a separate group regardless their performance.  
2) Group II consists of seven companies that do not perform in any of the dimensions of 
behaviour (Awareness: No, Concern: No, Action: No). 
3) Group III sums up the four companies that are aware of the biodiversity problem but 
do not show any further behaviour (Yes/No/No).  
4) Group IV pools the three companies that have been involved in concrete ABS pro-
jects without generating any corporate strategy towards the CBD and ABS 
(Yes/No/Yes). 
5) Group V consists of the three pharmaceutical companies which do voluntarily realise 
the CBD’s ABS provisions (Yes/Yes/Yes).  
 
The table below illustrates the number of companies in each group and puts those number in 
relation to the overall target group (percentage based on 100% = 20 companies). 
                                                
79 The number of companies has been reduced by three as will be explained in section 5.4.1. 
Dimensions of Behaviour 
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Figure 16: Number and Percentage of Companies per Group 
3    15%
4    20%
7    35%
3     15%
3    15%
Group I: Refrain from Use
Group II: No/No/No
Group III: Yes/No/No
Group IV: Yes/No/Yes
Group V: Yes/Yes/Yes
  
5.4.1 Group I: Drop-out 
Because of the significant overall importance of genetic resources in pharmaceutical R&D as 
outlined in section 5.1, this thesis was based on the assumption that the analysed companies 
being world leaders in this field would also use genetic resources. In light of the empirical 
data generated, this assumption has to be modified. The replies to our questionnaire from 
some companies indicated that they don’t use genetic resources at the moment (Boehringer 
Ingelheim, Roche). Pfizer did no reply to the questionnaire, but our analysis of secondary 
literature revealed that they pulled out of natural product research in 2003. Hence, those 
three companies are not addressees of the CBD’s ABS provisions as well as the Bonn 
Guidelines and do not have any obligation to share benefits. This reduces the target group to 
17 companies. 
However, it is still possible to draw interesting observations from this group: Two of the three 
companies are aware of the loss of biodiversity. Thus, the CBD and its provisions at least 
might have had some kind of impact in the sense of increasing problem awareness. Surpris-
ingly, Pfizer as the biggest pharmaceutical corporation of the world does not show any con-
cern for biodiversity or the CBD as an important environmental convention. Generally, Pfizer 
seems to lack behind their competitors in terms of general environmental awareness.  
Furthermore it is interesting to know why the mentioned companies do not use genetic re-
sources and if there is any connection with the CBD and its ABS provisions. On request, 
Roche explained that the company “has concentrated its efforts since quite a long time on 
innovative technologies such as genetics/genomics/proteomics etc. Therefore, at present, 
there is no need for Roche to use natural resources” (Matile-Steiner 200580). The CBD provi-
sions did not play a role in this decision as Roche further explains: "This evolution had noth-
ing to do with the CBD's access and benefit sharing provisions. Roche is committed to ob-
                                                
80 Personal communication, August, 4th 2005. Ms Matile-Steiner is attorney-at-law at Roche’s Corpo-
rate Communication/Government Affairs department. 
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serve the CBD obligations if it were to seek access to, and explore, genetic resources in the 
future” (ibid.).  
Boehringer Ingelheim argued similarly that “up to now we do not believe in a successful natu-
ral products strategy for new active pharmaceutical ingredients”, but also sees no connection 
of this decision with the provisions of the CBD (Leidig 200581).  
As Pfizer did not reply to the questionnaire we were not able to obtain any information on 
why Pfizer is not utilising genetic resources. 
 
Two out of four companies which replied to our questionnaire belong to this group of compa-
nies refraining from the use of genetic resources. This is not surprising as for them it is a 
rather ‘easy way out’ because the CBD does not contain any relevant provisions for them. 
They therefore do not have to disclose information on a sensitive issue in case they use ge-
netic resources but do not follow ABS provisions. It is more likely that companies which use 
genetic resources have refrained from answering our questions.82  
 
There seem to be very different views on the potential of natural product research in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Some companies such as Pfizer, Roche and Boehringer Ingelheim 
refrain from using genetic resources whereas for others the screening of natural components 
is a decisive part of their R&D strategy such as Novartis. Amstutz, Global Head of Discovery 
Technologies at Novartis, says that “Natural products research and activities was and will be 
a major contributor to drug discovery at the Novartis Institutes for BioMedical Research” 
(Rosenthal 2004: 31). In Novartis’ view, the potential of natural products as a source for new 
medicines is by far not exhausted.  
Some authors claim that there seems to be an opposite trend, especially of pharmaceutical 
giants in the US which “have discarded natural drug discovery and shifted resources into 
combinatorial chemistry and genomics research” (Rosenthal 2004: 31). This is interesting as 
the USA is not Party to the CBD which would suggest that regulation does not seem to play 
an important role in the companies’ decisions whether or not to conduct natural product re-
search. Two of the three companies of Group I are Europe-based (Roche, Boehringer-
Ingelheim) whereas Pfizer is a US-corporation. This hypothesis can therefore not be backed 
up by our findings. Whether or not there is a general trend away from genetic resources will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
The business strategy of group I corporations does not provide a basis for any additional 
incentives for biodiversity conservation based on access and benefit sharing. 
                                                
81 Dr. Hartmut Leidig, head of corporate department Environment, Health and Safety replied to our 
questionnaire in writing on June, 28th 2005. 
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5.4.2 Group II: Ignorance 
The second group of companies did not show any relevant behaviour regarding ABS – nei-
ther in terms of awareness, nor concern, nor action.83 The seven companies belonging to this 
group are: Sanofi-aventis, Abbott, Takeda, Schering-Plough, Schering AG, Amgen and San-
kyo. Each of those companies was contacted repeatedly which gave them the possibility to 
correct this picture evoked. Even if there was no codified code of conduct or any other official 
policy paper, the companies have had the opportunity to explain their biodiversity policy but 
chose not to do so.  
However, it is beyond the scope of the thesis and beyond our methodology to assess why 
this group of companies refrains from accepting biodiversity loss as an important environ-
mental problem. Two interpretations stand to reason: Firstly, the companies mentioned here 
do not use genetic resources and therefore are not concerned with the CBD’s provisions and 
the problem of biodiversity loss. In this case, it would have been very easy to reply to the 
questionnaire and provide this information84.  
The second possibility is that they use genetic resources without realising ABS provisions 
and are therefore not willing to provide any information or even acknowledge the problem of 
biodiversity loss. One possible interpretation of this behaviour is the following: As said before 
in 1.1.4, political science findings suggest that re-distributive policies are generally met with 
resistance and generate conflict. As the CBD is re-distributing property rights (access to ge-
netic resources is now subject to national legislation) and entails provisions for user of ge-
netic resources to share ‘their’ benefits out of the utilisation of those resources, one would 
expect resistance and conflict. The discussions around ABS do not really exhibit any conflicts 
and companies don’t reject those provisions publicly which is surprising. One could argue 
that especially pharmaceutical companies are very visible with their brands and depend on a 
positive image for their sales as said before.  
The sector has been criticised repeatedly85: Take the discussions about denied access to 
medicines for the world’s poorest people (e.g. Oxfam 2002); the accusations relating to ille-
                                                                                                                                                     
82 As mentioned before, Pettinger makes this point that companies will not cooperate with research 
that is likely to produce uncomfortable results. 
83 The limitations of the methodological approach of this thesis have been reflected upon before (chap-
ter 3.5). Any assessment here is based on the assumptions and methodological considerations as 
outlined. 
84 However, there might be several obstacles for this, including time constraints, lack of internal com-
munication, etc. 
85 Recently a few books mainly from insiders of this sector stirred up the discussions on the pharma-
ceutical industry: Powerful Medicines: The Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Prescription Drugs by Jerry 
Avorn (2004); The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It 
by Marcia Angell (2004); Overdosed America: The Broken Promise of American Medicine by John 
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gal anti-competition practices (see e.g. FTC 200286) or the public concern about the use of 
genetically modified organisms in producing pharmaceuticals (see FDA 2002). In light of this 
situation it seems reasonable that companies would not object to those provisions publicly 
but react with a ‘silent opposition’ towards ABS. In times of CSR, this could well be the only 
viable option for companies to cope with the normative pressure exerted by international 
regulations like the CBD. Countering this interpretation, Novartis claims that it is almost im-
possible to hide the origin of the compounds used for developing a new drug. Therefore, No-
vartis is ready to share the benefits as they fear image damage if they do not comply with the 
international norm (see Baruffol 2003: 50). From this point of view, ‘silent opposition’ is not a 
viable strategy. However, it is by no means possible for this thesis to verify or falsify one of 
the offered interpretations. Further research is needed in order to do so. 
A more general remark on the potential of corporate responsibility can be derived from the 
behaviour of this group: it was rather unexpected that some of the biggest corporations in the 
world would not live up to general CSR expectations which have been established interna-
tionally during the last few years. Especially the pharmaceutical industry has been accused 
for many scandals in the past and it is surprising that some of the companies seem not to act 
accordingly. Takeda and Amgen for instance do not even publish some kind of environ-
mental report or the like where a general awareness for sustainability issues could be dem-
onstrated. The anglo-saxon economies have a longer tradition of CSR (IÖW 2004: 8). Never-
theless, three companies of group II are US-based. National traditions or culture is therefore 
also unlikely to play a major role in respect to the level of awareness of companies for biodi-
versity depletion. A recent study on German businesses finds that, “most companies are 
quite advanced in their reporting of environmental matters, but devote less attention to the 
issues of countering corruption, taxes and subsidies, the contribution made to regulatory 
frameworks and biodiversity”.(IÖW 2004: 14). The problem structure of biodiversity loss is 
more complicated than most other environmental problem which seems to play a role in this 
context. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the conclusions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Abramson (2004) and  On The Take: How Medicine's Complicity with Big Business Can Endanger 
Your Health by Jerome Kassirer (2004). 
86 The US Federal Trade Commission announced in February 2002 a consent agreement with Ameri-
can Home Products Corporation (AHP) that would settle charges that the company entered into an 
anticompetitive agreement with Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering) to delay entry of a lower-cost 
generic drug into the U.S. market. The Commission's administrative complaint alleged that Schering, 
the maker of K-Dur 20 illegally paid AHP millions of dollars in exchange for AHP's agreement to delay 
the sale of its generic K-Dur 20 product (FTC 2002). There have been several similar cases. 
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5.4.3 Group III: Awareness 
The third group of companies expresses awareness of the problem of biodiversity loss, but 
does not, however, show any concern or action. The following companies belong to this 
group: Lilly, Eisai, Johnson&Johnson and AstraZeneca. All four companies are aware of the 
loss of biodiversity. Thus, the CBD and its provisions at least had some kind of impact in the 
sense of increasing problem awareness. 53% of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies now 
acknowledge biodiversity loss as an important environmental problem (according to our em-
pirical data). This acknowledgement is important as it first constitutes a problem for the indi-
vidual company. From a constructivist point of view, a problem is not a problem until it is de-
clared as being one. Therefore, awareness is the basic precondition for concern regarding 
the companies’ own activities and concrete action. The empirical data confirms this theoreti-
cal assumption as no company realises ABS without having acknowledged biodiversity loss 
as a problem. Showing awareness of biodiversity issues and making this public can be seen 
as the first step in a norm cascade. In this respect, positively viewed, this group could possi-
bly further the awareness also among their competitors. A more pessimistic interpretation of 
this group is that they shirk their duties regarding ABS by avoiding the core of the issue. The 
four mentioned companies narrowly frame biodiversity loss as a conservation issue. There-
fore the contribution of pharmaceutical companies to conservation initiatives is deemed an 
appropriate response of the company in order to act as a responsible corporate citizen. Crit-
ics could label this ‘greenwashing’ which is an easy task in this area because of the complex-
ity of the issue. Pharmaceutical companies are not the main cause of the problem of biodi-
versity loss, so why should they be primed to respond? AstraZeneca argues along those 
lines even though they also mention bioprospecting activities. The underlying normative as-
sumptions of ABS are therefore not accepted. 
Within this group, Eisai is in a special position: the company acknowledges biodiversity loss 
only very indirectly due to Japanese regulation. Our questionnaire inquiry brought to light that 
Eisai has a chemistry department using a natural compound library (Ishida 200587). As the 
company does not show any concern or action regarding the realisation of ABS it is possible 
that Eisai solely relies on samples taken before the CBD entered into force. That could be a 
way to circumvent the provisions of the CBD. Part of this strategy would be to avoid new 
screening and collecting activities while relying on existing gene banks/culture collections for 
product development. Collections that were established prior to the existence of the CBD are 
not subject to the provisions of the convention. Private companies and institutions such as 
botanical gardens or gene banks have huge libraries of samples. According to ten 
Kate/Laird, today many genetic resources “are found in vast ex situ collections housed in 
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developed countries, where they may be available without the obligation to share benefits 
arising with their original provider” (ten Kate/Laird 2000: 252). This could be an attractive 
alternative from some companies’ point of view. 
Generally, the business strategies of group II corporations does not provide a basis for any 
additional incentives for biodiversity conservation based on access and benefit sharing. 
However, any commitment of those companies with regard to conservation project is appre-
ciated and hopefully helps mitigating biodiversity loss on a local scale. 
 
 
5.4.4 Group IV: Action without Concern 
The fourth group is an especially interesting one as the companies are aware of the problem 
of biodiversity loss, did show action regarding bioprospecting activities under the CBD but do 
not have a codified biodiversity policy. Merck, BMS and Wyeth belong to this group. This is a 
rather unexpected finding as according to our theoretical assumptions the categories of be-
haviour build on each other. Concern was believed to be the precondition for action. The 
empirical findings show a different picture. The pyramid (see section 3.1) seems not to ac-
comodate the empirical data and the assumptions have to be redefined accordingly to allow 
for this group.  
It is difficult to explain why Merck, BMS and Wyeth have benefit sharing cases without having 
developed a corporate biodiversity policy regarding the CBD’s ABS provisions. One possible 
interpretation is that before codifying their approach to ABS these companies wanted to gain 
experience from a ‘test-case’. In support of this interpretation, one could cite the following 
line of argumentation from the Uzachi-Sandoz cooperation (Sandoz is one of the predeces-
sor companies of Novartis). The explanation why Sandoz entered this ABS case is quite fruit-
ful in this respect. Carrizosa et al. argue that 
„From the Sandoz perspective, the main interest was not pharmacological but 
a more strategic one. They wanted to understand how they could engage in 
long-term bioprospecting activities. They were also exploring the potential 
risks and benefits of the CBD’s new legal framework. In contrast with other 
bioprospecting firms, Sandoz is not a natural products business and is not 
interested in traditional knowledge. Their approach is not to find “active 
principles” in medicinal herbs and convert them into drugs. Most of their 
products come from chemical synthesis and their expertise relies in 
combinatory chemistry. However they had observed competitors, such as 
Merck or Schering, investing in bioprospecting, and their administration 
wanted to have first-hand understanding of the opportunities and risks 
involved in this emerging area” (Carrizosa et. al. 2004: 138-139). 
                                                                                                                                                     
87 Dr. Ishida, Manager, Corporate Communications Department Eisai; personal communication on 
June, 22nd 2005. 
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As it was the case with Sandoz, it is possible that Merck, BMS and Wyeth tried to gain first-
hand experience with ABS. However, this experience did not lead them to developing a codi-
fied approach towards ABS which leaves doubts about the future behaviour of those compa-
nies. Merck, BMS and Wyeth are aware of the problem of biodiversity loss and the CBD’s 
provisions, they have the capacity to deal with issues surrounding ABS, and they now have 
experience with ABS but nevertheless they did not develop a code of conduct to realise ABS 
continuously. This does not leave much hope for the future realisation of ABS through those 
companies. 
However, one could also reflect upon the impact of this behaviour on the competitors of 
those companies. Single cases without a codified policy neither really support the ‘norm cas-
cade’ nor do they exert ‘peer pressure’ on competitors to follow a stated biodiversity policy 
which is generally believed to be an influential mechanism.  
Interestingly, in two out of three cases of companies belonging to this group, the benefit shar-
ing cases have been part of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG) Pro-
gram which also involved the US government. It is unclear in how far this also contributed to 
the willingness of the corporations (BMS, Wyeth) to join this initiative. The third company in 
this group, Merck, has been involved in the famous and often cited INBio case. This is one of 
the first cases of benefit sharing originally initiated before the CBD entered into force and 
expired in 1999. To our surprise Merck did not develop a corporate ABS strategy accord-
ingly. As Merck did not reply to our questioannaire, we were unfortunately unable to  
 
5.4.5 Group V: Voluntary Realisation 
The fifths group encompasses companies which show full realisation of ABS in their behav-
iour. Three companies belong to this group: Bayer, GSK and Novartis. Along our lines of ar-
gumentation it is this group that accounts primarily for the voluntary realisation of ABS.  
The access and benefit sharing in which those three companies were involved transferred 
mainly non-monetary and some monetary resources to providers of genetic resources in the 
South. Non-monetary benefits included a variety of measures such as the supply of equip-
ment and materials, technology and knowledge transfer, support to cover laboratory ex-
penses and participation in conferences, advanced training of students, staff and locals, pro-
viding employment opportunities and the sponsoring of taxonomy training courses to support 
capacity building. The transfer of monetary benefits has been limited and included research, 
up-front and milestone payments.  
It is interesting to ask why these three companies realise ABS as opposed to others. What 
does distinguish them from their competitors? As mentioned before, Novartis claims that the 
non-compliance with the norms of the CBD could have immense negative impacts on the 
company. They believe that it is almost impossible to hide the origin of the compounds used 
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for drug development and that they accepted the international norm because they fear image 
damage if they do not comply with it (see Baruffol 2003: 50). In this case the international 
norm appears to exert power. The analysis of GSK’s biodiversity policy seems to suggest a 
similar interpretation. Mr. Rast from Bayer, however, explained Bayer’s commitment differ-
ently. He stated that benefit sharing clauses in their bioprospecting agreements were com-
mon business practice even before the CBD entered into place. The reason for this was that 
Bayer felt that their partners should share the success and because Bayer was interested in 
closer connections with the partner institutes. Technical assistance and training was always 
in Bayer’s interest because they needed the partner to do the extractions properly and 
needed the material properly handled. Bayer also has a policy to shift the first steps of analy-
sis and treatment of the specimens to the provider of the resources and outsource those 
functions if this is wanted by the partner.  
However, we were not able to identify any structural explanations which distinguish those 
companies from their competitors and prompted them to realise ABS. Further research is 
needed in this respect 
To what extent the realisation of ABS through those companies has had positive effects on 
the conservation of biodiversity in the respective provider countries is far beyond the scope 
of the thesis. However, this discussion will be taken up in the perspectives chapter to some 
extent. 
 
The following figure is visualising the findings presented above. 
 
Figure 17: The ABS Realisation Continuum 
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6 Conclusions 
The CBD’s third objective access and benefit sharing (ABS) aims at giving additional incen-
tives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. This mechanism has been fur-
thered through the voluntary Bonn Guidelines which contain provisions for the realisation of 
ABS by private actors using genetic resources commercially. So far it has been unclear to 
which extent these stipulations have been translated into action on the ground. In a situation 
of uncertainty, this thesis’ objective was to assess the voluntary realisation of ABS provisions 
by the world’s 20 largest pharmaceutical companies. On a conceptual level, it aimed at help-
ing to understand the possible role of CSR in biodiversity governance. On a political level, it 
aimed at contributing to the ongoing negotiation process on an international ABS regime by 
generating data on the behaviour of private actors regarding ABS and by asking for the ‘les-
sons learned’ from this assessment. The following three conclusions can be drawn from our 
work: 
 
Conclusion 1: In the realm of biodiversity governance, voluntary business measures based 
on corporate responsibility are inappropriate to safeguard access and benefit sharing. 
 
On a voluntary basis the pharmaceutical industry realises the ABS provisions of the CBD 
only to a very limited extent. The three companies which fully realise ABS, namely Bayer, 
GSK and Novartis, only account for 11.5 % of the global pharmaceutical market in 2004 (see 
figure 18). This number is an important and new revealing on the overall behaviour of the 
pharmaceutical sector with regard to ABS. 
 
Figure 18: Global Market Share of Pharmaceutical Companies realising ABS 
39,5%
11,5%
49%
no full realisation
full realisation
no data
 
 
Our theoretical considerations at the outset of our thesis brought up the question whether 
voluntary compliance of pharmaceutical corporations with ABS provisions could work on the 
grounds of corporate responsibility? We argued that in the course of globalisation fundamen-
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tal changes in the constellation of actors in the international system can be witnessed. The 
diffusion of global norms that increasingly determines appropriate behaviour in a ‘norm cas-
cade’ is by no means limited to the ‘naming and shaming’ of states and does not shy away 
from the private sector. This puts multinational companies under pressure to disclose and 
improve their activities not only regarding the economical, but also to the environmental and 
social dimensions of their business. CSR makes allowance for this recent trend. The possible 
role of the private sector in achieving the international communities’ goals has been empha-
sised strongly over the passed few years (think of the discussions on public-private-
partnerships in the context of the Millennium Development Goals and the WSSD). Against 
this background our empirical findings might cause some disappointment amongst CSR 
apologists. We conclude that the loss of biological diversity cannot be tackled by a mecha-
nism whose implementation merely depends on voluntary and ultimately market-driven 
measures of the private sector. 
Corporate responsibility might help ‘greening businesses’ in a very basic respect but shows 
its limits when it comes to more complex problems such as the loss of biological diversity. 
General environmental awareness amongst corporations is observable and reflected in the 
instruments of CSR. The establishment of environmental management units, the reduction of 
energy and water consumption and the improvement of material life-cycles range amongst 
the outcomes of this awareness. This is not surprising as all these activities offer win-win-
situations. Not only will a company’s image as a ‘responsible citizen’ improve, also it will in-
ternally optimise its resource consumption and become more cost-efficient. The former ex-
ecutive director of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development once stated his 
opinion that “when it comes to meeting the challenge of governance we should focus on 
practice, on implementation, on the right signals from governments, and on letting business 
respond in the most efficient way” (Faulkner 1997: 158). Our empirical findings demonstrate 
that business did not respond sufficiently to the signals of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines. 
The complex problem of biodiversity loss is not approached through CSR. What are the rea-
sons for this? The concept of biodiversity as such is a relatively recent ‘invention’ and it goes 
beyond nature conservation and prevention of the extinction of big mammalian species. The 
complexity of ecosystems and its web of flora-fauna-interactions require a deeper under-
standing of the issue. Biodiversity and ABS accordingly, is not as present in the CSR main-
stream as emissions or waste reduction for instance, due to the fact that it does not qualify 
for easy solutions or win-win-situations. Access and benefit sharing is a re-distributive 
mechanism which alters property rights. Consequently, companies neglect biodiversity loss 
in their CSR efforts. It is therefore not going to be possible to implement the international 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s third objective on the grounds of voluntary industry initia-
tives. 
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Conclusion 2: An internationally binding protocol is required to enhance the implementation 
of ABS. 
 
Seemingly, after more than a decade, cases of benefit sharing remain more an exception 
than the rule. In order to enhance the implementation of ABS, an international regime is cur-
rently being negotiated. At the latest meeting of the ABS working group in February 2005, the 
parties to the CBD were negotiating details of the to-be international ABS regime. As ex-
pected there were considerable disagreements among the negotiating states regarding the 
scope, potential objectives, and potential additional elements to be considered 
(UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/7). It has been difficult for the contracting Parties to develop a com-
mon vision regarding fundamental questions such as the nature of a possible instrument that 
could be added to the existing ABS regime. Generally speaking, those considered as pro-
vider countries argue for the adoption of a legally binding instrument on access and benefit 
sharing such as a protocol. In contrast, those regarded as user countries are more interested 
in maintaining the status quo in which voluntary guidelines are supposed to ensure the reali-
sation of ABS through industry (see IISD 2005).  
Our analysis shows that only very few companies voluntarily realise access and benefit shar-
ing. Under unchanged legal status of the ABS provisions, it is unlikely that this number is 
going to increase significantly. Commercial users of biodiversity are located in countries 
which have not transferred the ABS provisions into national law. If a voluntary instrument is 
going to be added to the international ABS regime, user countries will presumably continue 
to be reluctant in implementing ABS. National legislation to ensure ABS is neither in their 
interest, nor has such negative attitude internationally been denounced to an extent that 
would have marked the tipping point of a ‘norm cascade’. The idleness of user countries will 
not stimulate the large number of non-complying companies to realise ABS in the future.  
In our opinion, the transfer of the ABS provisions into national law by all Parties to the Con-
vention is deemed indispensable as a precondition for the realisation of ABS through com-
mercial users of genetic resources. A legally binding protocol as the outcome of the negotia-
tions would ultimately further ABS as an international norm and pressure provider as well as 
user countries to enact concrete national legislation. National ABS legislation in both provider 
and user countries would complement each other. It has been argued that provider countries 
are not capable of taking adequate measures for the realization of ABS without the support 
of user countries. Hence, the introduction of national laws based on a common point of refer-
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ence – the ‘ABS protocol’ – in all states is believed to significantly improve the enforcement 
and monitoring of ABS.88   
Our thesis has shown that not even the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies are realis-
ing the ABS provisions – despite their huge profit margins, despite having the needed knowl-
edge, skills, administrative capacities and despite the fact that they are depending on a posi-
tive image. We assume that smaller pharmaceutical companies will not be able to signifi-
cantly contribute to the ‘grand bargain’ as they have less resources, less capacity and are 
not as visible in public as their big competitors. Moreover, every company which is not in-
cluded in our analysis has a global market share below 0.8% each. Even if they realised 
ABS, the general picture is not changing much in the sense that in such a case, the global 
market share of the group of complying companies will only grow to a minor extent.89 Our 
empirical findings are quite robust in this sense. 
Among the different user sectors of genetic resources (such as the seed, horticulture, crop 
protection, biotechnology, personal care and cosmetics industry), the pharmaceutical indus-
try is the most advanced one with regard to realising ABS (ten Kate/Laird 2000). If that is the 
case, then there is little inclination towards benefit sharing among the other user industries. 
Accordingly, there is little hope for the success of the ‘grand bargain’ under a voluntary 
scheme.  
Having said this, from our point of view a binding protocol is indispensable to ensure national 
regulation of ABS in user states and consequently force private companies of all sectors util-
izing genetic to comply with the ABS provisions of the CBD. Given the limited realisation of 
ABS through private actors so far and the described prospects for the future, it is no longer 
possible for Parties to the CBD to officially promote voluntary approaches by industry. Any 
negotiation position which puts faith in non-binding measures is condemned as untrustworthy 
when at the same time claiming to support the objectives of the CBD. ‘User measures’90 have 
been at the heart of the debate in Bangkok and the data presented here underlines the ne-
cessity for such measures – be it certificates of origin or others measures. It is high time that 
                                                
88 We are aware that any scientific policy recommendations face certain challenges and that even the 
best advice in theory will not lead to the best policy. Politics are dominating international negotiations. 
However, it is necessary and important to contribute to those negotiation processes by providing data 
which legitimises or suggests certain policies over others. It is then up to politicians and negotiators to 
make faithful use of such data. 
89 This fact is due to the highly concentrated structure of the market structure for pharmaceuticals. The 
realisation of ABS in smaller companies with global market shares of below 0.8%, does not signifi-
cantly increase the overall global market share of companies realising ABS. The potential resources 
available for benefit sharing are accordingly also not going to increase significantly. 
90  “User measures are understood as a package of legislative, administrative, and policy measures 
designed to promote compliance among the users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge with 
the regulations on PIC, MAT, and benefit-sharing. These measures can be applied by either the pri-
vate or public sector and may be mandatory or voluntary (CBD 2002: 17). 
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the Parties to the Convention agree on a joint approach if ABS is to contribute to tackling 
biodiversity loss.  
 
Conclusion 3: ABS loses its wind before it even gathered way. 
 
Transcending the need for a protocol as argued above, a more general question comes to 
mind: What do our empirical findings tell us about the significance of ABS as a potential 
mechanism contributing to mitigating biodiversity loss? 
One could start to discuss this point by initially referring to one of the most basic findings of 
this thesis. There is a significant group of pharmaceutical companies which does not use 
genetic resources for their research. Based on the assessment of the world’s top 20 pharma-
ceutical companies, corporations not using genetic resources account for at least 13.9 % of 
the market share of global pharmaceutical sales (Pfizer, Roche and Boehringer). These 
companies are not subject to any ABS provisions and will not contribute to mitigating biodi-
versity by sharing benefits. With regard to those companies, no regulatory instruments based 
on ABS neither on international, regional or national level can provide additional incentives 
for conservation of biodiversity. 
To answer the question whether there is a general empirical trend away from the use of ge-
netic resources is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there are some signs that at 
least a growing number of pharmaceutical companies is withdrawing from natural product 
research: Bayer will close down its natural product group by the end of the year 2005 and 
also Merck has reduced or even closed down natural product discovery programmes (see 
Carrizosa 2004; also see Wynberg 2004). Others use genetic resources, but they are not 
considered as a major source of compounds for development of pharmaceuticals (see GSK). 
Taken together, these decisions could indicate a new trend away from the use of genetic 
resources in pharmaceutical R&D. This seems to be a very recent development and negotia-
tors might not be aware of this overall picture yet. 
Departing from the Bangkok meeting, some commentators sketch the future challenges as 
follows: “Shifting to the immediate next steps, the key issues in the run-up to the next ABS 
meeting are: the gap analysis, which may clarify the potential for benefit sharing in different 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals or agriculture” (IISD 2005: 11). As for the pharmaceutical 
sector our analysis shows that this potential is limited by a growing number of companies 
which refrain from or curb the use of genetic resources. If one of the main target groups of 
the ABS mechanism seems to be withering away, it is questionable if there is a significant 
potential for benefit sharing to achieve the objectives of the CBD: the preservation of the 
world’s biological wealth.  
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With regard to the obstacles in implementing ABS provisions and the recent trend among 
users of genetic resources outlined above, the question arises if the mechanism of ABS is 
‘much ado about nothing’? The perspectives chapter will provide some further reflections on 
this question in the following. 
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7 Perspectives  
“Excuse me, but what happened to the Sherwood Forest?” 
Companies from the industrialised North are the primary economic beneficiaries of genetic 
resources that are the property of the South. We described access and benefit sharing as an 
appealing ‘Robin Hood-mechanism’ that could not only reconcile this disparity but that has 
been developed to ultimately tackle the problem of biodiversity loss. Admittedly, it is too early 
to estimate the eventual contribution of ABS to conservation and our thesis did not aim at 
doing so. However, while we focused on the implementation of the mechanism one question 
shadowed our work: will ABS deliver for biodiversity? 
Costa Rica has probably the longest and most extensive experience with access and benefit 
sharing projects. Between 1991 and 2000, these projects channelled about US$ 2.7 million 
to conservation purposes which is equivalent of an average of US$ 0.3 million per year. This 
amount is rather insignificant compared with other means of financing conservation such as 
eco-tourism which accounts for US$ 650 million per year in Costa Rica (see Carizzosa 2004: 
4). The question is not only if these additional incentives are enough to make a difference for 
biodiversity but also how to make use of them in the most effective way? Currently, there is 
no common sense on how to ‘earmark’ benefits to ensure their positive effects on biodiver-
sity.91 Moreover, in cases where benefits flow to people on the ground, the simple picture of 
incentive politics has been confronted with the fact that the introduction of monetary incen-
tives and economic calculation can sometimes undermine and even destroy the very social 
values it wants to promote.92 Does ABS in the end foster a Western path of development that 
will lead to an even higher degradation of biodiversity in developing countries? 
 
Our thesis generated data that indicates a trend away from the utilisation of genetic re-
sources in the pharmaceutical sector which increasingly focuses on high through-put screen-
ings and combinatorial chemistry. Already in 1996 Gadgil reflected that  
“At least until the biotechnological applications are in place and monopolistic 
control established over biodiversity resources – perhaps held in ex-situ 
collections – as well as information on their uses, the industry and industrial 
nations are interested in the conservation of natural biodiversity and 
knowledge of its users. It is likely that this interest will be evanescent; to be 
                                                
91 The Indian Biodiversity Act for instance introduces a National Biodiversity Authority that is supposed 
to collect benefits in a national biodiversity fund. It remains however unclear how and for what pur-
poses this money is going to be used. 
92 The so-called Kani case in India has often been described as a success story for benefit sharing. 
However, there are concerns that benefits received from a bioprospecting project changed their tradi-
tional way of life which in turn could negatively impact biological diversity.  
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given up once monopoly over biological resources brought into ex-situ 
collections is established” (Gadgil 1996: 359-360).  
Did we already arrive at this point? Do the international negotiations for an ABS regime sim-
ply come too late? We cannot answer this question but it indicates an important point of cri-
tique of ABS: the mechanism is not capable of sufficiently tackling the root causes of biodi-
versity loss. It is subject to market failure and short term business cycles and will not alter the 
way of consumption and conversion patterns in the world.  
 
“Pardon me again, what about that nice story of ‘good corporate citizens’?” 
In recent years, it has become quite fashionable to talk about a form of global governance in 
which the private sector is fulfilling new roles in the international system. This is not surpris-
ing, baring in mind that corporations such as Pfizer, Novartis, Merck and others are operating 
with an annual turnover that is higher than that of many developing countries. They do have 
the power to make a difference. Even representatives of the world’s most powerful state 
have realized this. To quote a speech of Colin Powell held in Davos in 2003:  
“In the globalized world, states confront problems of such complexity and such 
scale that they cannot hope to address them without help from 
nongovernmental actors. A good number of opinioned leaders here today from 
the corporate world and the NGO community already are making greater 
contributions to international well-being than many governments are. Some of 
you even conduct your own foreign policies. Welcome to the club”93  
At a time when many environmental institutions remain weak, expectations have been raised 
that the private sector could make decisive contributions to achieving sustainable develop-
ment and offer a way ahead. We have introduced some of the factors that are driving com-
panies towards confirming these expectations, the most important one is shifting norms in 
terms of what is considered of being acceptable behaviour. Pressure for multinational com-
panies to adopt policies on their environmentally responsible behaviour is exerted from 
above, in the form of global institutions, and from below, through the efforts of NGOs. In the 
case of biodiversity conservation and especially access and benefit sharing, international 
norms have however generally not evolved to an extent that companies would be pressured 
to respond to them. In order to rely on voluntary business measures for developing and im-
plementing sound environmental and social standards, the existence of a strong normative 
international framework seems to be indispensable. In this regard, the negotiations for an 
international ABS regime could advance such a common framework. For the years ahead, 
CSR initiatives should not be administered as a general remedy that would cure the patient 
earth. They could however very well complement other governance initiatives in issue areas 
                                                
93 New York Times, 26 January 2003 
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with less complex problem structures and strong common normative assumptions about ap-
propriate business conduct. 
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Appendix 1: Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity 
Following the recently released Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report (MA report)94, an 
ecosystem “is a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the 
nonliving environment interacting as a functional unit” (MA synthesis report 2005: 9). This 
diversity of biological and other components is the life support system of our planet. Today, 
the globe accommodates more than six billion people and the world is heading for more. This 
generates an ever-increasing demand for ecosystem services (see table 1). 
 
 
Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Overview 
 
Mankind fundamentally depends on the benefits it obtains from ecosystems, the so-called 
ecosystem services. They can be categorised as provisioning services such as food, water, 
timber, and fibre; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water 
quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and sup-
porting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (see table 2). 
From an economic point of view, the provisioning services would be seen as direct use of 
biological diversity in satisfying the consumption or production needs of humans and all other 
services would be classified as the indirect value of biodiversity satisfying human needs. The 
table above shows only a very condensed version of ecosystem services. Other studies have 
grouped them into 17 major categories (see Constanza et al. 1997: 254). 
                                                
 
Table 1: Growing Demand For Ecosystem Services 
Water
One-third of the 
world’s population is 
now subject to water 
scarcity. 
Population facing 
water scarcity will 
double over the next 
30 years 
Food
Food production must 
increase to meet the 
needs of an additional 
3 billion people over 
the next 30 years 
 
 
Timber
Wood fuel is the only 
source of fuel for one 
third of the world’s 
population.  
Wood demand will dou-
ble in next 50 years. 
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Living organisms contribute to a wide variety of these environmental services such as the 
regulation of the gaseous composition of the atmosphere, protection of coastal zones, regu-
lation of the hydrological cycle and climate, generation and conservation of fertile soils, dis-
persal and breakdown of wastes, pollination of many crops and absorption of pollutants 
(UNEP 2002: 121). 
 
 
The MA report puts it as simple as: “Everyone in the world depends completely on Earth’s 
ecosystems and the services they provide, such as food, water, disease management, cli-
mate regulation, spiritual fulfilment, and aesthetic enjoyment” (MA synthesis report 2005: 16). 
The interactions between human beings consuming ecosystem services and biodiversity are 
complex: “That is, changing human conditions drive, both directly and indirectly, changes in 
biodiversity, changes in ecosystems, and ultimately changes in the services ecosystems pro-
vide. Thus biodiversity and human well-being are inextricably linked” (WRI 2005: iii). 
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Appendix 2: MA findings 
The alarming result of the worldwide assessment, briefly, is that: 
- Over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and exten-
sively than in any comparable period of time in human history, largely to meet rapidly 
growing demands for food, fresh water, timber, fiber and fuel; 
- The changes that have been made to ecosystems have contributed to substantial net 
gains in human well-being and economic development, but these gains have been 
achieved at growing costs in the form of the degradation of many ecosystem services, 
increased risks of nonlinear changes, and the exacerbation of poverty for some 
groups of people; 
- The degradation of ecosystem services could grow significantly worse during the first 
half of this century and is a barrier to achieving the Millennium Development Goals; 
- The challenge of reversing the degradation of ecosystems while meeting increasing 
demands for their services can be partially met under some scenarios that the MA 
has considered but these involve significant changes in policies, institutions and prac-
tices, that are not currently under way (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Findings; 
slide show). 
The alarming message reads that approximately 60 percent of the ecosystem services that 
support life on Earth – such as fresh water, capture fisheries, air and water regulation, and 
the regulation of regional climate, natural hazards and pests – are being degraded or used 
unsustainably. It is acknowledged that “the full costs of the loss and degradation of these 
ecosystem services are difficult to measure, but the available evidence demonstrates that 
they are substantial and growing” (MA synthesis report 2005: 16). 
 
MA findings: Some important facts and figures 
Humans are fundamentally, and to a significant extent irreversibly, changing the diversity 
of life on Earth, and most of these changes represent a loss of biodiversity. 
- More than two thirds of the area of 2 of the world’s 14 major terrestrial biomes and 
more than half of the area of four other biomes had been converted by 1990, primarily 
to agriculture. 
- Across a range of taxonomic groups, either the population size or range or both of the 
majority of species is currently declining. 
- The distribution of species on Earth is becoming more homogenous; in other words, 
the set of species in any one region of the world is becoming more similar to the set 
in other regions primarily as a result of introductions of species, both inter nationally 
and inadvertently in association with increased travel and shipping. 
- The number of species on the planet is declining. Over the past few hundred years, 
humans have increased the species extinction rate by as much as 1,000 times over 
background rates typical over the planet’s history (medium certainty). Some 10–30% 
of mammal, bird, and amphibian species are currently threatened with extinction 
(medium to high certainty). Freshwater ecosystems tend to have the highest propor-
tion of species threatened with extinction. 
- Genetic diversity has declined globally, particularly among cultivated species. 
 (Source: MA synthesis report 2005: 18-19)  
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Appendix 3: Examples for Direct Causes of Biodiversity Loss 
"Tropical forests are falling at the rate of approximately 1% per annum or 29 ha. per minute" 
(Töpfer 2003: 4) 
One of the well known examples for large scale 
destruction of natural ecosystems is the de-
forestation of the Amazon rainforest, the biggest 
rainforest on Earth which holds an enormous share 
of the world’s biodiversity. This outstanding 
ecosystem is being destroyed at near record levels 
with 26,000 sq km chopped down last year, 
according to the environment ministry of Brazil. 
This cleared area accounts for almost one fifth of 
the entire Amazon. The rainforest is then replaced 
with soya fields which are a major source of 
income for Brazil. Soya exports, mostly to China 
and Europe, propelled Brazil to a record trade surplus (Kingstone 2005). The destruction of 
the Amazon causes a tremendous loss of biodiversity.  
 
Deforestation in the Iguazú National Park 1973 - 2000 
     
Landsat imagery on this page shows how land clearing and logging have opened up a previ-
ously forested landscape. The protected area of Iguazú National Park, located in Argentina 
on the border with Brazil and Paraguay, is sharply defined as the dark green enclave on the 
right of the images, the only remaining original forest in the region. Conservation of this park, 
a World Heritage site, is critical because it harbours one of the most complete remnant 
patches of the highly endangered Paranaense forest. The park is rich in fauna and includes 
68 species of mammals, 422 of birds, 38 of reptiles and 18 of amphibians, a large number of 
which are threatened or vulnerable. 
Source: UNEP 2002 
 
Another compelling example for large scale destruction of natural 
ecosystems of immense value is the mangrove forests in Asia. 
They are among the most threatened habitats in the world and 
are declining at an alarming rate which is extremely severe in 
terms of biodiversity loss as “mangrove forests are among the 
planet’s most productive ecosystems, providing the basis for 
complex and extensive ecosystems at the interface of terrestrial, 
freshwater and marine habitats [ …] The forests support a great 
variety of marine life and food web interactions, and act as 
refuges and nursery grounds for many species of fish, shellfish and crustacean, many of 
which are of commercial or subsistence value” (Environmental Justice Foundation 2003: 7-
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8). The greatest threat to mangroves in Vietnam has been rapidly developing commercial 
shrimp farming in aquacultures (ibid. 11).  
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4561189.stm#map 
 
Appendix 4: Legal Concepts of binding/nonbinding and/or voluntary/mandatory  
Mandatory/voluntary: The entire regime may be “mandatory” or “voluntary,” or it may have some 
elements of each character. Frequently the terms “mandatory” and “voluntary” are confused with the 
terms “binding” and “non-binding.” While there are situations in which “mandatory” and “binding” have 
the same effect, they are different concepts. The same is true of the terms “voluntary” and “non-
binding.” A requirement is “mandatory” when every person or entity addressed by this requirement is 
required to comply with it. For example, a law which sets the maximum speed on highways is manda-
tory in that it is a requirement imposed on every person addressed – that is on every person driving a 
vehicle on a highway. A law is voluntary when a person or entity addressed by a law has a choice 
about whether that law will apply to him. “Voluntary standards” are an often-used example of this con-
cept. They are created (sometimes in law) to serve two possible purposes. 
First, they may create a “safe harbour.” This happens where the law is not completely clear, about 
what activities are legal and which are illegal. The person who can prove that he is complying with the 
voluntary standard is certain that he is acting legally. 
The other way that “voluntary standards” are used is where two parties to an agreement choose to 
adopt them as standards for that agreement. Then, depending on the terms of the agreement, they will 
be mandatory for the parties to that agreement. In some cases, “voluntary standards” also operate as 
“non-binding standards” (see below.) 
 
Binding/Non-binding: A regime may be “binding” or “non-binding” or a combination of binding and 
non-binding provisions. The terms “binding” and “non-binding” relate to whether the particular provi-
sion (in a law or contract) is formally legally enforceable or not. A binding provision is legally enforce-
able by law, a non-binding provision is not.  
Binding: A provision may be automatically binding (contained in a law that states that the requirement 
applies, even if nothing in the contract requires it). Other binding provisions are contractual provisions 
that are allowed (not prohibited by law), and that are specifically required under the contract. 
Non-binding: One cannot be punished for failure to comply with a non-binding provision. However, a 
‘non-binding provision” in an agreement or understanding is generally held to indicate a “good-will 
commitment” – the parties are legally expected to “use best efforts” to comply. If a party does not 
make such an effort, he can be accused of acting in “bad faith” in some legal systems. 
(Source: IUCN 2004: 3) 
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Appendix 5: Legally binding ABS-related commitments in the CBD  
 
When they ratified the convention, Contracting Party agreed to take the following actions: 
 
… create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other 
Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this Convention. 
(Art. 15.2.) 
… develop and carry out scientific research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting 
Parties with the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties. (Art. 15.6.) 
… take legislative, administrative or policy measures, ... with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable 
way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. (Art. 15.7.) 
… take legislative, administrative or policy measures... with the aim that ... developing countries, which 
provide genetic resources, are provided access to and transfer of technology which makes use of 
those resources..., including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights. 
(Art. 16.3.) 
… take legislative, administrative or policy measures... to provide for the effective participation in bio-
technological research activities by those Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, which 
provide the genetic resources for such research, and where feasible in such Contracting Parties. (Art. 
19.1.) 
… fairly and equitably share … the results of research, development arising from the commercial and 
other utilisation of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. (Art. 15.7) 
… take all practicable measures to promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis 
by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from bio-
technologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties. (Art. 19.2.) 
… provide, in accordance with its capabilities, financial support and incentives in respect of those na-
tional activities which are intended to achieve the objectives of this Convention. (Art. 20.1.) 
… (developed country Parties) provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial 
resources related to the implementation of this Convention through bilateral, regional and other multi-
lateral channels. (Art. 20.3.) 
… facilitate the exchange of information, from all publicly available sources…, taking into account the 
special needs of developing countries…. Such exchange of information shall where feasible, include 
repatriation of information (Art. 17.1&2) 
… consider strengthening existing financial institutions to provide financial resources for the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity. (Art. 21.4.) 
(Source: Young 2004: 272) 
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Appendix 6: List of Corporate Reports and Publications used 
 
Pfizer 
Pfizer Inc 2004 Financial Report (cited as Pfizer 2005) 
 
GlaxoSmithKline 
GlaxoSmithKline Annual Report 2004 ‘New challenges New thinking’ (cited as GlaxoSmith-
Kline 2005a)  
GlaxoSmithKline Corporate Responsibility Report 2004 (cited as GlaxoSmithKline 2005b) 
 
SanofiAventis 
Sanofi-aventis  – 2004 Annual Report (cited as Sanofi-aventis 2005a) 
Sanofi-aventis  – 2004 Sustainable development report (cited as Sanofi-aventis 2005b) 
‘Aventis und die biologische Vielfalt’ [‘Aventis and biological diversity’] 
 
Johnson&Johnson 
Johnson&Johnson 2004 Annual Report (cited as Johnson&Johnson 2005a) 
Johnson&Johnson 2004 Sustainability Report (cited as Johnson&Johnson 2005b) 
Johnson&Johnson 2004 Worldwide Contributions Program Report (cited as John-
son&Johnson 2005c) 
Johnson&Johnson Worldwide Contributions Program 2003 Annual Report “Social Responsi-
bility to the Community” (cited as Johnson&Johnson 2005d) 
 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
Merck Annual Report 2004 ‘Focussing on the Future’ (cited as Merck 2005)  
Merck Responsibility for Employees, the Environment and the Community Report 2003 (cited 
as Merck 2004) 
 
Astra Zeneca 
AstraZaneca Annual Report and Form 20-F Information 2004 (cited as AstraZeneca 2005a) 
Corporate Responsibility Summary Report 2004 (cited as AstraZeneca 2005b) 
 
Roche 
Roche Annual Report 2004 (cited as Roche 2005a) 
Roche Policy on Safety, Health and Environmental Protection (cited as Roche 2005b) 
Roche Sustainability Report (cited as Roche 2005c) 
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Global Roche Statement on Biodiversity (cited as Roche 2003) 
 
Novartis 
Caring and Curing Annual Report 2004 (cited as Novartis 2005) 
Sustainable Development: A Common Challenge for North and South (cited as Novartis 
Foundation 2005) 
Novartis GRI-Report (cited as Novartis 2004) 
 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 2004 Annual Report (cited as Bristol-Myers Squibb 2005) 
Corporate Social Responsibility at Bristol-Myers Squibb 2003/2004 Report ‘Creating A Leg-
acy Of Hope’ 
 
Lilly 
Eli Lilly and Company 2004 Annual Report ‘Answers for Shareholders’ (cited as Lilly 2005a) 
Lilly Corporate Citizenship 2004 (cited as Lilly 2005b) 
 
Wyeth 
Annual Report: Building our Strenghts – Investing in our Future (cited as Wyeth 2005a) 
Environment, Health and Safety Report – Weaving EHS into the Fabric of Wyeth (Wyeth 
2005b) 
 
Abbott 
2004 Annual Report (cited as Abbott 2005) 
2003 Global Citizenship Report ‘Touchin Lives’  
The 2000 Environmental, Health and Safety Update ‘Improving Lives Around the World’  
Code Of Business Conduct ‘Safeguarding Trust’ (cited as Abbott 2000) 
 
Bayer 
Bayer ‘Science For A Better Life’ Annual Report 2004 (cited as Bayer 2005a) 
Bayer Sustainable Development Report 2004 (cited as Bayer 2005b) 
“Checking out nature’s stores”, in: Bayer Research 13, p. 92-96. 
“Learning from evolution”, in: Bayer Research 16, p. 88-91. 
 
Boehringer Ingelheim 
Boehringer Ingelheim Annual Report 2004 ‘Value through Innovation’ (cited as Boehringer 
Ingelheim 2005) 
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Boehringer Ingelheim ‘Our planet - our responsibility’ Environment Safety Health 2000 (cited 
as Boehringer Ingelheim 2001) 
 
Takeda 
Takeda 2004 Annual Report (cited as Takeda 2005)  
 
Amgen Inc. 
Amgen 2004 Annual Report ‘Inspired science. Defining moments’  
Amgen Foundation Charitable Contributions Report 2003 
 
Schering-Plough 
Schering-Plough Annual Report 2004 (cited as Schering-Plough 2005) 
Report on Safety, Health and Environment 2003 
 
Eisai 
Eisai Annual Financial Report Release 2003 (cited as Eisai 2004) 
Eisai Environmental & Social Report 2004 (cited as Eisai 2005) 
 
Schering AG 
Schering Annual Report 2004 (cited as Schering 2005) 
Group Environmental Report (cited as Schering 2004) 
 
Sankyo 
Sankyo 2004 Annual Report (cited as Sankyo 2005) 
Sankyo Charter of Corporate Behaviour 
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Appendix 7: Pfizer Inc. Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Being the leading pharmaceutical corporation in terms of revenues and net profits, surpris-
ingly, Pfizer as opposed to most of its competitors does not report on its environmental or 
sustainability performance in a separate annually published document. Instead, it runs a data 
collection and verification programme for its various environmental, health and safety (EHS) 
commitments, as expressed in the EHS guidelines. The contents and results of the pro-
gramme are solely accessible online.95 The company has, however, a codified code of con-
duct for Environment, Health and Safety.96 According to Pfizer’s self-portrayal, the key princi-
ple of its EHS programme is to contribute to the global community's effort to protect the envi-
ronment. The management of the EHS programme is certified under the international man-
agement standards ISO 14001 and EMAS.  
Neither Pfizer’s code of conduct on Environment, Health and Safety, nor the company’s 
internet presentation on its environmental performance or its ambitions of being a ‘good cor-
porate citizen’ directly touch on the issue of biological diversity. The scope of Pfizer’s EHS 
activities covers the reduction of energy, water and waste consumption as well as of the re-
lease of ozone depleting substances, volatile organic compounds and hazardous substances 
of production facilities and company-wide goals and targets in these issue areas are set out. 
A commitment to biodiversity through Pfizer’s membership in the UN Global Compact can 
only be regarded as very indefinable and lose. Pfizer is engaged in partnerships and imple-
ments project in cooperation with a wide variety of different organisations relevant to biodi-
versity protection (such as Nature Conservancy and Rainforest Alliance). The sponsoring of 
these sporadic projects, such as “Restoring a Local Habitat - The Keysers River Project” in 
South Africa, are the company’s only noteworthy projects with direct reference to biodiversity 
protection.  
In recent years, the company’s name has partly been associated with a fairly well docu-
mented, yet controversial, benefit sharing case in South Africa (see Hoering 2004; Wise 
2003; Wynberg 2004). However, it has to be said that in this case it was not Pfizer who en-
tered into a benefit sharing agreement.  
With the aid of San hunters in South Africa using Hoodia, a succulent plant from the Kalahari 
used to suppress hunger for centuries, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 
South Africa (CSIR) succeeded in isolating the active ingredients as P57 and patented it in 
                                                
95 The Pfizer Inc Environmental, Health & Safety Programme can be accessed at 
http://www.pfizer.com/ehs/index.html.  
96 This code of conduct is the company’s Environmental, Health and Safety Policy Paper, online avail-
able at: http://www.pfizer.com/ehs/mgmt/pfe_policy.pdf, accessed 28th of July 2005.  
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several countries from 1997 on. One year later, CSIR entered into a licensing agreement 
with the British company Phytopharm for the exploitation of the patents. Pfizer signed a deal 
with Phytopharm in 2001 to develop a prescription drug. Pfizer was supposed to pay Phyto-
pharm royalties for use of the patents while Phytopharm in turn was supposed to pay the 
CSIR. The CSIR came to an agreement with the South African San Council in March 2003, 
recognising the San as the “custodians of an ancient body of traditional knowledge and cul-
tural values” and agreeing upon a “comprehensive benefit sharing agreement”. However, in 
July 2003, Pfizer withdrew from producing natural medicines and returned the production 
licence to Phytopharm, who since then has been looking for another pharmaceutical com-
pany or a food company to market products based on the patent for P57. 
In a recent interview with the UN University, Dr. Sumida of the Japan Bioindustry Association 
confirmed Pfizer’s withdrawal from natural products research: 
“For most mega-pharmaceutical companies, natural products are not a re-
search priority at the moment, given their low returns. Pfizer and Roche for in-
stance pulled out completely of natural product research a few years ago. As a 
consequence, natural products research posts have been disappearing, to the 
extent that, these days, they can be considered an endangered species! I 
wonder whether this situation is widely known outside of the industry?”97  
 
Questionnaire 
It was not possible to establish a direct contact with a responsible contact person at Pfizer 
Inc. The questionnaire, sent out via email as well as fax to the company’s general ad-
dress/number remained unanswered. 
 
Appendix 8: GlaxoSmithKline Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The GlaxoSmithKline Corporate Responsibility Report 2004 (CPR) briefly refers to biodiver-
sity issues by saying that: 
“There are a number of other environmental issues associated with our 
products, including the use of genetically modified organisms and the use of 
natural resources which may impact on biodiversity. See more on our 
approach to biodiversity and genetically modified organisms in the GSK 
website” (GlaxoSmithKline 2005b: 164). 
This is the only point in the CPR where GSK directly refers to biodiversity issues. More indi-
rectly, GSK refers to nature conservation in general by stating that the company entered into 
a partnership with the Earthwatch Institute and funds them to help developing their field re-
search and conservation projects in the UK (ibid: 124). 
                                                
97 The interview is online available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/news/details.cfm/ArticleID/540/, ac-
cessed August 10th 2005. 
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The full statement on biodiversity is then to be found on the GSK website98: It neglects a 
strong interest in sampling and natural resources but states that there are some co-
operations in place with different partners (Extracta, Centre for Natural Product Research in 
Singapore) to collect some natural products. However, GSK claims to be confident that its 
“screening activities are conducted according to the principles set out in the Convention on 
Biodiversity” without going into details any further. At the same time GSK says that their drug 
discovery efforts continuously focus on high-throughput screening of synthetic compounds 
which limits the interest in collecting and screening activities. Nevertheless, the policy state-
ment also outlines:  
“In the event of GlaxoSmithKline developing a commercial product from our 
natural material screening programmes, GlaxoSmithKline will ensure a clear 
benefit is returned to the country of origin. This benefit sharing may amount to 
payment of fair and reasonable royalties or other means determined by mutual 
agreement on a case-by-case basis”. 
The policy statement finally concludes by saying that  
“GlaxoSmithKline is fully aware of our responsibilities towards protecting 
biodiversity, respecting nature and working with the communities in which 
these natural resource materials are found. By adhering to the principles of the 
CBD, we are confident that we are operating in a sustainable manner”. 
Other than those official policy statements, GSK demonstrates commitment to biodiversity 
protection through various initiatives: A report by Earthwatch Institute (Europe) on Business 
& Biodiversity states that the board of GSK has been advised on biodiversity issues by Prof. 
Sir Richard Southwood, former Prof. of Zoology at Oxford University. It listed the following 
activities of GSK to do with biodiversity:  
• GSK became a member of the secretariat of the UK Round Table for Sustainable Develop-
ment for the production of a UK Business Guide to integrating biodiversity into environmental 
management systems; 
• contributed to a Business and Biodiversity publication produced by the World Business Coun-
cil for Sustainable Development (WBCSD); 
• produced internal guidelines on the collection and use of natural products and materials 
(Earthwatch 2002: 31)  
 
Already before the merger into GSK, the two predecessor companies were active in this field: 
SmithKline Beecham seems to have had prior experience directly with ABS issues. Those 
cases are also included into our analysis. Also Glaxo Wellcome already had a policy on bio-
diversity issue in place before the merger (see O’Neill 2000). 
In the relevant literature, three cases involving Smith-Kline Beecham are described: The 
Topotecan case has been looked into by ten Kate and Wells, the Fiji case was described by 
Aalbersberg, whereas Laird and Wynberg analysed a cooperation agreement between 
                                                
98 http://www.gsk.com/corporate_responsibility/cr_issues/ehs_mf_i_biodiversity.htm; accessed 
12.04.2005. 
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Smith-Kline Beecham and Rhodes University. Glaxo Wellcome started cooperating with Ex-
tracta (Brazil), a partnership which was continued by GSK from 2000 on. 
 
The development of Topotecan was based on a sample of seeds of Camptotheca acuminate 
which was originally collected in 1911 in China. In 1927 and 1934 the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) was supplied with some more material and the National Cancer 
Institute (NCI) discovered the anti-tumour properties as early as in the 1950s. Only in the 
1980s the NCI started to co-ordinate a National Co-operative Drug Development Drug De-
velopment Group (NCDDG) that continued to further work on Camptothecin and its derivates. 
Smith-Kline Beecham (SKB) joined the NCDDG and undertook clinical trials of Topotecan in 
the early 1990s together with the NCI. They went on to develop and patent the Camptothecin 
derivative Topotecan, which was approved by the FDA in 1996 and is since then marketed 
as Hycamtin® (ten Kate/Wells 1998). 
As the initial sourcing (1911) and the provision of additional specimen (1934, 1967) occurred 
pre-CBD, there are no formal agreements between the USDA, the UCI or Smith-Kline 
Beecham and the governments of China, India or Taiwan, where the tree originates. Accord-
ing to ten Kate/Wells, the company at the time they received the material from NCI did, like 
most other companies at that time, not have a  
“corporate policy on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing. 
Subsequently, SB has developed a corporate policy to share the benefits 
arising from the development of new natural product discoveries with source 
countries” (ten Kate/Wells 1998: 28). 
One interesting fact to mention here about this case is that SKB found out that it is more cost 
effective to use semi-synthesised material although total synthesis was technically feasible. 
The company decided later “to obtain Camptothecin from a pharmaceutical company that 
acts as a broker for plant material from around the world. Most of its Camptothecin supplies 
come from plantations of Camptotheca acuminata in Brazil” (ten Kate/Wells 1998: 36). As 
described in the summary of benefits and inputs to the development of Topotecan, SKB 
gains the profits on sales of the drug (monetary benefits) and holds a patent on Topotecan 
(among other non-monetary benefits) whereas the suppliers (initial suppliers in India and 
Cina and later the pharmaceutical broker company) of the material only received payments 
for the supply of Camptothecin to the NCI and later SKB (monetary benefits). Non-monetary 
benefits are un-known for the suppliers of Camptothecin in this case (ibid.). Ten Kate and 
Wells conclude, that  
“access has remained divorced from benefit-sharing since the original supplies 
of plant material were not obtained under access and benefit-sharing 
agreements. Most of the benefits were shared between researchers in the 
U.S.A.” (ten Kate/Wells 1998: 37). 
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This case describes the state-of-the-art pre-CBD of most corporate policies very well. As 
genetic resources were thought to be ‘common heritage of mankind’ the providers of such 
material were just paid for the delivery of material regardless of benefits arising out of the use 
of such material. This example shows the normal business practice without benefit-sharing 
involved as benefit-sharing has to go beyond ‘business as usual’. 
 
In Fiji a cummunity-based trust fund has been developed as a cooperation between the Uni-
versity of the South Pacific (USP), the Verata Tikina communities and commercial partners. 
The three-year project aimed at linking pharmaceutical medicines R&D with conservation 
and community development. Originally in 1995, SKB was the commercial partner, but the 
fund subsequently changed its cooperation to the Strathclyde Institute of Drug Research 
(Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 2002: 337). This change happened because SKB surprisingly 
closed down the natural products discovery division in the US in April 1996 (Aalbersberg et 
al. 1998: 4; Aalbersberg 2002: 321). However, of interest for the argumentation of this thesis 
is the information that on the outset of this agreement none of the parties involved (including 
SKB) had any stated policy on bioprospecting but used their involvement in the project to 
develop such guidelines (ibid.). 
 
The cooperation agreement between Smith-Kline Beecham and Rhodes University (South 
Africa) commenced in 1994 (Laird/Wynberg 1996: 44). SKB received material samples, did 
the extraction and is keeping a share of it for their research while returning the extracts for 
academic research at Rhodes University. 
The company payed for collecting costs and costs incurred by taxonomic study and naming 
of specimens. Beyond this ‘normal’ business practice, “SKB staff come to South Africa to 
collect marine organisms in collaboration with University of Port Elizabeth and Rhodes Uni-
versity staff” (Laird/Wynberg 1996: 44) because SKB has a special expertise in marine or-
ganism collecting which most companies lack. Also an additional sum per sample supplied is 
transferred to “cover basic laboratory expenses, participation in international conferences 
and fora, and training for students” (ibid). Other non-monetary benefits encompass the infor-
mal supply of equipment and material, non-commercial agreements to test material for re-
search and graduate student projects as well as sponsoring a taxonomy training course 
(ibid).  
Concluding this case, Laird and Wynberg claim, that  
“The agreement itself, growing out of SKB's involvement over the years in the 
international dialogue surrounding the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
biodiversity prospecting allows for short-term process benefits, as well as the 
requirement of royalties, and includes language requiring that 50% of any 
royalties received by the University must be returned to the research, 
development and management of marine reserves. Decisions regarding 
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disbursement of funds and the process of determining priorities had yet to be 
made, however university researchers were willing to follow whatever national 
guidelines are set and agreed with the concept that a portion of royalties 
should go to a national fund, with a representative committee in charge of 
disbursement” (1996: 44-45). 
This case indicates the development of SKB’s corporate policy on biodiversity. Benefit-
Sharing in monetary and non-monetary form is part of the agreement beyond ‘normal’ busi-
ness practice. The CBD seems to be the primary reason for this change of the corporate pol-
icy. 
 
More recently, in 1999, Glaxo Wellcome established a collaborative research agreement with 
the Brazilian company Extracta to investigate the potential of Amazonian biodiversity for their 
R&D (Earthwatch 2002: 38; EC 2002: 40). Extracta’s homepage makes this deal the “largest 
research collaboration South of the Equator” and reports that in 2002 the initial phase was 
concluded yielding “seven natural compounds active on Elastase (7) and three others 
against multi-resistant strains of the hospital infection germ Staphylococcus aureus”99. The 
research contract was prolonged for one year in December 2003 and finally completed in 
December 2004. 
The two companies are committed  
“to ensuring that they will not collect samples from endangered species. 
Additionally, if a developed medicine comes from this area both companies 
have pledged that an agreed portion of any royalty paid on sales is returned to 
the source country to be used to support conservation, health and education 
at the community level. GSK and Extracta are working together to ensure that 
this agreement will be fully compliant with the 1992 United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity” (Earthwatch 2002: 38). 
The research agreement identified eight targets of interest indigenous to the Amazon Rain-
forest and these were screened against therapy areas of relevance to the region in an Ex-
tracta Laboratory in Rio de Janeiro. The contract entailed research and milestone payments 
(totalling a potential pay-out of several million pounds) as well as a certain percentage of the 
net profits from sales, in case of subsequent commercialisation by GSK. Additionally, the 
research cooperation includes technology transfer: GSK has provided cell lines for Extracta’s 
screening programmes and a number of Brazilian scientists were given some advanced 
training at GSK’s R&D facilities in the UK. To support the community level, Extracta and GSK 
agreed that a quarter of royalties paid on sales will be returned to the source of the material 
to support conservation, health and education (Earthwatch Institute et al. 2002: 14). Interest-
ingly, it was also agreed that Extracta has to have legally binding contracts with their suppli-
ers, might they be government organisations, academia or local communities, which provide 
                                                
99 http://www.extracta.com.br/news.htm; accessed: 15.05.2005. 
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for agreed rates of return also for the case of the launch of a new drug based on their sample 
(EC 2002: 40)100.  
To follow up on this information, we contacted GSK to obtain more detailed information. Dr. 
Melanie O’Neill101 replied by saying that  
“The collaboration between GSK and Extracta was completed and closed 
some years ago. The specific terms of the contract are confidential (as for any 
other collaboration). However I can tell you that the terms were compliant with 
CBD principles as outlined in the policy on the GSK web page”. 
As seen in comparison to the earlier cases of SKB, GSK now has an advanced biodiversity 
policy which complies with the provision of the CBD and specifically GSK has undertaken to  
• only work with organisations and suppliers with the expertise and legal authority to collect 
plant and other natural material samples. These include botanic gardens, universities and re-
search institutes around the world. 
• ensure that the governments in developing countries are informed of and consent to the na-
ture and extent of any proposed natural materials collecting programme. 
• protect biodiversity by classifying samples of plants and other organisms taxonomically and 
only investigate species if their supply is reproducible and sustainable. 
• work with small quantities of natural materials to discover bioactive principles. Where possible 
further supplies of lead compounds and derivatives are synthesised by the company’s own 
medicinal chemists. 
• develop sustainable harvesting procedures where further supplies of the active compounds 
cannot be synthesised. 
• where appropriate, collaborate with the appropriate organisations to educate and train local 
peoples in collecting/screening skills. 
• ensure an agreed benefit is returned directly or indirectly to the country of origin in the event of 
GSK developing a commercial product based on a natural material. 
• only transport potentially hazardous R&D material under contained use conditions and in ac-
cordance with the CBD’s Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (EC 2002: 35-36). 
 
Questionnaire 
GSK did not reply to our questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 9: Sanofi-aventis Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Neither the Sanofi-aventis – 2004 Annual Report nor the Sanofi-aventis – 2004 Sustainable 
development report touches upon the issue of biodiversity loss. The sustainability report 
generally voices a commitment to economise the use of natural resources (Sanofi-aventis 
2005b: 47) and that investments are being made to protect the environment and to promote 
conservation of natural resources (ibid.: 44) without going into any further details.  
 
                                                
100 As a source of information the EC report is based on personal communication (17 April 2002) with 
Mark Rhodes, Director of GSK’s Environment, Health and Safety Strategy. 
101 per e-mail on May, 16th, 2005.Ms O’Neill 
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Being one of the predecessor companies, Aventis once published a paper on biodiversity. 
The statement Aventis und die biologische Vielfalt [‘Aventis and biological diversity’] ac-
knowledges biodiversity loss as an important problem, supports the principles of the CBD 
and states that Aventis only conducts business in provider countries with which agreements 
have been settled. Aventis is aware that such agreements are negotiated in the interest and 
for the benefit of all partners. However, no concrete cases are mentioned there. 
In addition, Aventis has been part of the project ‘Life Counts’ which is aiming at boosting the 
debate on biological diversity. Aventis was working together with the World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (WCMC), the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) to draw up a global inventory of biodiversity and published 
two books to increase awareness. For every book sold in a developed country, Aventis do-
nated another one to a developing nation. The publication ‘Global Biodiversity’ is meant to 
provide a platform for developing strategies to protect biodiversity and a method to assess 
successes of the actions taken. Aventis has also been member of the World Business Coun-
cil for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) which published a brochure ‘Business and Biodi-
versity’ in cooperation with the IUCN to help business managers developing responsible prin-
ciples and operations. Those two examples indicate problem awareness of biodiversity loss 
beyond the verbal commitment to support the principles of the CBD in general of at least one 
of Sanofi-aventis predecessor companies.  
 
Questionnaire 
Sanofi-aventis did not reply to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 10: Johnson&Johnson Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Johnson&Johnson 2004 Annual Report does not mention the biodiversity problem or the 
CBD but protecting the environment and natural resources is part of the company’s credo 
(Johnson&Johnson 2005a: 78). 
 
The Johnson&Johnson 2004 Sustainability Report102 touches upon biodiversity as one as-
pect of nature conservation with regard to a project carried out at the Ehticon Ltd. site in 
Scotland (Johnson&Johnson 2005b: 26). J&J is also engaged with NGO partners like the 
WWF or The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to support their nature conservation projects includ-
ing biodiversity aspects for example in South America or Africa (Johnson&Johnson 2005b: 
                                                
102 The J&J sustainability reports are not audited externally. 
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37). Moreover, J&J serves on the corporate council of the Centre for Health and the Global 
Environment at the Harvard Medical School where they especially contribute to the centre’s 
biodiversity and human health project. The goal is to educate policy-makers and the public 
about the “urgent need to preserve natural ecosystems” (Johnson&Johnson 2005b: 32). The 
Johnson&Johnson 2004 Worldwide Contributions Program Report acknowledges that the 
health and well being of local people in the developing world is inextricably linked to the 
health of local ecosystems. J&J therefore supports the work of the WWF to protect and re-
store biologically significant ecoregions (Johnson&Johnson 2005c: 19). Interestingly, the 
Johnson&Johnson Worldwide Contributions Program 2003 Annual Report “Social Responsi-
bility to the Community” also referred to the partnership with NGOs but additionally acknowl-
edged the importance of genetic resources for J&J: 
“The loss of species deprives us of invaluable tools for biomedical research 
that provide insights into how human body functions in health and illness, and 
precludes our developing important new medicines for currently untreatable 
human diseases. Most importantly, ecosystems provide the life support 
systems for all life, including human life, on Earth” (Johnson&Johnson 2005d: 
16). 
It cannot be answered here why this statement is missing in the following reports and why 
J&J does not live up to the CBD provisions. There is no formal acceptance of the CBD and 
its ABS provisions. 
 
Questionnaire 
Johnson&Johnson did not reply to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 11: Merck & Co., Inc. Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The company has a code of conduct in which it considers the responsibility to protect the 
environment as one of its highest business priorities (Merck 1999: 20). In order to assure 
compliance with its standards, Merck is running an internal compliance program in which the 
development and distribution of written standards of conduct, as well as written policies, pro-
cedures and guidelines is the centre piece. It includes monitoring, auditing, and ongoing 
evaluation regarding compliance with the company’s policies and procedures. Merck does 
not mention an ISO 14001 certification of its facilities. 
Overall, Merck’s main focus in the environmental area lies on the minimization of its resource 
use, energy use and the reduction of waste production and water consumption of its opera-
tions as well as on conservation. The company provides financial support through the Merck 
Company Foundation to charitable organisations and a large number of conservation pro-
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jects to protect ecosystems and habitats around its production facilities. ‘Conservation’, how-
ever, is not specified in further detail and Merck is not stating a clear company policy regard-
ing biodiversity, the CBD and its ABS provisions apart from a general statement to comply 
with all applicable laws, rules and regulations. This is somewhat surprising as Merck’s re-
search collaboration agreement with the Costa Rican Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad 
(INBio) created in 1991 (two years prior to the CBD) is generally seen as  
“perhaps the primary example of a comprehensive and influential benefit-
sharing agreement was the Merck–National Biodiversity Institute contract 
negotiated in Costa Rica. This agreement not only inspired subsequent 
contracts signed by INBio with many organizations worldwide but also the 
agreements established under the International Cooperative Biodiversity 
Group program” (Carrizosa et. al. 2004: 68). 
This was the first agreement with a commercial company to search for sustainable uses of 
Costa Rican biodiversity with potential for the pharmaceutical industry and veterinary sci-
ence. It was renewed in 1994, 1996, and 1998 upon similar terms and expired in 1999. InBio 
is a private, non-profit institution established in response to national concerns about the ac-
celerating loss of Costa Rica's biological diversity. The agreement covered the study of a 
limited number of extracts of plants, insects, and environmental samples to determine their 
potential use. The agreement has given INBio access to technology, technical expertise and 
training (see Cabrera-Medaglia 2004: 111). Merck provided INBio with a research fund of 
US$1 million during the first two years of the agreement and contributed the laboratory 
equipment and materials needed by INBio to process the samples. Merck also agreed to pay 
royalties to INBio for any pharmaceutical product that has been produced from any sample 
sent by INBio (GDI 2003: 25). The royalty percentage is, however, considered to be confi-
dential information.  
While the Merck-INBio case is often presented as a success story in the literature, Carrizosa 
critically annotates that between 1991 and 2000, benefit sharing projects in Costa Rica over-
all channelled about US$ 2.7 million to conservation purposes. This is equivalent to an aver-
age of US$ 300.000 per year, an amount which is quite insignificant compared to the US$ 
650 million per year that Costa Rica gets from ecological tourism (Carrizosa et. al. 2004: 4). 
Furthermore, drawing on personal communication (with J. Rosenthal and J. Cabrera in Feb-
ruary 2004) he states that Merck meanwhile has reduced or even closed some of its natural 
products discovery programs (Carrizosa et. al. 2004: 3). 
 
Questionnaire 
Merck did not reply to our questionnaire.  
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Appendix 12: AstraZeneca Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The AstraZaneca Annual Report and Form 20-F Information 2004 does not mention the bio-
diversity problem nor the CBD. 
 
The company’s Corporate Responsibility Summary Report 2004 outlines biodiversity loss as 
one of the major global concerns while claiming at the same time that AstraZeneca does not 
have “any significant impact on global diversity” (AstraZeneca 2005b: 13). This might well be 
the case but the company is still subject to the ABS provisions of the CBD and there is no 
mentioning of a corporate policy on those issues with regard to the CBD in the corporate re-
sponsibility report. Instead the company states that they are currently “engaged in pilot as-
sessments of the biodiversity at some of our major sites, as preparation for developing an 
appropriate biodiversity management plan” (AstraZeneca 2005b: 13). 
In a corporate statement on Managing Biodiversity103, AstraZeneca recognises the impor-
tance of long term sustainable development, “based on good financial, social and environ-
mental performance. These foundations are the same as those underpinning the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD)”. The corporate responsibility policy relating to biodiversity 
states that “As a minimum, we will meet national and international regulations” and that 
“safety, health and environmental (SHE) considerations will continue to be a fundamental 
consideration” including “economising on use of natural resources and minimising impact on 
the environment”. The statements further elaborates the policy by claiming that 
“AstraZeneca is developing a biodiversity strategy aimed at conserving, and if 
possible increasing, local biodiversity on and around the Company’s 
properties worldwide. The maxim “think global act local” underlines the 
principle that conservation on a global scale (e.g. corporate level) is the sum 
of actions or projects implemented at a local or site level. Individual sites can 
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of local biodiversity by 
protecting natural habitats and creating or maintaining refuges and “green 
corridors” for flora and fauna. These activities are being integrated with 
everyday site activities, without compromising business operations or future 
site developments”.104 
The company describes some examples of those activities on the site level.  
The statement also mentions that bio-prospecting activities for new drugs from the Aus-
tralian rainforests and from the Great Barrier Reef are carried out in collaboration with 
Griffith University in Queensland and that the project has made a significant contribution 
to the documentation of biodiversity in the terrestrial and marine environment. However, 
the ABS provisions are not mentioned in this context. 
 
                                                
103 see http://www.astrazeneca.com/Article/11142.aspx, accessed 05.04.05. 
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Questionnaire 
AstraZeneca did not reply to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 13: Roche Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Roche has formulated a code of conduct in the form of guiding corporate principles (see 
Roche 2005b). In this context, Safety, Health and Environmental Protection (SHE) is seen as 
a key issue for sustainable development. The implementation of the principles is supposed to 
be ensured through an internal management system that is geared to internationally recog-
nised standards such as the ISO 14000 group. Roche does however not seem to be certified 
against ISO 14001. Roche is communicating about SHE through its reporting. Similar to its 
competitors, Roche focuses on environmental issues regarding energy consumption, carbon 
dioxide emissions, acid rain, water consumption, waste and the like. In its sustainability re-
port, the company assesses biodiversity as not relevant to Roche’s business (Roche 2005c: 
102). 
Moreover, the company has a very clear position regarding the use of genetic resources. 
This is expressed in the ‘Global Roche Statement on Biodiversity’ (Roche 2003) as well as in 
a clear statement on the company’s website:  
“Bioprospecting refers to the collection and analysis of natural substances that 
show promise of leading to new therapies and medicines. Roche does not 
currently engage in any activities of this type. Should this change in the future, 
we will base our activities on the broad principles of the 1992 UN Convention 
on Biological Diversity”.105 
Following the Roche statement on biodiversity, the company  
“recognizes that the issue of biodiversity and traditional knowledge is of 
growing importance, particularly for developing countries. The nations have 
sovereignty over the biological resources and indigenous knowledge within 
their boundaries. Moreover, unauthorized or unrestrained removal of natural 
materials from their indigenous habitats can harm the ecology and economy of 
the country concerned. Therefore, Roche supports the principles of resource 
stewardship as broadly enunciated in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). Roche at present avoids the use of natural resource materials as a 
source for existing products or as a source for the discovery and development 
of pharmaceuticals. In the event of Roche discovering or developing a 
commercial product derived from natural resource material or from plant, 
microbial or animal genetic resources, the company is committed to ethical 
and legal access to the resources as well as to fair and appropriate 
recognition of rights-holders to biodiversity resources and traditional 
knowledge” (Roche 2003: 1).  
                                                                                                                                                     
104 see footnote above. 
105 See http://www.roche.com/sus_res_nat.htm, accessed August 10th 2005. 
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Questionnaire 
Ms Matile-Steiner, Corporate Communications Roche, answered our questionnaire on Au-
gust 4th 2005 by explaining that Roche currently does not see the need to use natural re-
sources in its R&D as the company's drug discovery efforts focus on innovative technologies 
such as molecular biology and genetic engineering, genomics, proteomics and bioinformat-
ics, but also high-throughput screening of synthetic chemical compounds and chemical com-
pounds obtained by combinatorial chemistry. According to Ms Matile-Steiner, this evolution 
had nothing to do with the CBD's access and benefit sharing provisions. Roche has commit-
ted to adhere to the CBD obligations if it were to seek access to, and explore, genetic re-
sources in the future. 
 
 
Appendix 14: Novartis Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Novartis sees its commitment to Health, Safety and Environment Protection (HSE) is an inte-
gral dimension of Corporate Citizenship Policy. The company has an overall code of conduct 
for corporate citizenship and concrete HSE guidelines. These compulsory guidelines are 
supposed to define its global standard and procedures. HSE at Novartis includes biosafety, 
health protection, building, plant and process safety, product stewardship, environmental 
protection and conservation of natural resources and energy. Novartis is mainly focusing its 
attention on ways to conserve energy and water and reduce emissions and (hazardous) 
waste in order to achieve operational efficiencies. The company publishes a high-quality en-
vironmental report verified by an external auditor. Its environmental management system is 
recognised as meeting or even exceeding requirements of external certification programs 
such as ISO 14001. According to Innovest Strategic Value Advisors106, the company’s long 
established ecological accounting system has served as an industry model, if not standard, 
in the last decade. Novartis’ sites are certified against EMAS or ISO 14001 management 
standard.  
Generally, Novartis is well aware of the importance of biological diversity. 26 years ago, 
Ciba-Geigy established a foundation for cooperation with developing countries as a depart-
ment within the company, today known as the Novartis Foundation. One of its publications 
underlines the company’s awareness for biodiversity loss as follows:  
                                                
106 Innovest Strategic Value Advisors is an internationally recognized investment research and advi-
sory firm specializing in analyzing companies' performance on environmental, social, and strategic 
governance issues. 
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“This loss is regrettable for esthetic, ethical, philosophical and ecological 
reasons. The loss of biodiversity is also deplorable from an economic 
standpoint since it involves the irrecoverable loss of genetic resources whose 
value for man and nature has never even been determined. One can only 
speculate whether tropical rain forests contain basic materials for decisive 
breakthroughs in the treatment of diseases which today are still regarded as 
incurable” (Novartis Foundation 2005). 
Novartis’ 2004 GRI-Report107 analyses the company’s impact direct on biodiversity as not 
significant (GRI-Report 2004: 54). The report continues with defining bioprospecting and 
benefit sharing as a key challenge for Novartis: 
“Novartis’ bioprospecting activities have negligible negative impact on 
biodiversity, as samples taken for lab for further analysis are limited and have 
little or no impact. A key challenge is finding an agreement on benefit sharing 
for the local population and the country. Novartis accepts the principle laid 
down in the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) whereby countries have 
sovereignty over their genetic resources and can control access to them. 
Novartis contributes to the implementation of the CBD, by conveying know-
how to collaboration partners, passing on the latest technologies and building 
up capacity” (GRI-Report 2004: 55).  
This awareness for the problem of biodiversity loss and the concern for the CBD and its ABS 
principles are reflected in Novartis’ active cooperation with providers of genetic resources 
through benefit sharing agreements. Over the years Novartis has undertaken substantial 
research and development in natural products in view of discovering potential new drugs 
(Earthwatch et al. 2002: 33). In line with the CBD, Novartis adapted its bioprospecting policy 
to recognise the principle that countries have sovereignty over their genetic resources and 
that benefits derived from future products based on natural compounds should be shared. 
The study further states that in 1994, Novartis started its first large bioprospecting project 
based on these principles, with partners in Mexico, Panama and India. Novartis also collabo-
rated with Chinese researchers to develop an anti-Malaria treatment based on Artemisia an-
nua, a common medicinal plant in China. While there is no other research done on most of 
these activities, the Novartis-UZACHI Biolead Project in Mexico has been studied extensively 
by Baruffol and to some extent by Larson-Guerra et. al. in IUCN’s comprehensive 2004 pub-
lication on ABS. 
The Novartis-Uzachi bioprospecting agreement was the first of this kind for Novartis. It has 
been realised between 1996 and 1998. Initially, Sandoz signed a contract with four Mexican 
communities to explore the microbiological diversity of their surroundings. Baruffol sums up 
the conditions of this cooperation as follows: 
                                                
107 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a long-term, multi-stakeholder, international process whose 
mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. These 
Guidelines are for voluntary use for reporting on the sustainability dimension of the activities, products 
and services of an organisation.  
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“Novartis scientists could not have access to the forests or to raw material, 
which had to be collected and prepared by trained local people. Novartis was 
to provide the equipment of a local laboratory, train the employees and pay 
the salaries, while the Mexican partner delivered the desired microbiological 
strains, mostly fungi” (Barrufol 2003: 2). 
Furthermore, the contracting parties agreed on a ‘success sum’ in case important com-
pounds should be discovered. In a personal interview with two Novartis scientists Baruffol 
found out that the company is ready to share the benefits derived from future products based 
on bioprospection. They argue that it would be almost impossible to hide the origin of the 
compounds once a new product reaches the market and there would be no incentive to do 
so as the image-damage for the company would be tremendous. Novartis claims to act ac-
cording to the ideas and norms of the CBD and to contribute to their implementation (see 
Barrufol 2003: 50). Retrospectively, the Novartis staff involved assesses its cooperation with 
the Mexican communities as a meeting of many advantaging factors at the right time and 
therefore as not being reproducible. 
 
Questionnaire 
Novartis did not respond to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 15: Bristol-Meyers Squibb Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Neither the Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 2004 Annual Report nor the Corporate Social 
Responsibility at Bristol-Myers Squibb 2003/2004 Report ‘Creating A Legacy Of Hope’ men-
tion the problem of biodiversity loss108. 
 
The section of the internet presence concerned with sustainability issues includes a state-
ment on land use and biodiversity. BMS states that many of their pharmaceutical products 
(inc. TAXOL®) are derived from natural plants and organisms, that the company has a “spe-
cial interest in preserving biodiversity” and that they “therefore support natural resource 
stewardship from both a business and environmental perspective”109. One of the tangible 
ways BMS claims to support biodiversity is to purchase and preserve biologically diverse 
land.  
                                                
108 Bristol-Myers Squibb is ranked 22 out of the top 50 corporate environmental and sustainability re-
porters, according to Risk and Opportunties: Best Practices in Non-Financial Reporting, a joint report 
by SustainAbility, the United Nations Environmental Programme, and Standard and Poor's. Published 
in November 2004, the report ranks Bristol-Myers Squibb among the top two pharmaceutical compa-
nies and top three U.S.-based companies (http://www.bms.com/ehs/; accessed 31.05.2005). 
109 http://www.bms.com/static/ehs/perfor/data/landus.html; accessed 06.04.2005 
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The 2004 Sustainability Web Site Preview ‘Building and Sustaining a Better World’110 outlines 
BMS’s biodiversity policy goals by stating 
“Our 2010 goal is conservation of ecologically significant areas to offset the 
property occupied by Bristol-Myers Squibb’s total operations worldwide while 
also promoting employee participation in protection of ecosystems. We’ve 
already met our goal of protecting land equal in area to the amount of land 
used by our research and development, manufacturing, and distribution 
centers and are on our way to protecting, by 2005, land equal in area to the 
amount of land used by our administrative offices. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
encourages local site conservation projects as well. We have preserved land 
in the Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, and the United States” (BMS 2004: 
4). 
Beyond this voluntary commitment neither the CBD nor ABS provisions are mentioned in this 
document. 
BMS also follows another approach to protect biodiversity. It entered into a partnership with 
local authorities and NGOs (The Nature Conservancy) to come up with an eco-regional plan 
for Puerto Rico to sketch out a sustainable conservation strategy for the island. In this con-
text, BMS also sponsors environmental education for students. The company has also joined 
forces with The Wildlife Habitat Council and received certification for wildlife habitat projects 
at their facilities in New Jersey and Indiana (land use and biodiversity111 statement). 
In addition, the BMS website also outlines the companies’ bioprospecting policy without di-
rectly referring to the provisions of the CBD (section Social Performance: Human Rights, 
Bioprospecting112): Their research efforts involve the acquisition of genetic material or indige-
nous plants or animals. In those cases, BMS is “committed to appropriate acquisition that this 
respectful of local mores and costumes. Reasonable compensation will be offered to the af-
fected country, territory, indigenous population, or other group”. It seems that the ABS provi-
sions are indirectly accepted but not directly referred to. It remains unclear why the other 
available documents do not outline some kind of official ABS policy. 
Interestingly, the relevant literature mentions cases of bio-prospecting contracts in which 
BMS has been part of although no official commitment to the ABS provisions has been made 
public as shown above. 
 
 
 
                                                
110 A summary of the online sustainability report 
111 http://www.bms.com/static/ehs/perfor/data/landus.html; accessed 31.05.2005. 
112 http://www.bms.com/static/ehs/perfor/data/humanr.html#bioprospect; accessed 31.05.2005 
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The Suriname International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG113) programme 
The programme aimed at a screening of wild genetic resources in the forests of Suriname to 
find leads for new pharmaceuticals. Partners to this benefit-sharing agreement are Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, the University or Suriname, Conservation Interna-
tional (a conservation NGO), the foundation for nature preservation in Suriname, a local, 
pharmaceutical firm owned by the Suriname government (BGVS), Missouri Botanical Garden 
(US), the National Herbarium of Suriname, the Walter Reed Army Hospital (US), local 
Saramaka tribe groups and the Bristol Meyers Squibb Pharmaceutical Research Institute 
(Barber/Glowka/Vina 2002: 370; OECD 2003: 56;45). The collection was done by people 
from the Saramaka tribe and the University of Suriname through both random botanical col-
lecting and ethno-botanical collecting based on traditional knowledge about the medicinal 
qualities of certain species held by locals. After the extraction at a local, public pharmaceuti-
cal firm (BGVS), BMS tested the samples for anti-cancer and anti-infective activity from the 
screening phase to future commercialisation (Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 1998: 9). 
The agreement entails the following short-term benefits: 
• employment/incomes for traditional healers, field collectors and others; 
• training and technology transfer for Suriname research institutions; 
• building capacity for local pharmaceutical production; 
• strengthening the national botanical inventory; 
• recording and securing of tribal knowledge; and 
• establishment of Forest People Fund (FPF) for community development, health care and con-
servation projects. 
 
The following long-term benefits have been agreed upon: 
• joint ownership of patents by tribal groups where their knowledge is a basis for development of 
a product; 
• payment of royalties on future products to Suriname on a sliding scale depending upon pro-
portion of local genetic resources/traditional knowledge contribution (see boy below); and 
• potential discovery of more effective treatments for malaria (Barber/Glowka/Vina 2002: 370). 
 
The contract dating back to 1993  
“specifies each participant’s rights to the licensing and royalties of any drug 
products that result from the project. The design of such concrete 
mechanisms, which are intended to compensate tribal communities for their 
contribution to drug development, may lead to direct economic benefits in the 
form of royalties” (Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 1998: 4-5). 
                                                
113 The International Cooperative Biodiversity Group (ICBG) is a U.S. government funded programme 
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was designed to stimulate the field of 
bioprospecting, to provide models for the development of sustainable uses of biodiversity, and to 
gather evidence on the feasibility of bioprospecting. The ICBG awarded grants for 5 projects in differ-
ent developing countries (see Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 1998: 2-3; Rosenthal 1996: 2). In the fiscal year 
1995, the total U.S. government funding (NIH, NSF, USAID) for the ICBG program was US$ 2.3 mil-
lion. 
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The contract foresees royalties for the Forest People Fund, which was established to ensure 
that tribal communities would benefit immediately from the access to their forest resources, 
two local NGOs and two academic institutions (between 5 and 50%) (OECD 2003: 53). Ac-
cording to Rosenthal, the FPF is the largest single recipient of any financial return to reflect 
the importance of community stewardship of their resources (Rosenthal 1996: 9).  
Apart from potential future royalties, the short-term benefits arising from the implementation 
of the bioprospecting activities play an important role such as the information, training and 
employment of people, technology transfer and up-front payments. As one immediate result, 
the FPF was established in 1994 with a US$ 50,000 contribution from BMS. Another US$ 
10,000 donation followed in 1996 and additional donations of US$ 20,000 have been made 
each year as part of the renewed ICBG project until 2003114 (Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 1998: 5; 
Guerin-Mc Manus et al. 2002: 338). The short-term returns have been used to give grants for 
making tool, training and marketing of traditional non-timber forest craft products, to enable a 
meeting among indigenous leaders to promote common interests and to finance shaman 
apprenticeships (Rosenthal 1996: 19). The fund provides funding for small-scale, sustainable 
economic development and health projects which are designed and proposed by the locals. 
The FPF is also supposed to capture additional long-term revenues. 
A more detailed account of the benefit-sharing plan for monetary benefits is giving below 
(please see box). 
 
Box: Monetary benefit-sharing - Suriname ICBG. 
Suriname portion of advance payments and royalty earnings 
Advance Payments        Royalties 
                                                 Ethno-medicinal collection     Random collection 
 
100%   Forest Peoples Fund    50%     30% 
 
          Bedrijf Geneesmiddelen 
   Voorziening Suriname   10%     10% 
 
   University of Suriname  
   Herbarium     10%     10% 
 
   Stichting Natuurbehoud  
   Suriname     5%     10% 
 
   Conservation  
   International-Suriname    10%     10% 
 
   Suriname Forest Service   5%     10% 
 
   Future collaborating  
                                                
114 Originally, the project duration was scheduled from September 1993 until September 1998 but was 
prolonged for another five years to fund the coninutation and expansion of the bioprospecting efforts to 
include agrochemistry. 
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   institutions     10%     20% 
 
100%   Total      100%     100%  
(source: Rosenthal 1996: 10) 
 
On the conceptual level, this benefit-sharing agreement seems to be entirely in accordance 
with the ABS provisions of the CBD. 
However, the current literature leaves important questions unanswered because of the confi-
dentiality of the agreement. It therefore remains unclear to which extent actors on the user 
side (private or public) have received benefits. It is also unidentified if any products or pat-
ents resulted from this programme and if so, which royalty rates apply.115 It would be of spe-
cial interest to know if there is any joint ownership of patents so far and which benefits re-
sulted out of this ownership for the local community. To our knowledge, this would be an ex-
ceptional case.  
 
The Costa Rica ICBG programme 
The programme is aiming at studying insects and related organisms from the dry tropical 
forests of the Guanacaste Conservation Area in Costa Rica. The agreement includes the 
National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) of Costa Rica, the University of Costa Rica, Cornell 
University, the Cornell Research Foundation and Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical Re-
search Institute (see Rosenthal 1996: 4; 14). 
 
The Africa ICBG programme 
In this programme, the Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical Research Institute was part of 
one of the five associate programmes entitled Drug Development – B (Antivi-
ral/Cytotoxicity/CNS Activity etc.) (Iwu/Laird 1998: 7) together with other partners (Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals Inc, Center for Drug Discovery of the University of Utah).  
 
Questionnaire 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb did not reply to our questionnaire. 
 
 
                                                
115 The agreement lists a number of factors which determine the royalty rate amongst which are the 
“type of patent claims granted, potential product sales, the level of development and potential costs of 
subsequent research and development, marketing exclusivity available to BMS, the competitive im-
pact of related market products, and the extent of the contribution of ethnobotanical knowledge or 
uses […] The amount to be given to Suriname is calculated by means of a decimal fraction (Suriname 
Factor). The Suriname Factor is multiplied by the royalty rate, which is kept confidential among the 
parties” (Guerin-Mc Manus 1998: 13). 
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Appendix 16: Lilly Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Eli Lilly and Company 2004 Annual Report ‘Answers for Shareholders’ does not mention 
any biodiversity problem related statement. 
 
The company’s corporate responsibility report 2004 outlines the corporate biodiversity policy. 
The report states that 
“Lilly is continuously working to protect habitat and minimize the impacts of our 
operations on ecosystems. We are committed to engaging in conservation 
projects and habitat enhancements on the more than 7,300 acres of land that 
we own around the globe, as well as supporting conservation efforts outside 
our own properties” (Lilly 2005b: 35).  
Alike most other companies, Lilly is generally committed to the sustainable use of natural 
resources and resources conservation (ibid: 24). Since 1997, Lilly has also been a corporate 
member of the Wildlife Habitat Council (WHC), a non-profit organization dedicated to protect-
ing and enhancing wildlife habitat. They help the company managing their unused lands in 
an ecologically sensitive manner for the benefit of wildlife and certify sites that meet the strict 
requirements for habitat enhancement (ibid: 35). Apart from the commitment to its own sites, 
the Lilly foundation also contributed to the ARBOR project of the Center for Earth and Envi-
ronmental Science at Indiana University – Purdue University, Indianapolis which aims at de-
veloping an outdoor research and experiential learning site for teaching principles of science 
based environmental stewardship. 
 
Questionnaire 
On our inquiry per fax (June, 3rd) and by phone (June, 3rd and15th), Lilly’s Corporate Centre 
informed us that it is a corporate policy of Lilly not to participate in any surveys. We were 
therefore not able to obtain any additional information.  
 
 
Appendix 17: Wyeth Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Wyeth has a code of conduct for its performance related to environment, health and safety 
(EHS).116 One of the indicators for this performance (among others such as energy and water 
use and waste production) is land use and biodiversity. Hence, Wyeth acknowledges the 
importance of biological diversity as expressed in following statement: “Wyeth is committed 
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to preserving natural habitats and biodiversity” (Wyeth 2005b: 6). The company tries to con-
tribute to its conservation through the support and implementation of conservation projects 
that enhance the environment both at its facilities and in ecologically rich areas. Significant 
efforts in the area of biodiversity protection have to be seen in the financial support of The 
Nature Conservancy and the Wildlife Habitat Council.117 The Nature Conservancy in turn 
supports the Atlantic Forest in Brazil’s Southern Bahia region with donations. The funds will 
be used to support a community-based conservation project in this highly endangered natu-
ral area. The Wildlife Habitat Council is a U.S. non-profit organization committed to wildlife 
habitat management and environmental education that helps to develop and maintain wildlife 
areas on corporate properties. Wyeth has achieved ISO 14001 and EMAS certification for its 
environmental management system.  
Even though the company has no official position on the CBD and access and benefit shar-
ing, it has taken part in the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group Programme (ICBG) 
from 1993 to 1998. In this context, five project were initiated, one of them for collaborative 
work with three countries in Latin America. The University of Arizona, in cooperation with 
universities and research institutions from Argentina, Chile and Mexico, was looking at plants 
from arid and semi-arid ecosystems as potential sources of new pharmaceuticals and agro-
chemicals. Amongst the collaborators in this ICBG Programme was also Wyeth Ayerst Re-
search Laboratories (see Timmermann 1997). Ferreira-Miani remarks that this project also 
sought the participation of local communities and associations such as the Association of 
Traditional Healers of Oaxaca, although they were not parties to the main agreement. Never-
theless, these communities received non-monetary benefits that included urban and rural 
health centres and training for the cultivation of medicinal plants (Ferreira-Miani 2004: 71). 
 
Questionnaire 
Wyeth could not be provided with a questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 18: Abbott Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Abbott 2004 Annual Report and the 2003 Global Citizenship Report ‘Touchin Lives’ do 
not mention any biodiversity policy. Additionally, The 2000 Environmental, Health and Safety 
Update ‘Improving Lives Around the World’ does not touch upon the biodiversity problem or 
                                                                                                                                                     
116 In this regard, the company states that “as a global leader in the industry, we recognize that envi-
ronmental, health and safety (EHS) considerations are an essential element of our business” (see: 
http://www.wyeth.com/ehs/vision/index.asp, accessed August 10th 2005). 
117 See http://www.wyeth.com/ehs/performance/landuse.asp, accessed August 12th 2005. 
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any CBD related issues either. Only the Abbott Code Of Business Conduct ‘Safeguarding 
Trust’ generally refers to compliance with laws relating to the environment (Abbott 2003). 
Additionally, in the entire internet-representation we were unable to find any hints of a 
CBD/ABS corporate policy scheme or even the acknowledgement of biodiversity loss as a 
political issue for the company.  
 
Questionnaire 
After contacting Abbott through an online form, the Abbott Corporate Human Resources sec-
tion did not provide answers to our questions but replied by stating that any available com-
pany information is on their website (e-mail communication, 18.04.05). 
The company (Abbott Laboratories Global Citizenship and Policy) was contacted again on 
June, 3rd via fax with a request for a phone interview but did not get back to us.  
Abott did not reply to our questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 19: Bayer Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Bayer ‘Science For A Better Life’ Annual Report 2004 does not give any statement on 
biodiversity issues. 
In the Bayer Sustainable Development Report 2004 there is a section on biodiversity protec-
tion (Bayer 2005b: 57-58). It lists Bayer’s contributions to and activities in conservation pro-
jects on various sites in different countries (incl. NZ, US, Congo, Australia, UK, Guatemala, 
Brazil). Bayer donated medicines for animals, financed biotopes, research, donated to funds 
and sponsored a project to protect butterflies.  
 
After contacting Bayer, the company supplied us with two other publications118 and the 
Statements and Procedures for the active integration of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD) proposed by the German Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Com-
panies (VFA) which is fully supported by Bayer. The statement outlines in detail the positions 
of pharmaceutical companies with regard to the ABS provisions of the CBD (For the full 
statement, please see Appendix 28). 
 
The article Checking out nature’s stores published in Bayer’s Research magazine clearly 
outlines the provisions of the CBD (Bayer Research 13: 95) and assure Bayer’s compliance 
                                                
118 „Checking out nature’s stores“, in: Bayer Research 13, p. 92-96, [not online available any more]  
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with the convention. Bayer does not conduct any plant or micro-organism collecting activities 
but receives them from partner institutions which have to commit themselves to the CBD 
provisions. Examples for those partnerships are the Institute of Materia Medica, part of the 
Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, which has been a partner of Bayer for over 20 years 
or the cooperation with the Kunming Institute of Bottany in Yunnan Province (ibid.: 94-95). 
 
The article Learning from Evolution highlights the potential of natural lead structures119 for 
both Bayer’s Health Care’s natural substance research department and Bayer’s crop science 
researchers (88). Also this publication refers to the cooperation with the Kunming Institute “in 
accordance with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity” (Bayer Research 16: 
91). 
 
Phone interview with Mr. Rast, Technology Manager Natural Product Research Group 
(based on questionnaire120): 
Mr. Rast outlined Bayer’s CBD policy as follows: benefit-sharing is part of every contract with 
providers of genetic resources. This has also been the case prior to the CBD. Bayer has 
agreements in place with a number of provider institutions (not only the already mentioned 
one with the Institute of Materia Medica and the Kunming Institute, but also with the Institute 
of Chemistry (Hanoi), some private company in Indonesia and Biotransfer (France)). Part of 
those agreements is a clause on benefit-sharing including monetary and non-monetary bene-
fits.  
As non-monetary benefits, Bayer usually trains people from the partner institutions at their 
research sites in Germany for some weeks or even months in doing extractions and purifica-
tions of compounds and the proper handling of the material. This is part of almost every 
agreement and is in the vital interest of Bayer. Mr. Rast explained that Bayer is interested in 
having closer connections with the partners for which the pre-condition is this kind of techni-
cal assistance. Then pre-testing stages and extraction can be done in the provider country. 
The Kunming Institute for example delivers extracts which already showed an interesting 
activity and Bayer trained people from the Institute to do the difficult tests and provided the 
necessary testing equipment. The same holds true for the cooperation with the Institute of 
Chemistry, Hanoi: the provider does the collecting and some extraction and pre-screening 
on-site and then provides Bayer with enriched extracts or even pure substances. Also this 
agreement encompassed a very strong training programme.  
                                                                                                                                                     
and “Learning from evolution”, in: Bayer Research 16, p. 88-91, 
[http://www.research.bayer.com/medien/pages/2990/Crop_protection.pdf; accessed 06.05.05]. 
119 That is substances which already have a desired biological effect but lack certain characteristics.  
120 In response to our questionnaire, Mr. Rast got in touch with us and he preferred to go through the 
questionnaire orally. The phone interview was conducted on June, 20th 2005. 
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As monetary benefits, Bayer’s agreements usually contain milestone payments and royalties. 
The milestone payments vary according to the development stage the compound reaches 
(minor payments when reaching phase I or II, larger if you reach phase III) but in general, Mr. 
Rast considers them to be significant. The (up-front, milestone, and royalty) payments for the 
provider for already processed or pre-tested material (extracts, pure substances) or material 
in connection with traditional knowledge about its use are higher than compared to just pro-
viding material or giving access to collections121. The philosophy is that “if the partner wants 
to have higher payments, then they need to have stronger inputs”.  
 
The Kunming Institute of Botany (KIB) as a provider of genetic resources 
KIB is the leading Chinese institute for plant research and is affiliated with the Chinese 
Academy of Science (Academia Sinica). The main task of Kunming Institute is to exploit, util-
ize and protect plant resources. It is well known for its strong infrastructure and phytochemi-
cal competence, encompassing departments of taxonomy, ethnopharmacology, phytochem-
istry and plant physiology. The Institute grows some 4,500 medicinal plants in their botanical 
garden and the Yunnan province where the institute is located, is a biodiversity ‘hot spot’. 
 
The key frame of the partnership between Bayer and Kunming Institute is based on the fol-
lowing points: 
• scientific collaboration with exchange of know how and people, incl. capacity   
   building 
• sharing of risks (scientific effort) and benefit (royalties) 
• goals and strategy is mutually decided 
• sample collection at KIB 
• sample transfer possible to both sides 
• adequate reimbursement of effort at KIB by Bayer, incentive structure established 
 
Bayer’s policy is that to enable the use of natural products, there has to be feasible access to 
sources technically as well as legally. An adequate sharing of risks and benefits will lead to a 
mutually agreed compensation which is reasonable. 
[source: presentation of Mr. Rast, “practical aspect of natural product research in the light of the CBD - 
an industry perspective”, held on Sept, 23rd 2003 in Berlin] 
 
It has also been mentioned during the interview that Bayer receives material from partner in 
France (Biotransfer). This company has access to the overseas departments of France (e.g. 
Guadeloupe or Martinique) which are legally part of France. For Bayer “this was a rather 
convenient situation as the CBD was not a point with them […] they did not help us to cir-
cumvent the CBD but the CBD was not a problem with them”. This statement contradicts a 
bit the earlier mentioned point that benefit-sharing is part of those research agreements re-
gardless of the CBD. 
Generally, it has to be said that the mentioned clauses are part of the agreements but the 
success of the research was disappointing for Bayer. Their scientists were not able to bring a 
                                                
121 In our view, this set-up is a kind of outsourcing process which is both in the interest of Bayer (pre-
sumably lower costs) and the provider (more value added in the provider country helps capturing more 
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drug on the market. None of the compounds even reached the first development stage. This 
means in turn that the transfer of benefits has been limited to the mentioned technology 
transfer and up-front payments so far. In light of this Bayer decided this year to close down 
the natural product research group which was quite substantial for Bayer during the last 20 
years. The group accounted for approximately 10-15% of the chemical research activity of 
the pharmaceutical business. Mr. Rast explains this decision with the poor results, a different 
focus of Bayer’s pharmaceuticals strategy which does not rely that much on natural com-
pounds and the fact that natural products research is very expensive compared to conven-
tional or combinatorial chemistry. He does not see any connection of this decision with the 
CBD as Bayer has been used to have benefit-sharing prior to the provisions of the CBD. 
Bayer’s crop science group still is more interested in the natural product group and the com-
pany tries to keep the capacity of the man-power. Also for the crop science group “benefit-
sharing is not a problem at all”.  
The CBD therefore seems not to be decisive for the corporate behaviour as Bayer already 
had benefit sharing clauses in agreements with partners and did therefore not change its 
business practice according to the CBD’s ABS provisions. The only point were Mr. Rast saw 
some impact of the CBD was the expectations of providers which have risen since the CBD 
entered into force. He mentioned the example of an Institute from Puerto Rico contacting 
Bayer. They were never able to establish an agreement with any partner from South or Mid-
dle America “because they ask for very, very high up-front and royalty payments and we 
didn’t feel this to be appropriate”122. This situation was disappointing for Bayer as they felt 
that they offered a good deal including milestone and royalty payments. Mr. Rast claims that 
“cooperation partners strongly overestimate the success rate”. In his view, the mentioned 
Asian partners have a more pragmatic approach: they charge comparably high payments for 
extracts and materials but often except contracts which leave the question of milestone pay-
ments and royalty rates open for a second agreement in case an interesting compounds 
reaches the development stage123.  
For the general corporate policy the CBD did not have any significant impact as CBD issues 
are only of importance for the natural product development which is a minor activity. Sec-
ondly, Mr. Rast imagined that it would only be a point for the official company policy “if you 
have some compounds in late stage development” which was not the case with Bayer. 
                                                                                                                                                     
benefits). 
122 Following up on this statement, Mr. Rast concretised that 5% would be a very high rate for Bayer in 
case of solely providing access to a collection or delivering material. 
123 This is favourable for Bayer as the board has to give its consent to any agreement signed. It is eas-
ier to get a contract approved by the board if an agreement leaves those questions open and negoti-
ates them only in case of success. The outcome will be the same as the provider partner will receive 
milestone and royalty payments. 
 Busch and Kern: Realising Access and Benefit Sharing Provisions of the CBD 
 140
As mentioned before Bayer does not collect samples themselves but receives them from 
partner institutions which have to be committed to the CBD provisions. Asked about mecha-
nisms to ensure compliance of their partners, Mr. Rast described that Bayer ensures the 
compliance through asking for necessary documentation of the source of material and of PIC 
from state authorities. In this respect the provisions of the CBD had an effect as Bayer 
started to ask for this documentation only after the CBD entered into force. 
 
 
Appendix 20: Boehringer Ingelheim Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Neither the Boehringer Ingelheim Annual Report 2004 ‘Value through Innovation’ nor the 
Boehringer Ingelheim ‘Our planet - our responsibility’ Environment Safety Health 2000 report 
does include any statement concerning biodiversity loss or the CBD. The report nevertheless 
mentions an activity by employees at Solana, Boehringer Ingelheim’s Duboisia Plantation in 
Brazil. Large areas of the farm have been reforested allowing the wild animal population to 
increase significantly. After the discovery of some seriously endangered species on this site 
(e.g. tapirs) some co-workers founded a wildlife conservation society (Boehringer Ingelheim 
2001: 18-19). This only happened by chance and doesn’t have its point-of-departure in any 
company’s corporate policy.  
The latest available EHS report dates from 2000, which had a predecessor only in 1996. The 
report also covers mainly narrow areas regarding improvements at site level but neglects 
global dimensions of corporate responsibility (e.g. access to medicines for the poor, etc). 
 
Questionnaire 
Dr. Hartmut Leidig, head of corporate department Environment, Health and Safety replied to 
our questionnaire in writing on June, 28th 2005. According to his information, Boehringer 
Ingelheim does not use any genetic resources in their R&D. Natural products exploitation 
and screening is nor part of the company’s R&D strategy because “up to now we do not be-
lieve in a successful natural products strategy for new active pharmaceutical ingredients”. 
Boehringer Ingelheim acknowledges biodiversity loss as an important environmental prob-
lem, but the CBD and its ABS provisions are not an important issue for the company due to 
their R&D strategy. 
 
Appendix 21: Takeda Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
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In 1992, the Takeda announced its "Basic Principles on the Environment", a code of conduct 
for environmental measures. The company states that this would ‘aggressively add’ to the 
compliance with all relevant laws and regulations its own voluntary initiatives towards protect-
ing the global environment.124 Takeda is implementing a voluntary program of environmental 
activities aimed at meeting mid-range environmental objectives (Responsible Care pro-
gramme) as a set of concrete environmental measures. The focus of this program lies on the 
reduction of waste and emissions of chemical substances as well as on energy conservation 
(countermeasures against climate change).  
The company conducts internal environmental audits at its plants and research laboratories 
in Japan to ensure implementation of the environmental protection measures detailed in the 
Responsible Care programme. Its two main production facilities in Hikari and Osaka obtained 
ISO 14001 certification for their environmental management systems.  
Takeda does neither touch on biological diversity as an important issue at any point, nor 
does the company acknowledge the Convention on Biodiversity and its ABS provisions as a 
relevant topic. There is no indication in the relevant literature that Takeda would have been 
involved in any benefit sharing cooperation. 
 
Questionnaire 
Takeda did not answer our questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 22: Amgen Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Amgen 2004 Annual Report ‘Inspired science. Defining moments’ does not refer to the 
problem of biodiversity loss or the CBD. Moreover, the Amgen Foundation Charitable Contri-
butions Report 2003 does not mention the support of any primarily environmental initiatives 
either.  
Although the company’s description of research activities clearly outlines the use of bacteria 
of animal cell lines125, there is no mentioning of a CBD/ABS corporate policy in any document 
whatsoever. Amgen claims to use bacteria Eschericia coli (E. coli), baker's yeast, and mam-
malian cell lines, including the Chinese Hamster Ovary cell line (CHO cells)126. The source of 
the used materials remains unclear. It could be from gene banks. The company does not 
                                                
124 See http://www.takeda.co.jp/english/environment/index.html, accessed August 10th 2005. 
125 http://www.amgen.com/rnd/RecombinantDNA.html; accessed 05.04.05 
126 http://www.amgen.com/science/about_biotechnology_recombinant_dna_technology.html, ac-
cessed on July, 22nd 2005. 
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publish a corporate social responsibility/sustainability or Environment, Health and Social re-
port at all. 
 
Questionnaire 
Unfortunately, Amgen was not willing to provide this thesis with any further information al-
though we contacted them several times via e-mail and fax. The company claims not to be 
resourced to handle our request127. 
 
 
Appendix 23: Schering-Plough Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Schering-Plough does not acknowledge biodiversity loss as being a relevant issue in its 2004 
environmental report (which is the first report since 1998), on its internet presence, or re-
leases any other official relevant statement. The company does not follow a consistent and 
reliable policy regarding the CBD and its ABS provisions.  
 
The company focuses in its environmental management programme on its energy consump-
tion, emissions as well as the generation of hazardous waste and wastewater. Schering-
Plough has an environmental management system in place in order to ensure compliance 
with its environmental standards and production facilities are ISO 14001 certified.  
 
Questionnaire  
Schering-Plough did not respond to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 24: Eisai Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
The Eisai Annual Financial Report Release 2003 does not voice any concerns about the en-
vironmental problem of biodiversity loss. 
 
The Eisai Environmental & Social Report 2004128 refers to biodiversity issues only at one very 
specific point in the section on Ethics in Research and Development by claiming that “Eisai 
complies fully with relevant laws –including the Law Concerning the Conservation and Sus-
                                                
127 personal communication with Mary Klem, Associate Director, Corporate Public Relations, June, 
14th 2005. 
128 This report has been externally audited by independent certified auditors (Tohmatsu Environmental 
Research Institute Ltd.).  
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tainable Use of Biological Diversity through Regulations on the Use of Living Modified Organ-
isms” (Eisai 2005: 16). The CBD is not mentioned in this context. 
 
Questionnaire 
In response to the questionnaire we sent to Eisai, Ms Ishida (PhD, Manager, Corporate 
Communications Department) informed us that after contacting the Environment and Safety 
Department she found out that Eisai “cannot answer/comment on none of the questions” we 
posed to the company129. After contacting Eisai again, we were at least able to obtain the 
information that the chemistry department is using a natural compound library for drug devel-
opment. 
 
 
Appendix 25: Schering AG Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Schering AG has neither an official policy on biodiversity, the CBD or Access and Benefit 
Sharing nor does it acknowledge these issues in its annual reports or its internet presence.  
 
The company has defined a Code of Business Conduct & Ethics that covers various aspects 
such as corruption, insider trading and Corporate Responsibility. Accordingly, ”Schering is 
dedicated to operate in a manner that is economically, socially and environmentally respon-
sible.”130 Furthermore, Schering states that it is committed to the principles of sustainable 
development in so far as that it “strives to make efficient use of natural resources and mini-
mise the environmental impact of its activities and products over their life cycle”.131 The man-
agement of natural resources is brought up in Schering’s Environmental Report which in-
forms about the company’s performance with regard to its energy and water use and waste 
production (Schering 2003: 24). Production facilities are ISO 14001 certified and Schering 
has been included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index as a leading company within 
the pharmaceutical sector.132 
  
 
                                                
129 Personal communication, June, 22nd 2005. 
130 See http://www.schering.de/scripts/en/10_about/ethic/standard/index.php#mark, accessed 
11.08.2005. 
131 See footnote above. 
132 This index, compiled annually, lists the top ten percent of companies around the world which strive 
for sustainable development. Points are awarded for the use of innovative and efficient technologies 
combined with a progressive corporate culture and a distinct sense of responsibility regarding society 
and the environment. 
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Questionnaire 
Notwithstanding repeated personal communication with the company’s responsible contact 
person, Schering did not answer to the questionnaire. 
 
 
Appendix 26: Sankyo Data 
Biodiversity Policy 
Sankyo established a code of conduct in March 1999 to promote the observation of laws and 
corporate ethical requirements. The code acknowledges the company’s role as a corporate 
citizen and established an ‘environmental and compliance program management depart-
ment’ in 2004. All of Sankyo’s production plants have been awarded the ISO 14001 man-
agement standard. The company’s environmental policy focuses on the prevention of energy 
conservation/global warming, recycling, chemical substance management and has set out 
concrete goals and targets on these themes (see Sankyo 2005: 18; 19). However, Sankyo is 
not aware of the loss of biological diversity as a major environmental problem. The company 
bespeaks no official position in this regard. 
 
Questionnaire 
Sankyo Co., Ltd. did not respond to the questionnaire. 
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Appendix 27: Questionnaire Boehringer Ingelheim 
Please return to: 
Fabian Busch and Florian Kern 
Roskilde University, Denmark 
Phone: +45 26 46 52 79 
Fax: + 45 46 74 30 41 
Mail: florian@ruc.dk; fabian@ruc.dk 
 
 
I. Use of Genetic Resources in Product R&D? 
 
1. Does your company use genetic resources in the pharmaceutical R&D? 
a) If so, which kind of genetic resources (specimen, extracts, derivates, etc) do you 
use and where do you get them from (provider country and providing institution; ex 
situ/in situ resources) and when? 
Where is the research carried out? 
How important are genetic resources in your R&D (e.g. research budget for natural 
products in comparison to other branches)? 
 
b) If not, why do you not use genetic resources? 
 
 
II. The Convention on Biological Diversity’s Provisions on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing: Boehringer Ingelheim’s Corporate Policy? 
 
2. Do you consider biodiversity loss to be an important environmental problem? 
     
 
3. Do you know the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its Bonn Guidelines on 
access and benefit-sharing? Do you consider these provisions to be an important issue for 
your company? 
 
 
4. Do you have a corporate policy on biodiversity issues in accordance with the CBD and its 
access and benefit-sharing provisions?  
a) If yes, please provide further information on the policy (e.g. what does it cover? 
When did it come into being? How is it implemented?)  
b) If not, why not? 
 
 
5. Did your corporate behaviour change in any way after the CBD entered into force in 1993? 
a) If yes, why and in how far?  
b) If not, why not? 
 
 
6. Did the CBD affect the extent of use of genetic resources in your company? 
 
 
III. Boehringers’s Experience with Access and Benefit-Sharing? 
 
7. Do you have any experience with bioprospecting contracts which entail some kind of ac-
cess and benefit-sharing agreement?  
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a) if so, can you tell us something about this experience?  
 
To which extent did you receive rights of access from the country of origin and which kind of 
benefit-sharing did you agree upon? 
 
Could you tell us something about the terms of it? 
 
Is a government agency party to the agreement? 
 
b) If not, what are the particular reasons for this? Do you intend to have some in the 
future and what would this depend upon? 
 
 
8. Why do you (not) voluntarily comply with the ABS provisions? Do you feel some kind of 
normative pressure to comply? 
 
 
9. Why do your competitors comply/not comply?  
 
 
10. Were you able to bring new products on the market by research activities with genetic 
resources or to announce patents based on genetic resources since the CBD entered into 
force in 1993? 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time! We don’t have any further questions, but if you have 
anything more you want to bring up or ask about, please do not hesitate to let us know. 
 
 
Respondent: 
 
Name: 
 
Position: 
 
e-mail-address for further queries: 
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Appendix 28: VFA Statement on CBD 
Statements and Procedures for the active integration of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) proposed by the German Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies 
(VFA) 
 
General Statement 
The German Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VFA) states - to support the 
intentions of the Convention on Biological Diversity  
- to confirm its sincere interest and support in conservation of biological diversity and sustainable use 
of its components  
- to offer constructive proposals for adequate multi-factorial compensation of each party´s contribution 
in co-operations between receivers and providers of genetic resources (Receiving Party and Providing 
Party, respectively) 
 - that the interests of all participating parties need to be respected and realised in order to vitalise the 
CBD. 
 
The VFA´s understanding of such collaborations under the CBD is that those need to result in exploit-
able outcomes. To enable the Pharmaceutical Industrie as a Receiving Party to optimally fulfil the 
above general criteria, several elements need to be prepared. We are convinced to herewith present 
thoroughly considered outlines, that should give a broad constructive basis for negotiations and estab-
lishments of fruitful collaborations to the advantage of all involved parties. 
 
Prerequisites / Needs / Expectations / Supportive Elements. 
1. Legal prerequisites 
A legal basis for the access to Genetic Resources has to be established in the provider countries. This 
means i.e.: 
- national legislation in the provider countries and 
- identification of the ownership with respect to the local genetic 
resources which needs to be made transparent to the potential Receiving Party. 
 
It is desirable that provider countries agree on harmonised national legislations, which follow interna-
tional standards at least with respect to the most important issues in the process of access and benefit 
sharing. 
The Receiving Party definitely needs legal and general safety that any signed contracts remain en-
forceable. Regarding governing law, a suitable arbitration arrangement may be appropriate for all par-
ties involved. The Receiving Party needs to have one clearly identified and fully authorised local, re-
gional or state institutional legal body representing the legal and collaboration partner for each collabo-
ration as Providing Party. The Receiving Party itself is not in a position to support or develop local, 
regional or national legislation. 
 
2. Requirements regarding the legal status and competence of the Providing Party 
As to each specific collaboration, the particular Providing Party needs 
- to be a strong and scientifically competent partner performing creative collaborations 
- to be authorised to represent all relevant rights of the local populations of the regional and national 
authorities 
- to be responsible – if so required – to arrange for “Prior Informed Consent” of the local and other 
relevant bodies. 
- to be authorised to negotiate legally binding contracts for individual collaborations 
- to be authorised and responsible for establishing corresponding legally binding contracts and for 
performing and executing those collaborations 
- to be fully responsible with respect to all obligations and all rights under a joint collaboration 
 
Taking into account the time needed to establish national corresponding legislation and infrastructure 
necessary to empower Providing Parties as identified above, interim solutions may be helpful to en-
able straight-forward collaboration arrangements. As interim solutions, “National Focal Points” or 
equivalent institutions may act as Providing Parties. In principle, however, “National Focal Points” or 
equivalent institutions should take responsibilities as highly qualified contact and information institu-
tions. 
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Flexibility in performing collaborations 
Depending on the needs, interests and capabilities of the involved parties, quite different types and 
intensities of collaborations will deem appropriate, which consequently will reflect different contribu-
tions and compensations. Any rigid and compulsory standardised guidelines ruling the collaboration 
which do not allow individual bilateral contracts would be therefore counter-productive to the efficiency 
and flexibility of any collaboration. 
 
For illustration, below some typical examples of collaborations 
qualified by increasing contributions are listed: 
- sampling and providing of genetic resources 
Providing Party: collectors and people involved in sample processing (e. g. drying, grinding) without 
special education, one or few taxonomist(s); 
- providing of samples obtained from systematic sampling and 
sophisticated taxonomic characterisation, 
identification of collecting area in order to ensure for re-sampling, cartography; Providing Party: collec-
tors with special knowledge (taxonomy, ecology) 
- research co-operations, 
including – beyond pure sampling and characterisation – additional activities like extraction, isolation 
of pure compounds, conservation, cultivation and/or biological testing; 
- Joint co-operative partnerships where both parties actively contribute in research and development. 
 
The order of those four examples of collaborations are representing an increase in duration value, 
compensation, Know-How-transfer and added value of the sample. 
 
Rights in results 
The Receiving Party definitely needs to have undivided, exclusive ownership in all results of the col-
laboration (and all received samples from genetic resources). The ownership in intellectual rights de-
veloped from the collaboration will be treated according to the patent law. The Receiving Party needs 
to have the right to apply for patent applications in its own name. The Providing Party will have the 
right to use the results of the collaboration for its own research and for purposes of conservation of 
Biological Diversity according to individual contract provisions. The Providing Party will have the right 
to use the Know-how transferred under the collaboration for its own research and for use in other col-
laborations according to individual contract provisions. 
 
Compensation of contributions to collaborations 
Any compensation will take into account and appreciate the extent of the contribution of all parties 
regarding discovery and use of the bioactive principle as well as the relative contribution of this dis-
covery to the subsequent development of the commercial products. Flexibility in the creation of com-
pensation elements should be ensured. Compensation should be structured flexible and individually 
by way of adequate non-monetary and monetary benefits according to the needs and interests of the 
parties, to be mutually agreed upon by the partners. Below, some examples of potential elements of 
such compensation are given: 
 
Potential non-monetary elements of compensation: 
- Know-how transfer to allow for higher qualification, capacity building and further development of the 
Providing Partner, e. g. by exchange and training of scientists and scientific staff 
- training and education to support the collaboration and to enable for the local conservation of Bio-
logical Diversity, as for example by establishing ex-situ collections 
- Providing/ donations of laboratory and other equipment and integration into the collaboration 
- Joint research activities, joint scientific publications, patents  
 
Potential monetary elements of compensation 
- Initial payments to enable for preparing the infrastructure for sampling and for establishing capacities 
and organisation of cooperation 
- Effort towards adding value to the collected sample 
- Consecutive payments for compensating the efforts in performing collaboration 
 
All those above mentioned potential monetary and non-monetary elements of compensation represent 
risk-free immediate rewards and advantages to the Providing Party, because those will flow inde-
pendent of any commercial value for the Receiving Party. There are other potential ways of monetary 
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compensations mentioned below which may be agreed upon which imply “Share of Risk” of both 
parties: 
 
- Milestone payments for further development steps 
- Success fee (participation in sales of a marketed product, “royalty payments”). Any such success fee 
would only come up after market entry of the product, which means a considerable number of years 
after the termination of a collaboration. 
 
It needs to be taken into consideration, that the last two mentioned elements for a potential monetary 
compensation bear a considerable risk. According to all previous experiences and taking into account 
the attrition rate of targets in drug development this means that such compensations will – with con-
siderably high probability – remain illusive. As mentioned before, the different elements and the 
amount of compensation have to be mutually agreed by the partners of a collaboration according to 
the individual needs and interests. 
 
10.2001 
